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Abstract
In this thesis we shall present and develop the concept of a theory machine. Theory
machines describe computation via logical systems, providing an overarching for-
malism for characterising computational systems such as Turing machines, type-2
machines, quantum computers, infinite time Turing machines, and various physical
computation devices.
Notably we prove that the class of finite problems that are computable by a
finite theory machine acting in first-order logic is equal to the class Turing machine
computable problems. Whereas the class infinite problems that are computable by
a finite first-order theory machine is equal to the class type-2 machine computable
problems.
A key property of a theory machine computation is that it does not have to occur
in a causally ordered manner. A consequence of this fact is that the class of problems
that are computable by finite first-order theory machine in polynomial resources is
equal to NP∩ co-NP. Since there are problems which appear to lie in NP∩ co-NP \
P that are efficiently solvable by a quantum computer (such as the factorisation
problem), this gives weight to the argument that there is an atemporal/non-causal
component to the apparent speed-up offered by quantum computers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Computation is a kind of magic, a mathematician can write a few
a lines on a piece of paper and point to a patch of sky and say; there is
a new plant.” -Vladimir Kisil
In 1936 Turing published his famous paper [67] in which he defined what he called
automatic machines but what we now call the Turing machine [27], which mathe-
matically formulated the process of a person or machine algorithmically deciding a
problem. However Turing was not the first to describe a mathematical formulation
of computation, in the 1930’s Church described his lambda calculus [23, 24], and
prior to this the theory of general recursive functions had been developed [20, 27].
Notably, the class of problems that can be computed by a Turing machine is
equal to the class of problems that are effectively calculable via Lambda calculus,
which is in turn equal to the class of problems that are recursive [27, 67]. Therefore,
despite being quite different from each other these three models of computation are
in a sense equivalent to one another.
This equivalence lead to what is now known as the Church-Turing thesis [27, 29,
67], which is often rendered as:
“Every effectively calculable function is computable by a Turing machine.”
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The Church-Turing thesis seems to suggest that any computational system that
we can compute with is at most as computationally powerful as a Turing machine.
Indeed modern digital computers have the same computational power as Turing
machines [27].
Suppose that we have arbitrary physical system S, the Church-Turing thesis seems
to imply that if we were to use S to carry out a computation then we should only
be able to compute Turing machine computable problems with S. However a Tur-
ing machine computation is defined is in a very particular way, whereas since S is
arbitrary it is not immediately apparent what a computation on S actually is. It is
therefore not entirely clear why such a computation should be bounded by what is
Turing machine computable.
Remark 1.0.1 By physical system, we mean a system that exists or could be made
to exist in the real world. Computing with a physical system should then involve
being able to input data into the system (by adjusting the locations or properties
of the objects within said system) so that we may reliably observe an output from
the system that provides a solution to some problem of ours. Examples of physical
computation systems include a table of ball bearings and grooves [13], a screen
diffracting a ray of light [17], a slide rule [7], and indeed a normal digital computer.
Computation is typically thought of as a discrete sequential process that is governed
by an algorithm [42], but for such a process to make sense in S the relevant evolution
in S would have to happen in accordance to a discrete, ordered, and acyclic notion
of time. Not only does this effectively preclude computers which make use of closed
time loops [5] (see Subsection 1.1.1 for details), it also does not accurately reflect
our understanding of many real-world physical systems. For example, if we want to
describe the action of a fluid-mechanical system we use a set of differential equations
such as the Navier-Stokes equations [55]. However, such a description does not tell us
directly how the system evolves at each moment in time, and since there remains no
general solution to the Navier-Stokes equations, we are in general unable to extract
an algorithm detailing its evolution.
2
Figure 1.1: MONIAC, located in the science museum, London (Picture copyright:
Richard Whyman)
An example of a fluid-based computer is the monetary national income analogue
computer (MONIAC) [14] (Figure 1) which utilises water and a collection of con-
tainers and valves to simulate the UK economy.
Now the quantum computer [50, 59, 63] is an example of a physical computation
system which does appear to act in accordance to a discrete, ordered, and acyclic
notion of time. However the manner in which quantum computers compute is quite
different to how a Turing machine computes (see Sections 2.2 and 2.4 for details), and
though a Turing machine is able to simulate any quantum computation [50, 59], the
simulation appears to be far more complex than the original computation. Indeed,
whilst the class of problems that are computable by a quantum computer is equal
to the class of Turing machine computable problems, the class of problems that are
feasibly computable by a quantum computer appears to be larger that of a Turing
machine [63].
Going beyond systems that are clearly physically realisable, there are many ex-
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amples of computational systems that are more powerful than a Turing machine.
Perhaps the most reasonable of these is the type-2 machine of computable analysis
[71, 72]. A type-2 machine is essentially a Turing machine that has been modified to
have infinite inputs and outputs (see Section 2.3 for details). Hence type-2 machines
can clearly compute problems that are not Turing machine computable.
Type-2 machines are also capable of computing with real numbers, as each real
number can be encoded as an infinite word via its binary expansion. However, a key
aspect of type-2 machines is that at every finite stage the output of a computation
is computable by a regular Turing machine. So in this sense a type-2 machine can
be simulated by a Turing machine, and so in some respects a type-2 machine is not
more powerful than a Turing machine and the existence of a such a device in the
real world would not violate the Church-Turing thesis. However this also means
that a type-2 machine is in general unable to decide whether two real numbers are
equal to one another, as whilst 0.999 . . . = 1, if a = 0.999 . . . and b = 1.000 . . . then
a type-2 machine cannot know that a = b by looking at only a finite number of the
symbols in a and b.
Another form of super-Turing computer is the Blum-Shub-Smale (BSS) machine
[22, 52], which performs algebraic computations over an arbitrary (ordered) ring.
The BSS machine was devised by Blum, Shub, and Smale in 1989 [18, 19]. Unlike
a type-2 machine, a BSS machine that acts over the real numbers R is capable of
deciding whether two arbitrary real numbers are equal to one another in a single
step. Conversely, type-2 machines are able to compute the real exponential function,
but a real BSS machine cannot [22], so in some sense they are incomparable.
In 2000 Hamkins and Lewis presented the infinite time Turing (ITT) machine
[43, 44] which acts like a Turing machine but is able to compute in an ordinal
number of time steps (see Section 2.5 for details). ITT machines are capable of
computing any type-2 machine computable problem, as well as any arithmetical
relation (Theorem 7.2.5). Which means that ITT machines are even more powerful
than type-2 machines, and BSS machines, and are able to decide problems that a
Turing machine has no way of computing.
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Some infinite computations that occur in the manner of an ITT machine may in
fact be physically realisable. As it is has been proposed [57] that a computer passing
through the event horizon of a black hole and into another universe could in theory
compute a problem in finite time (from the appropriate observer’s perspective) that
is not Turing machine computable.
In recent work Beggs and Tucker have proposed various physical experiments that
could, in theory, be used to compute problems which are not Turing computable
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Arguing that with unbounded precision such experiments should
be able to efficiently decide any problem in P/ log ?. A mathematical formalisation
of these experimental processes was given by us in [73]1.
Beyond this, in 2012 Koepke and Seyfferth [52] combined BSS and ITT machines
to obtain infinite time Blum-Shub-Smale machines, which are able to compute any
sets of real numbers in the Lωω level of Go¨del’s constructible universe. Going even
further Koepke and Koerwien in [51] presented the concept of an ordinal computer,
which acts like a Turing machine but has tapes of ordinal length and acts in an
ordinal number of time steps. Ordinal computers are capable of deciding any set of
ordinals in the whole of the constructible universe L [51].
So given everything we have mentioned above, it can be seen that there exist
multiple different mathematical formalisms which claim to describe some form of
computation. Some of these formalisms are inequivalent to one another, some of
these formalisms claim to describe some form of “physical” computation, and some
of these “physical” computation systems are inequivalent to each other. However
what does not appear to defined is an overarching computational formalism that
would allow one to characterise any of these forms of computation, as well as enable
one to compare different computational systems to one another.
In this document we present the concept of a theory machine2, which is intended
to provide this overarching computational formalism, and allow us to characterise
1In should be noted that the mathematical formalism presented in [73] will not be appearing
in this document.
2Despite the similar name, theory machines are not related to the concept of a “logic theory
machine” found in [58].
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any form of computational system. Theory machines are inspired by (and serve as
a generalisation of) Gurevich’s concept of a sequential algorithm [42], and Hosman
et al.’s reasoning on physical computation [48] (both of which we describe below).
We originally presented theory machines in our paper Physical Computation and
First-Order Logic [75] and further developed the concept in our paper An Atemporal
Model of Physical Complexity [74]. The formal definition of a theory machine will
be given in Chapter 4.
1.1 Sequential and Non-sequential Algorithms
In attempt to characterise the computational processes required to implement any
deterministic sequential algorithm Gurevich introduced the concept of a sequential
abstract state machine in Logic and the Challenge of Computer Science [41]. Gure-
vich further demonstrated in Sequential abstract-state machines capture sequential
algorithms [42] that every sequential algorithm can be step-for-step simulated by an
appropriate sequential abstract state machine.
Gurevich’s proof of this result depended on the assertion that a sequential algo-
rithm should satisfy the following 3 postulates [42]:
1. Sequential time: Each sequential algorithm A is associated with a set of states
S(A), a set of initial states I(A) ⊆ S(A), and a one-step transformation τA :
S(A)→ S(A), which evolves A in discrete time steps.
2. Abstract state: S(A) and I(A) are each sets of first-order structures with
the same finite vocabulary Υ that are closed under isomorphism. The one-
step transformation τA does not change the domain of any state, and any
isomorphism from a state X ∈ S(A) to a state Y ∈ S(A) is also an isomorphism
from τA(X) to τA(Y ).
3. Bounded exploration: There exists a finite set of Υ-ground terms1 T such that
1Definition 3.1.8
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if X, Y ∈ S(A) coincide over T then the differences between X and τA(X) are
the same as the differences between Y and τA(Y ).
A computation of a sequential algorithm A is then a finite or infinite sequence of
states X0, X1, X2, . . . from S(A), where X0 ∈ I(A) and τ(Xi) = Xi+1 for all i ∈ N.
Gurevich justified the first part of the second postulate by arguing that “The
huge experience of mathematical logic and its applications indicates that any static
mathematical situation can be faithfully described as a first-order structure.” Be-
fore noting that second-order and higher-order structures can be described in terms
of many-sorted first-order structures. Indeed sequential algorithms can still be de-
scribed using higher order logic, it is just the states that use the semantics of first-
order logic.
Notably, the first postulate was not directly justified by Gurevich in [42], instead
it serves as more of a definition than an assertion. Now it does make sense that a
sequential algorithm should have an associated collection of states/configurations,
with some of them corresponding to input states. However the association with
a discrete one-step transformation only appears to follow from the fact that only
sequential algorithms are considered.
We believe that whilst Gurevich’s algorithmic postulates all make sense for de-
scribing a classical machine-based computational process, the sequential time pos-
tulate and its one-step transformation is not sufficiently general for describing all
forms of physical computation. This is because crucially the transformation expects
that a physical system’s evolution is discrete. Not only does this not fit with our
continuous experience of the world, but it also assumes that a classical notion of
time is present and acts independently of the physical system in an unchanging,
acyclic manner.
Our belief is further justified by the fact that algorithms that are not constrained
by a discrete unchanging notion of time have been defined. In Axiomatising analog
algorithms [21] Bournez, Dershowitz, and Ne´ron defined the analog algorithm, which
is a generalisation Gurevich’s sequential algorithms to contexts where the states
7
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(which are still first-order structures) evolve over a totally ordered monoid (for
example the monoid R>0). Thereby enabling a characterisation of continuously
evolving computational scenarios.
Though Bournez et al.’s analog algorithms do provide a characterisation of con-
tinuous computation, they are still limited. As since totally ordered monoids are
necessarily acyclic (that is, time is not allowed to loop), Bournez et al.’s analog
algorithms are unable to characterise a computation on a closed time-like curve.
This is a problem as closed time-like curves exist as solutions to Einstein’s theory
of general relativity [38], which suggests that we should also be able to implement
a physical computation system on such a curve [32].
1.1.1 Non-causal Circuit Algorithms
Now computation on a closed time-like curve may, at first, appear to be logically
impossible as a closed time-like computer could output in such a way so as to
prevent its computation from ever being initiated, leading to a paradox. A second
issue is that computing on a closed time-like curve could lead to an “ex nihilo”1 [5]
appearance of some uncomputed piece of information. For example, a closed time-
like computer could output a proof of whether P = NP, a user might then check
that the proof is correct, before inputting it back into the computer, and sending
the proof back in time to be outputted. The proof is given, but there is no clear
answer as to where it actually came from.
In Computational tameness of classical non-causal models Baumeler and Wolf [5],
described a model of computation on closed time-like curves in which these issues
are overcome by assuming that any such computation is uniquely determined and
logically consistent. Uniqueness ensures that any uncomputed information cannot
appear without being a necessary result of the process, whereas logical consistency
necessarily prevents a paradox from occurring.
Specifically, they defined a deterministic non-causal circuit algorithm A to be a
1Out of nothing.
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deterministic algorithm which on any input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ produces a Boolean circuit
Cx in which there exists a unique y ∈ {0, 1}∗ that is a fixed point of Cx. That is,
Cx(y) = y. If y = 1z for some z ∈ {0, 1}∗ then A accepts x, otherwise A rejects x.
Baumeler and Wolf proved that the computational power of polynomially time
deterministic non-causal circuit algorithms is equal to UP ∩ co-UP (see Definitions
2.2.12 and 2.2.13 for details), and every problem that is decidable by a deterministic
non-causal circuit algorithm is Turing machine computable. So not only is their
non-causal computation non-paradoxical, it also does not violate the Church-Turing
thesis.
Notably, there exist problems in UP ∩ co-UP that are efficiently solvable by a
quantum computer but have no known polynomial time Turing machine algorithm,
such as the factorisation problem [63] (see Section 2.2 for details). This suggests
that there may be a non-causal component to the quantum computational speed-up.
Therefore, given all of this, following the arguments of Gurevich and Bournez et
al. theory machine computations will occur on logical structures. However, rather
than describing each computation as a discrete ordered sequence of structures, in
a theory machine the whole of a computation is described via a single consistent
structure. Hence any temporal evolution of the machine is described within this
structure, and may take on a variety of forms. Indeed, as we shall demonstrate,
the inclusion of the evolution within the structure itself allows a theory machine to
compute in a consistent non-causal or atemporal manner.
1.2 Constraints on Physical Computation
The algorithmic notions described above each provide abstract descriptions of po-
tential computational processes. But what they do not make clear is when a given
algorithm can be actually realised by a physical system. Indeed, there might exist
physical computational processes that are not describable (or at least not faithfully
describable) by such algorithms.
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A framework for discussing physically realisable computation was put forward in
When does a physical system compute? [48] by Horsman, Stepney, Wagner, and
Kendon. Horsman et al.’s central assertion was that for any physical system to be
computationally usable, a user must possess a representation relation R from the
system to some numerical/logical/linguistic abstraction, reasoning that “without a
way of describing objects abstractly, we cannot do science.” To then compute with
this physical system the user must have a theory T that describes how the system
behaves within the abstraction.
The representation relation and the theory model the physical system, and to-
gether they are required to provide a “good” model of the system. So suppose that
p is an initial state of the system and R(p) is the abstract representation of the
system in state p. Let H be some physical dynamics and HT be the representation
of H within the abstract theory. The representation R and theory T then provide
a “good” model of the dynamics of the system if in general R(H(p)) ≈ HT(R(p)),
so in a sense, if R and H commute. Knowledge that this commutation relation
is true can be obtained by carrying out multiple experimental tests. However, a
user is naturally limited to being able to carry out only a finite number of these
tests. Hence for unbounded systems they can only ever be partially certain about
the correctness of their theory.
Further, the abstract representation and theory should allow the user to predict
the output of the physical computer from any given input. Horsman et al. stressed
that “Without this predictive element, a physical system is not a computer... If a
computational description of a physical evolution can only be applied post-hoc, then
the system has not acted as a computer.” [48] So a user cannot carry out a physical
process on a system and then pick a computational representation for the system.
For example, let f : N→ N be an arbitrary function that is not Turing machine
computable, and let M be a simple Turing machine that on any input x ∈ {0, 1}∗
outputs x0. Through a post-hoc description we would be able to make M compute
f . As for any n ∈ N we can take x ∈ {0, 1}∗ to represent n and interpret x0 as
representing f(n). It would then by the case that on input n the Turing machine
10
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M outputs f(n) despite M not really doing anything.
We believe that Horsman et al.’s approach is, for the most part, the “correct”
approach to physical computation. As it is surely the case that a user is unable to
compute with a physical system without some prior theoretical understanding of it.
They cannot simply push a button and just hope that their physical computer gives
them the correct output.
However, Horsman et al.’s formalism is not particularly explicit, they do not
specify any general conditions about how the abstraction of a physical system may
be presented. This was of course a deliberate choice, humanity as a whole does
not have a complete understanding of physics, so there was no sense in Horsman
et al. proposing unjustifiable constraints on their representations. But beyond
clearly defining what is not physical computation, Horsman et al.’s generality does
unfortunately prevent further conclusions from being drawn about what is achievable
(both feasibly and in principal) with physical computation.
Theory machines are intended to be able characterise any possible physical com-
putation system. To ensure that this is the case we shall try to make theory machines
be as general as possible, so as to not preclude any forms of physical computation.
However this does mean that some of the computational systems that are character-
isable may well be “unphysical”. This is less of a bug and more of a feature of our
formalism, as it allows us to also consider hypercomputational frameworks such as
infinite time Turing machines and Blum-Shub-Smale machines. Thereby enabling
us to see where the boundary between the physical computation and unphysical
computation lies.
The generality of theory machines does not conflict with Horsman et al.’s key
ideas. Indeed they do note that the inverse of the representation relation, an instan-
tiation from the abstract to physical, is unlikely to always exist, stating that “there
is no a priori reason to suppose that there is a physical system corresponding to
every model.” However in Chapter 8 we do consider a restricted version of theory
machines, which we call finite first-order theory machines. We prove that computa-
tional systems characterisable by finite first-order theory machines are computation-
11
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ally equivalent to Turing machines. Therefore if we assume that the Church-Turing
thesis is true and also applies to physical computation, then any physical computa-
tional device may be characterised by a finite first-order theory machine.
1.2.1 Other Uses for our Formalism
Another benefit of our theory machine formalism is that it provides a general way
of looking at physical complexity.
Though it has been argued [70] that the class of problems which are feasibly
computable by a physical system should be equal to the class of problems that are
efficiently computable by a Turing machine (denoted by P). The fact that quantum
computers appear to be able to feasibly decide problems that are not believed to lie
in P, such as the factorisation problem [63], appears to suggest this equality is false.
Further, in [16, 17] Blakey described a collection of classical physical devices that
are capable of solving the factorisation problem in polynomially bounded space and
time. However, Blakey argued that, unlike quantum factorisers, his factorisation
systems are not feasibly realisable, as the precision needed to implement his systems
is required to grow exponentially with the size of the input.
Indeed Blakey argued that “unconventional computers warrant unconventional
complexity analysis” and that the general resource usage of physical computation
should be measured in more than just time and space alone. For example the energy
or precision required by a computation should also be considered.
As we shall see in Chapter 9 theory machines provide us with a natural way of
describing the general resource usage of a computation. We then argue that since
finite first-order theory machines appear to be able to characterise any physical
computational process, a problem is feasibly computable by such a process only if it
may be characterised by a theory machine with polynomial resource usage. Notably,
we prove in Chapter 9 that the class of problems that can be computed by a finite
first-order theory machine with polynomial resources is exactly NP∩co-NP. Theory
machines are able to achieve this feat by efficiently computing in an atemporal/non-
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causal manner. Since problems such as the factorisation problem appear to lie
in NP ∩ co-NP \ P, this gives additional weight to the argument that there is an
atemporal/non-causal component to the quantum computational speed-up.
Besides complexity, our formalism also serves as an actualisation of the concept
of model-based computation put forward by Beebe and Ulmann in Model-based
computation [7, 68]. The idea behind model-based computation is that in order to
compute the solution to a given problem we use a a system which acts in a manner
that is analogous to the problem. For example a scale model of a physical process
acts in analogous manner to that process and we can use the model to answer
questions about the physical process (see Remark 5.2.1 for details).
1.3 Outline of this Document
The remainder of this document is structured as follows.
• In Chapter 2 we define various standard computational frameworks that are
considered in this document.
• In Chapter 3 we give the definition of a logical system. We also give the specific
definitions of each of the logical systems used in this document. Further, we
define what it means for a logical system to be complete.
• In Chapter 4 we define our principal concept, the theory machine. We also
define what it means for a theory machine to compute decision and function
problems.
• In Chapter 5 we give examples of theory machines. In particular we explain
how theory machines may be used to characterise Turing machines, type-2
machines, and physical systems which are defined via a collection of differential
equations.
• In Chapter 6 we discuss the properties of theory machines, as well as how
we may combine two theory machines. We also prove in Theorems 6.1.9 and
13
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6.1.12 that if LS is a logical system which contains first-order logic, then the
class of problems computable by a finite LS-theory machine is closed under
functional concatenation as well as union and intersection.
• In Chapter 7 we give further examples of theory machines, detailing how theory
machines may be used to characterise quantum computers, and infinite time
Turing machines.
• In Chapter 8 we discuss computation with finite first-order theory machines,
and finite LS-theory machines in which LS is a complete logical system. We
prove in Theorem 8.2.1 that, for finite problems, the computational power of
such theory machines is equivalent to that of a Turing machine. Whereas in
Theorem 8.3.3 we prove that for general problems their power is equivalent to
that of a type-2 machine. This leads us to argue that these theory machines
are able to characterise an arbitrary physical computation system.
• In Chapter 9 we define a concept of complexity for theory machines. We prove
in Theorem 9.3.1 that the class of problems that are computable by a finite
first-order theory machine with polynomial resources is NP ∩ co-NP.
• In Chapter 10 we conclude and discuss further work.
• In the Appendix A we define the various sets of axioms, such as the integer
successor axioms, that are used repeatedly in this document.
• The end of this document features the references followed by the index.
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Computation Preliminaries
The following definitions are presented for the purposes of clarity and completeness,
and may be mostly skim-read by a familiar reader.
Definitions 2.0.1 Let A be a finite set of symbols, we call such a set an alphabet.
The set of words of A length n ∈ N is:
An = {a1a2 . . . an | a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ A}.
The set of finite words of A is then:
A∗ =
⋃
n∈N
An.
The set of infinite words of A is the set:
Aω = {a1a2 . . . | a1, a2, . . . ∈ A}.
The length of a finite word is the number of symbols it contains, if w = b1b2 . . . bm
then we denote the length of w by |w| = m.
Let v = c1c2 . . . ∈ A∗ ∪ Aω, the concatenation of w and v is the word wv =
b1b2 . . . bmc1c2 . . ..
For any a ∈ A we denote the word of length n which consists entirely of a’s by
an, and the infinite word consisting entirely of a’s by aω.
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Definitions 2.0.2 A total function f : A → B is a map that is defined for every
element of A.
A partial function f from A to B is a total function from some subset C ⊆ A to
B. That is, f(x) may not be defined for some x ∈ A. We then write f :⊆ A → B
for this partial function and denote the set of elements of A for which f is defined
by dom(f), which we refer to as the domain of f .
2.1 Computability Theory
Definitions 2.1.1 [4, 27, 65, 67] A Turing machine M has a single two-way infinite
tape (Figure 2.1) divided into squares (also referred to as cells). At each moment in
time each cell contains a single symbol from the tape’s alphabet. The machine has
a head which at any moment in time points to exactly one of the tape cells. If the
cell pointed to by the head at a given moment in time contains the symbol a then
we say that the head is reading a at this moment in time. The machine also has
a finite set of internal states and at each moment in time the Turing machine is in
one of these states.
A configuration of a Turing machine then consists of the contents of the tape, the
current internal state of the machine and the position of the head. The inputs of a
Turing machine are finite words taken from specified input alphabet. At time 0 the
machine begins in a specified initial state with the input written on the tape from
left to right, and the head pointing to the cell containing the leftmost symbol of the
input. The remaining tape cells at time 0 are taken to be blank, however for clarity
it useful to refer to such cells as containing the blank symbol of the tape alphabet.
The blank symbol is not part of the input alphabet, hence from looking at the tape
it is clear where the input word starts and ends.
To evolve the configuration from one time step to the next the machine follows
a finite set of rules. At each time step the machine checks its internal state, reads
the contents of the cell pointed to by the head, and implements one of its rules
accordingly.
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Some of the Turing machine’s internal states are specified to be halting states,
and if the machine enters one of these states then it halts, meaning that it produces
an output and ceases to evolve.
A Turing machine is represented by a 7-tuple M = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, H,R) where:
• Λ is a finite alphabet of tape symbols,
• Π is a finite set of internal states,
• b ∈ Λ is the blank tape symbol,
• A ⊆ (Λ \ b) is a finite alphabet of input symbols,
• s0 ∈ Π is the initial state,
• H = 〈s〉 or 〈s, t〉 for halting states s, t ∈ Π,
• R is a set of Turing machine rules.
Each rule in R is of the form:
(t, b;u, c, p) ∈ (Π \H)× Λ× Π× Λ× {LEFT, PAUSE,RIGHT},
which is read as “if the machine is in internal state t reading b then go to state u,
replace the symbol being pointed to with c, and have the tape head perform the
operation p.” With p = LEFT standing for “move one square left”, p = PAUSE
for “stay in the same tape square” and p = RIGHT for “move one square right”.
We call a Turing machine M a deterministic Turing machine if for any two rules
(t, b;u, c, p), (t′, b′;u′, c′, p′) ∈ R we have:
((t, b) = (t′, b′))⇒ ((u, c, p) = (u′, c′, p′)).
So at each moment in time at most one rule may be implemented by M . In this
document, unless otherwise mentioned, all our Turing machines will be deterministic.
If H = 〈sa, sr〉 for some sa, sr ∈ Π then M carries out a decision process, and
we call sa the accepting state and sr the rejecting state. Suppose that M is a
17
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· · · b b 1 0 1 1 0 0 b b · · ·
Figure 2.1: An input configuration of a single-tape Turing machine.
· · · 0 b 0 1 1 0 b 0 1 b · · ·
Figure 2.2: If a Turing machine carrying out the computation of a function halted
in the above configuration then its output would be 110.
deterministic Turing machine. If on a given input w ∈ A∗ the machine eventually
halts in the accepting state then the output of M is that it “accepts” w, whereas if
it eventually halts in the rejecting state then the output of M is that it “rejects” w.
If H = 〈s1〉 for some s1 ∈ Π then M carries out the computation of a function.
If on a given input w ∈ A∗ the machine reaches s1 then the output of M consists of
the word written on the tape from the right of the tape cell pointed to by the head
up to but not including the first blank symbol (See Figure 2.1). This output word
is then denoted by M(w). If M never reaches a halting state from input w then this
output is undefined.
Definition 2.1.2 Let a ∈ {∗, ω}. A decision problem is a subset A ⊆ Aa. If a = ∗
then A is a finite decision problem, otherwise if a = ω then A is an infinite decision
problem.
Definition 2.1.3 [65] Let M be a Turing machine with input alphabet A. We say
that M computes a finite decision problem A ⊆ A∗ if for any w ∈ A∗ we have:
(w ∈ A ⇐⇒ M accepts w) and (w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ M rejects w).
If there exists a Turing machine that computes A then we say that A is Turing
machine computable.
Definition 2.1.4 Let a, b ∈ {∗, ω}. A function problem is a partial function f :⊆
Aa → Bb from a set of words Aa to a set of words Bb. If a, b = ∗ then f is a finite
function problem.
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Definition 2.1.5 [65] Let M be a Turing machine with input alphabet A and blank
symbol b 6∈ B. We say that M computes a finite function problem f :⊆ A∗ → B∗
if for any w ∈ dom(f) we have:
M(w) = f(w).
If there exists a Turing machine that computes f then we say that f is Turing
machine computable.
The condition above that the blank symbol of M is not part of B is a necessity
as it is not possible for a Turing machine to output a word that contains its blank
symbol.
Remark 2.1.6 Since a Turing machine program is finite, in a given alphabet there
is a countable number of possible Turing machine programs. However the sets of pos-
sible decision problems and possible function problems are both uncountable. Which
means that there must exist problems that are not Turing machine-computable.
Definition 2.1.7 A finite problem is either a finite decision problem or a finite
function problem. A general problem is either a decision problem or a function
problem.
Definition 2.1.8 [65] A multi-tape Turing machine Mm is a Turing machine with
m > 2 tapes (Figure 2.1), each with their own head. At time 0 the input is written
on only the first tape, with every other cell starting off blank.
A multi-tape Turing machine is represented by the 7-tupleMm = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, H,P)
where as in Definition 2.1.1; Λ is a finite alphabet of tape symbols, Π is a finite set
of internal states, b ∈ Λ is the blank tape symbol, A ⊆ (Λ\b) is a finite alphabet of
input symbols, s0 ∈ Π is the initial state, and H is a 1 or 2-tuple of halting states.
Though unlike a Turing machine, P is a set of multi-tape Turing machine rules.
Each multi-tape Turing machine rule in P is of the form:
(t,~b;u,~c, ~p) ∈ (Π \H)× Λm × Π× Λm × {LEFT, PAUSE,RIGHT}m,
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· · · 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 · · ·
· · · 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 b 1 0 · · ·
... ...
· · · 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 b 1 1 · · ·
Figure 2.3: A multi-tape Turing machine configuration.
which is read as “if the machine is in internal state t reading ~b from the tapes then
go to state u, replace the symbols being pointed to with ~c, and have the tape head
perform the operation ~p on the tapes.”
If Mm is computing a function then the output is written on the mth tape.
Slightly unusually, here we shall take the output to be the word written rightwards
from the cell where mth tape head is at time 01. The output word of Mm on input
w ∈ A∗ is denoted by Mm(w).
Like with Turing machines, the multi-tape Turing machines in this document will
be deterministic, so for any (t,~b;u,~c, ~p), (t′,~b′;u′,~c′, ~p′) ∈ P we have:
((t,~b) = (t′,~b′))⇒ ((u,~c, ~p) = (u′,~c′, ~p′)).
Remark 2.1.9 For any alphabet A, if |A| > 2 then for any n ∈ N there exists a
computable bijective function 〈·, . . . , ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
×n
〉 : ∏ni=1A∗ → A∗ which encodes elements of∏n
i=1A
∗ as elements of A∗.
We can therefore represent a multi-input decision problem C ⊆∏ni=1A∗ as single-
input decision problem D ⊆ A∗ such that for any (w1, . . . , wn) ∈
∏n
i=1A
∗:
(w1, . . . , wn) ∈ C ⇐⇒ 〈w1, . . . , wn〉 ∈ D.
1We define the output of a multi-tape Turing machine in this somewhat unusual way as later
it will allow us to more easily describe type-2 machines (Definition 2.3.1) and infinite time Turing
machines (Definition 2.5.4).
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Similarly we may represent a multi-input and output function problem g :⊆∏n
i=1A
∗ → ∏mj=1B∗ as single-input and output function problem h :⊆ A∗ → B∗
such that for any (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ dom(h):
g(w1, . . . , wn) = (v1, . . . , vm) ⇐⇒ h(〈w1, . . . , wn〉) = 〈v1, . . . , vm〉.
Definitions 2.1.10 A relation problem is a subset R ⊆∏ni=1A∗.
R is computable if there exists some Turing machine M with input alphabet A
such that for any (w1, . . . , wn) ∈
∏n
i=1A
∗:
((w1, . . . , wn) ∈ R ⇐⇒ M accepts 〈w1, . . . , wn〉),
and:
((w1, . . . , wn) 6∈ R ⇐⇒ M rejects 〈w1, . . . , wn〉).
Definition 2.1.11 [27] Let Σ00 = Π
0
0 = ∆
0
0 be the class of computable relations.
For each n ∈ N let:
• Σ0n+1 the class of relations of the form R(~x) ≡ ∃~yP (~x, ~y) for some P ∈ Π0n.
• Π0n+1 the class of relations of the form R(~x) ≡ ∀~yP (~x, ~y) for some P ∈ Σ0n.
• ∆0n = Σ0n ∩ Π0n.
We then say that a relation R is arithmetical if R ∈ ⋃n∈N(Σ0n ∪ Π0n).
Theorem 2.1.12 [27] For all n ∈ N:
Σ0n,Π
0
n ⊂ ∆0n+1 ⊂ Σ0n+1,Π0n+1.
Also:
Σ0n 6= Π0n.
Hence every relation problem in
⋃
n∈N(Σ
0
n∪Π0n)\∆00 is not Turing machine-computable.
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2.2 Complexity Theory
The definitions appearing in this section, unless otherwise mentioned, can also be
found in [4].
Definition 2.2.1 Let t : N→ N be an increasing function1. A deterministic Turing
machine M with input alphabet A computes in time t if for any w ∈ A∗ the number
of time steps between time 0 and the time at which M on input w reaches a halting
state is at most t(|w|).
Definition 2.2.2 Let u : N→ N be an increasing function. A deterministic Turing
machine M with input alphabet A computes in space u if for any w ∈ A∗ the number
of tape cells that are used in a computation2 with input w is at most u(|w|).
Remark 2.2.3 Clearly if M computes in time t then on any input w the number
of tape cells that are used in the computation is at most t(|w|) + |w| as the machine
cannot visit more than one tape cell at each time step.
Notation 2.2.4 Let f, g : N→ N be functions, we write:
f(n) = O(g(n)),
if there exists c,N ∈ N such that for any n > N we have f(n) 6 c× g(n).
Definition 2.2.5 A function p : N → N is a polynomial function if there is some
k ∈ N such that p(n) = O(nk).
Definition 2.2.6 A finite word problem A ⊆ A∗ is polynomial time computable if
there exist a Turing machine M and polynomial function p such that M computes
A in time p.
We denote the class of polynomial time computable word problems by P.
1That is, for any m,n ∈ N, if m 6 n then t(m) 6 t(n).
2We say that a tape cell is used if it either contains part of the input or at some point in time
during the computation the head of the machine points to that cell
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Definition 2.2.7 Let M = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, H,R) be such that for some rules (s, a; k,
b, p), (s, a; k′, b′, p′) ∈ R we have ((k, b, p) 6= (k′, b′, p′)). Clearly M is not a determin-
istic Turing machine and so we refer to M as a non-deterministic Turing machine.
So if at a given moment in time M is in state s and its head is reading a then either
the rule (s, a; k, b, p) or the rule (s, a; k′, b′, p′) may be implemented by the machine.
Hence at the next moment in time there are at least two possible configurations
that M may be in. It is therefore possible that M may carry out multiple different
computations on the same input.
Let H = 〈sa, sr〉 then M carries out a non-deterministic decision process, with
accepting state sa and rejecting state sr. If for a given computation path of M
on input w ∈ A∗ the machine eventually halts in state sa then the output of this
computation path is that M “accepts” w. Whereas if on this computation path the
machine eventually halts in the rejecting state sr then the output of the computation
path is that M “rejects” w.
Definition 2.2.8 Let M be a non-deterministic Turing machine with input alpha-
bet A. We say that M computes a finite decision problem A ⊆ A∗ if for any w ∈ A∗
we have:
w ∈ A ⇐⇒ There exists a computation path of M on input w which accepts w,
and:
w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ Every computation path of M on input w rejects w.
So every computation of M on any input halts.
Definition 2.2.9 Let t : N → N be an increasing function. A non-deterministic
Turing machine N with input alphabet A computes in time t if for any w ∈ A∗ and
any computation of M on input w, the number of time steps between time 0 and
the time at which the computation reaches a halting step is at most t(|w|).
Definition 2.2.10 A word problem B ⊆ A∗ is non-deterministic polynomial time
computable if there exists a non-deterministic Turing machine N and polynomial
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function p such that N computes B in time p.
We denote the class of non-deterministic polynomial time computable word prob-
lems by NP.
Definition 2.2.11 A word problem C ⊆ A∗ is co-non-deterministic polynomial
time computable if there exists a non-deterministic Turing machine N and polyno-
mial function p such that N computes A∗ \ C in time p.
We denote the class of co-non-deterministic polynomial time computable word
problems by co-NP.
Definition 2.2.12 [5, 69] A word problemD ⊆ A∗ is unambiguous non-deterministic
polynomial time computable if there exists a non-deterministic Turing machine N
and polynomial function p such that N computes D in time p, and for any w ∈ D
the accepting computation for M on input w is unique.
We denote the class of unambiguous non-deterministic polynomial time com-
putable word problems by UP.
Definition 2.2.13 A word problem E ⊆ A∗ is co-unambiguous non-deterministic
polynomial time computable if there exists a non-deterministic Turing machine N
and polynomial function p such that N computes A∗ \ E in time p, and for any
w ∈ E the accepting computation for M on input w is unique.
We denote the class of co-unambiguous non-deterministic polynomial time com-
putable word problems by co-UP.
An important problem in complexity theory is the factorisation problem. The
factorisation problem is typically rendered as “given a number N ∈ N find a prime
factor of N”. As for any natural number N there exists a unique prime factorisation,
that is a collection of prime numbers p1, . . . , pl such that p1 × · · · × pl = N .
So the factorisation problem may be rendered as a function problem f : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗ such that if w ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a binary expansion of N ∈ N then f(w) = v, where
v is the binary expansion of one of p1, . . . , pl.
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However the factorisation problem may also be rendered as a decision problem
F ⊆ {0, 1}∗ such that for each 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ {0, 1}∗1, if w1 and w2 are binary expansions
of N ∈ N and K ∈ N respectively then 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ F if and only if there exists a
prime factor pi of N such that pi 6 K.
It is also known that F ∈ UP ∩ co-UP ⊆ NP ∩ co-NP [5].
2.3 Type-2 Machines
The type-2 machines of computable analysis [72] (Figure 2.3) generalise the concept
of a multi-tape Turing machine by enabling it to compute with infinite input words
and produce infinite output words.
Definition 2.3.1 [72] A type-2 machine T is a multi-tape machine (Definition
2.1.8) with m > 3 tapes, where the input and output word sets are of two pos-
sible types ∗ or ω. Like with multi-tape Turing machines, each input word of a
type-2 machine is placed on the first tape rightwards from the head position. If T ’s
input set is of type ∗ then every input word must be finite and followed by an infinite
sequence of blank cells. Whereas if T ’s input set is of type ω then every input word
must be infinite and fill the entirety of the first tape to the right of the head.
Rule-wise a type-2 machine behaves exactly like a multi-tape Turing machine
with m > 3 tapes. That it, the machine sequentially applies its multi-tape rules in
accordance to the contents of its tapes and its internal state.
If T ’s output set is of type ∗ then every output of T must be a finite word. So
like with a multi-tape Turing machine that computes a function, if T given input w
reaches the halting state then the output of T is the finite word written on tape m
to the right of the cell where the tape head started to the last non-blank symbol.
We denote the output of T given input w by T (w) and if T on input w never halts
then T (w) is undefined.
1Where as in Remark 2.1.9, 〈·, ·〉 is an encoding of {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ in {0, 1}∗.
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Conversely if T ’s output set is of type ω then every output of T must be an infinite
word. To output an infinite word a type-2 machine must compute forever without
halting, eventually filling every cell of tape m to the right of where the head started
with a non-blank output symbol. So T (w) is the infinite word of non-blank tape
symbols that are eventually written on tape m to the right of where the tape head
started. If T on input w eventually halts or does not eventually write a non-blank
symbol on every relevant tape cell, then T (w) is undefined.
The mth tape of T is write-only, and after each symbol is written the machine
moves right and never changes that symbol1. Whereas the input tape is read-only,
with the machine never moving leftwards on tape 12. The computation is then
carried out on the remaining tape(s).
A type-2 machine is then represented by the 9-tuple T = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, s1,P, a, b)
where a, b ∈ {∗, ω} describe the types of the input and output words sets respectively.
Whereas Λ,Π,b,A, s0, s1 and P are as they are in Definition 2.1.8 so; Λ is a finite
alphabet of tape symbols, Π is a finite set of internal states, b ∈ Λ is the blank tape
symbol, A ⊆ (Λ \b) is a finite alphabet of input symbols, s0 ∈ Π is the initial state,
s1 ∈ Π is the halting state, and P is a set of multi-tape Turing machine rules.
Remark 2.3.2 A key aspect of a type-2 machine is that we should be able to stop
the computation at any time and still obtain a portion of the output. However this
aspect would not make sense if we tried to carrying out a never-ending decision
process. As in such a process the machine should only ever output a clear “accept”
or “reject”. This is why here a type-2 machine is defined to only ever have one
halting state, as type-2 machines are typically used to carry out the computation of
functions and not the computation of decision problems.
Definition 2.3.3 Let T be a type-2 machine with input alphabet A, blank symbol
1This means that we could in theory stop a type-2 machine at any time step of its computation
and know that whatever T has already written on tape M must be a correct initial segment of the
output word.
2Such a restriction allows for the output tape of one type-2 machine to used as the input tape
of another.
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1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 · · ·
· · · 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 · · ·
... ...
· · · 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 · · ·
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 · · ·
M
Figure 2.4: A type-2 machine.
b 6∈ B, input type a, and output type b. We say that T computes a word function
problem f :⊆ Aa → Bb if for any w ∈ dom(f) we have:
T (w) = f(w).
If there exists a type-2 machine that computes f then we say that f is type-2
computable.
Proposition 2.3.4 [72] Let a, b, c ∈ {∗, ω}. If the word function problems f :⊆
Aa → Bb and g :⊆ Bb → Cc are type-2 computable and b = ∗ or c = ω, then
g ◦ f :⊆ Aa → Cc is type-2 computable.
Otherwise if b = ω and c = ∗ then for both a = ∗ and a = ω, there exists
a type-2 computable function f :⊆ Aa → Bω and a type-2 computable function
g :⊆ Bω → C∗ such that g ◦ f :⊆ Aa → C∗ is not type-2 computable.
2.4 Quantum Computation
Quantum computers utilise quantum objects and quantum transformations to effi-
ciently perform calculations that do not appear to be feasibly implementable by a
Turing machine in polynomial time.
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A well-studied model of quantum computation is the quantum circuit model, the
necessary details of which we will explain below. A full explanation of the model is
given in [50, 59], whilst a full introduction to quantum mechanics may be found in
[6]. The quantum object that a quantum circuits operate on is called a qubit.
Definitions 2.4.1 A qubit is a quantum object whose state is an element of the
set:
Q = {α|0〉+ β|1〉 | α, β ∈ C and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1}.
Q is a Hilbert space [76] with basis elements |0〉 and |1〉, we refer to these elements
as the basis states for Q.
When multiple qubits are considered they can be entangled, which means that
the set of possible states for N ∈ N qubits is the tensor product [47]:
Q⊗ · · · ⊗ Q︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
= Q⊗N =

2N−1∑
k=0
αk|k〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ α0, . . . , α2N−1 ∈ C and
2N−1∑
k=0
|αk|2 = 1
 .
Where we write |bN−1〉|bN−2〉 · · · |b0〉 = |bN−1bN−2 · · · b0〉 = |k〉 if the binary expan-
sion of k is bNbN−1 · · · b0, so Q⊗N has 2N basis states.
If we consider a qubit with state α1|0〉 + β1|1〉 together with a qubit with state
α2|0〉+ β2|1〉 the combined state is:
(α1|0〉+ β1|1〉)(α2|0〉+ β2|1〉) = α1α2|00〉+ α1β2|01〉+ β1α2|10〉+ β1β2|11〉
Definition 2.4.2 A quantum transformation U : Q⊗N → Q⊗N is a map from the
space of N qubits to the space of N qubits. Which means that U must be a unitary
transformation. We also refer to a quantum transformation as a quantum gate.
Notably, a quantum transformation can be applied to two qubits in such a way
that the two qubits cannot be decomposed, for example the joint state may become
1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉 6= (α1|0〉+ β1|1〉)(α2|0〉+ β2|1〉) for any α1, β1, α2, β2 ∈ C.
Any quantum transformation on Q⊗N can be written as a 2N×2N complex-valued
matrix, with the kth row and columns corresponding to the kth basis state of Q⊗N .
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An example of a single qubit quantum gate is the Hadamard gate:
H =
1√
2
 1 1
1 −1
 .
The Hadamard gate maps α|0〉 + β|1〉 to α+β√
2
|0〉 + α−β√
2
|1〉. Another example of a
single qubit quantum gate is the pi
4
gate1:
T =
 1 0
0 ei
pi
4
 .
The pi
4
gate maps α|0〉+β|1〉 to α|0〉+ eipi4 β|1〉. An example of a two qubit quantum
gate is the controlled-not gate:
•
=

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 .
The controlled-not gate maps α|00〉+β|01〉+γ|10〉+δ|11〉 to α|00〉+β|01〉+δ|10〉+
γ|11〉.
Definition 2.4.3 A quantum circuit on N qubits consists of a finite sequence of
quantum transformations applied to Q⊗N . Typically, the qubits inputted into a
quantum circuit are either in state |0〉 or in state |1〉.
A circuit U1, U2, U3, U4 applied to 5 qubits in states |a1〉, |a2〉, |a3〉, |a4〉, |a5〉 ∈
{|0〉, |1〉} respectively can be written as:
|a1〉
U1 U2 U3 U4
|a2〉
|a3〉
|a4〉
|a5〉
The output of the above circuit is then U4U3U2U1(|a1a2a3a4a5〉).
1For historical reasons, sometimes pi4 gate is often referred to as the
pi
8 gate [50, 59]
29
Chapter 2. Computation Preliminaries
In many cases a quantum gate U acting on Q⊗N will just carry out the identity
mapping I on some (but not necessarily all) of the qubits. Which means that it
can be decomposed as U = V ⊗ I⊗(2N−l), where V : Q⊗l → Q⊗l is also a unitary
transformation. Which means that if for U acting on Q⊗5 we have U = V ⊗ I⊗2
then U can be written as:
U
Naturally if we can perform the transformation U then we can perform U⊗I. We
may also permute the qubits in Q⊗N before and after applying each gate. Through
permutations and tensor products we may construct a large gate set from a small
number of gates.
Indeed it so happens that any N -qubit quantum circuit can be efficiently approx-
imated by an N -qubit circuit constructed from just the Hadamard gate, the pi
4
gate
and the controlled-not gate [50, 59]. In this document we will therefore assume that
any quantum circuit will be constructed from this gate set.
The exact values of the complex state of a qubit cannot typically be measured.
Instead a quantum measurement of a qubit can only have two possible outputs,
these two outputs each correspond to a basis state of Q, and after measuring the
state of the qubit will become one of these states. This change in the state due to
the measurement means that a quantum measurement cannot be repeated.
In this document we will always take these basis states to be |0〉 and |1〉. If we
apply a measurement with basis states |0〉, |1〉 to a qubit in state α|0〉 + β|1〉 then
the probability of measuring a |0〉 is |α|2 and the probability of measuring a |1〉 is
|β|2.
Applying a measurement with basis states |0〉, |1〉 to the first qubit of a collection
of N qubits in the collective state of
∑2N−1
k=0 αk|k〉 results in |0〉 with a probability
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of
∑2N−1−1
j=0 |α2j|2 and in |1〉 with a probability of
∑2N−1−1
j=0 |α2j+1|2.
Definition 2.4.4 In the quantum circuit model, a quantum computer consists of
a sequence of quantum circuits Q = {QN}N∈N that can be computably constructed
1, and for each N ∈ N the circuit QN has N inputs.
We input a word w ∈ {0, 1}∗ into the quantum computer Q as the state |w〉,
to which we apply the quantum circuit Q|w|. We then apply a measurement with
basis states |0〉, |1〉 to Q|w||w〉, the output of Q on input w is then the result of this
measurement.
Definition 2.4.5 Let Q be a quantum computer and A ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be a decision
problem. We say that Q computes A if for any input w ∈ {0, 1}∗:
w ∈ A ⇐⇒ Q outputs |1〉 with probability P > 2
3
,
and:
w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ Q outputs |1〉 with probability P 6 1
3
.
Definition 2.4.6 A word problem A is bounded quantum polynomial time com-
putable if there exists a quantum circuit Q and a polynomial function p : N → N
such that Q computes A, and for any w ∈ {0, 1}∗ the number of gates in Q|w| is at
most p(|w|).
We denote the class of bounded quantum polynomial time computable word prob-
lems by BQP.
Let F be the factorisation problem rendered as a decision problem, it is known [63]
that F ∈ BQP.
1That is there exists some Turing machine which for any N ∈ N is able to compute an exact
description of QN
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2.5 Infinite Time Turing Machines
The concept of an infinite time Turing (ITT) machine [44] was devised by Hamkins
and Lewis in 2000. An ITT machine generalises standard Turing machine compu-
tation by allowing it to take an ordinal number of time steps. The ordinal numbers
are defined as follows
Definition 2.5.1 [25, 64] A well-ordered set is a set W with a strict total ordering
relation < that is well-ordered. That is in W the relation < satisfies the properties
of:
• For any x, y ∈ W , either (x < y), (x = y) or (x > y) is true and no two of
these relations are simultaneously true.
• For any x, y, z ∈ W if (x < y) and (y < z) then (x < z).
• For any non-empty subset T ⊆ W there exists an x ∈ T such that for any
y ∈ T \ {x} we have (x < y).
Definition 2.5.2 [25, 64] Two ordered setsW1,W2 with respective orderings<1 and
<2 have the same order type if there exists an order-preserving bijection between
W1 and W2. That is there exists a total function f : W1 → W2 such that for any
x, y ∈ W1, we have x <1 y in W1 if and only if f(x) <2 f(y) is true in W2.
Definition 2.5.3 [25, 64] An ordinal number is an order type of a well-ordered
set. The set of ordinals ORD is then the set of all ordinal numbers.
Axioms for the ordinals are detailed in Definition A.1.14.
The order type of the empty set is clearly an ordinal, as is the order type of any
finite set of the form {0, 1, . . . , n}. The set of natural numbers N is well-ordered
and its corresponding ordinal is denoted by ω. Generally, given any ordinal α there
exists a successor ordinal α + 1. If a well-ordered set W with ordering < has order
type α, then the set W ∪ {a} with ordering <, where x < a for any x ∈ W , has
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order type α + 1. The class of ordinals is of the form:
ORD = 0, 1, 2, . . . ω, ω + 1, . . . 2ω, 2ω + 1, . . .
So in a sense, the class of ordinals generalises the set of natural numbers. For α 6= 0,
if there does not exist an ordinal β such that β+ 1 = α then we refer to α as a limit
ordinal, otherwise α is a successor ordinal. ω is an example of a limit ordinal.
Definition 2.5.4 [43, 44] An infinite time Turing machine (IIT machine) V is a
multi-tape machine with m > 3 tapes. Like a multi-tape Turing machine (Definition
2.1.8) an ITT machine has m > 3 tapes each with their own tape head. Each tape
consists of a well-ordered collection of ω cells that contain either a 0 or a 1 (an ITT
machine has no blank symbol). Unlike a usual multi-tape Turing machine the tapes
of an ITT machine are only infinite in the rightwards direction, and each tape has
a left-most cell at position 0 (which allows the tape cells to be indexed by N).
An ITT computation is allowed to take an ordinal number [54] of time steps. At
time 0 and successor time steps an ITT machine behaves just like a normal multi-
tape Turing machine with tape alphabet {0, 1}, implementing a multi-tape Turing
machine rule depending on what the tape heads see and what the machine’s internal
state is. Whereas at limit ordinal time steps we make the contents of each tape cell
equal to the limit supremum of its previous contents1. At limit ordinal times the
heads of the machine are placed back at cell 0, and the internal state becomes the
special limit state.
Like a type-2 machine, the inputs of an ITT machine are infinite words from
{0, 1}ω, which are placed on the first tape at time 0. Every cell on every other tape
contains 0 at time 0 (see Figure 2.5). Unlike a type-2 machine an infinite output
word in {0, 1}ω can be written (and re-written) in its entirety on the mth tape before
the machine halts at some (possibly transfinite) time.
1So if δ is a limit time step, and there exists an ordinal α < δ such that the symbol in cell x
is 0 at every time step β ∈ (α, δ), then at time δ the symbol in cell x must be a 0. Otherwise if
for every α < δ there exists a β ∈ (α, δ) such that the symbol in cell x is a 1, then at time δ the
symbol in cell x must be a 1.
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1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 · · ·
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
Input:
Work:
Output:
Figure 2.5: The initial configuration of an infinite time Turing machine with an
input beginning with 10100011 . . ..
We denote an ITT machine by the 5-tuple1 V = (Π, s0, sλ, s1, S), where Π is a
finite set of internal states, s0 ∈ Π is the input state, sλ ∈ Π is the limit state,
s1 ∈ Π is the halting state, and S is the finite set of rules. Each rule of V is an
element of (Π \ {s0})× {0, 1}m × Π× {0, 1}m × {LEFT, PAUSE,RIGHT}m.
If an ITT machine V given input w ∈ {0, 1}ω eventually halts, then we denote
the infinite word written of the mth tape from the left-most cell by V (w).
Definitions 2.5.5 Let A ⊆ {0, 1}ω be a decision problem. We say that an ITT
machine V computes A if for any w ∈ {0, 1}ω:
(w ∈ A ⇐⇒ V (w) = 10ω) and (w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ V (w) = 0ω).
Let f :⊆ {0, 1}ω → {0, 1}ω be a function problem. We say that an ITT machine V
computes f if for any w ∈ dom(f):
V (w) = f(w).
Proposition 2.5.6 [44] Every halting ITT machine computation must halt at a
countable ordinal time step.
1We do not need to mention the tape or input alphabet of an ITT machine as it is always
{0, 1}.
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Logical System Preliminaries
“Rome wasn’t built in a day” - Anonymous
In this chapter we formally define what we mean by a logical system, and also define
its related notions.
Informally a logical system LS is a mathematical formalism with which we may
define LSV-structures, LSV-sentences, and a semantic consequence relation (|=LSV).
We will use these concepts to define a theory machine and the manner in which it
computes.
Examples of logical systems include first-order logic, second-order logic, and
modal logic [15, 31].
Typically the concept of a logical system is not formally defined, hence whilst
the definitions in this chapter are based on what is generally taken to be true when
working with any logical system, they are to some extent our own concepts.
3.1 Vocabularies and Structures
Here, for any logical system LS, every LS-structure will be based upon a first-order
logical structure [46]. Every such structure includes a vocabulary of symbols, which
is sometimes referred to as a similarity-type.
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Definition 3.1.1 A vocabulary V is a set of symbols. Each symbol in V is either:
• An m-ary relation symbol, for some m ∈ N.
• An n-ary function symbol, for some n ∈ N \ {0}.
• A constant symbol.
Definition 3.1.2 Let V be a vocabulary. A V-structure M consists of the following:
• A set M , which is referred to as the domain of M and denoted by dom(M) =
M .
• For each m-ary relation symbol R ∈ V, there is an m-ary relation R : Mm →
{true, false} in M. So for any a1, . . . , am ∈ M the statement R(a1, . . . , am)
is either true or false in M.
• For each n-ary function symbol f ∈ V, there is an n-ary function f : Mn →M
in M. So for any a1, . . . , an ∈M there is a b ∈M such that f(a1, . . . , an) = b
in M.
• For each constant symbol c ∈ V, there is a constant c in M. The constant c is
assigned to some element of M .
If V = {R1, . . . , RI} ∪ {f1, . . . , fJ} ∪ {c1, . . . , cK} where each Ri is a relation, each
fj is a function and each ck is a constant, then we write:
M = 〈M ;R1, . . . , RI , f1, . . . , fJ , c1, . . . , cK〉.
Notation 3.1.3 When required for the sake of clarity, we denote the relation in
a structure M which corresponds to the relation symbol R by RM. Similarly we
denote the function in M which corresponds to the function symbol f by fM, and
the constant in M which corresponds to the constant symbol c by cM.
We will define the formulas of a logical system as combinations of other formulas.
In order for this construction to make sense the variables of all of these formulas
will be taken from a fixed set.
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Definition 3.1.4 The set of variables Ξ is a fixed vocabulary of the form:
Ξ = ΞC ∪ ΞR ∪ ΞF.
Where:
ΞC = {x1, x2, . . . | Each xi is a constant symbol},
ΞR = {P1, P2, . . . | Each Pj is an α(j)-ary relation symbol},
ΞF = {g1, g2, . . . | Each gk is a β(k)-ary function symbol},
and α : N \ {0} → N and β : N \ {0} → N \ {0} are functions that denote the arity
of each relation and function symbol in Ξ. Also for any k ∈ N and any l ∈ N \ {0}
the sets {z ∈ N | α(z) = k} and {z ∈ N | β(z) = l} are infinite.
We refer to the symbols in Ξ as variables.
So Ξ contains an unbounded number of distinct constant symbols. Similarly for any
m ∈ N and any n ∈ N\{0} there is an unbounded number of distinct m-ary relation
symbols in Ξ, and an unbounded number of distinct n-ary function symbols in Ξ.
Remark 3.1.5 Whenever we refer to a vocabulary V in this document which is not
Ξ we will assume that V ∩ Ξ = ∅.
Notation 3.1.6 We denote the set of possible relations (of any arity) on a set M
by MR and the set of possible functions (of any arity) on M by MF.
Remark 3.1.7 For a finite set {1, . . . , L} there are 2Lm possible m-ary relations
and LL
n+1
possible n-ary functions. For an infinite set I the situation is less clear,
and contents of IR and IF depend on the set-theoretic axioms one assumes. For
simplicity, in this document we will assume that the standard axioms of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory ZFC [25] hold.
Definition 3.1.8 Inductively, a V-term is a word such that:
• If c ∈ V is a constant symbol, then c is a V-term.
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• If x ∈ ΞC is a constant variable, then x is a V-term.
• If f ∈ V is an n-ary function symbol and γ1, . . . , γn are V-terms, then f(γ1, . . . , γn)
is a V-term.
• If g ∈ ΞF is an n-ary function variable and γ1, . . . , γn are V-terms, then
g(γ1, . . . , γn) is a V-term.
• Nothing else is a V-term.
A V-term τ is a first-order term if it does not contain any function variables. τ is a
ground term if it is a first-order term which does not contain any constant variables.
Notation 3.1.9 We write a term τ which contains constant variables ~x = (x1, . . . , xk)
from ΞC and function variables ~g = (g1, . . . , gl) from ΞF as τ(x1, . . . , xk; g1, . . . , gl) =
τ(~x;~g).
We can assign each variable in a V-term τ to an element of M or MF. Under such
an assignment τ itself becomes assigned to an element of M when considered in a
V-structure with domain M . Formally, this assignment is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1.10 Let M be a V-structure with domain M and let τ(~x;~g) be a
V-term. Let ~a = a1a2 . . . ∈Mω an infinite word of elements of M such that each ai
in ~a corresponds to xi in ~x = (x1, . . . , xk). Let ~h = h1h2 . . . ∈MωF be an infinite word
where each hj is a β(j)-ary function on M which corresponds to gj in ~g = (g1, . . . , gl).
τM[~a;~h] is an element of M such that:
• If τ = c, where c is a constant symbol in V, then τM[~a;~h] = cM.
• If τ = xi, where xi is a constant variable, then τM[~a;~h] = ai.
• If τ = f(γ1, . . . , γn), where f is a function symbol in V, and for each j ∈
{1, . . . , n} γj is V-term such that γMj [~a;~h] = bj, then τM[~a;~h] = fM(b1, . . . , bn).
• If τ = gi(γ1, . . . , γn), where gi is a function variable, and for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
γj is V-term such that γ
M
j [~a;
~h] = bj, then τ
M[~a;~h] = hi(b1, . . . , bn).
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We refer to τM[~a;~h] as the assignment of τ to (~a;~h) in M.
Notation 3.1.11 Let τ, δ(x) be terms, where δ contains a single constant variable
x and no function variables. The word δ(τ) denotes that x has been replaced by
τ in δ. Let n ∈ N, the word δn(τ) then denotes that δ has been placed around τ
exactly n-times. So δ0(τ) = τ and δk+1(τ) = δ(δk(τ)) for any k ∈ N.
Definition 3.1.12 An atomic V-formula is a word of the form R(τ1, . . . , τm), where
R ∈ V ∪ Ξ is either an m-ary relation symbol or an m-ary relation variable, and
τ1, . . . , τm are V-terms.
Let M be a V-structure with domain M , and let ~a ∈Mω and ~h ∈MωF .
We write R(τ1, . . . , τn)[~a;~h] for the assignment of R(τ1, . . . , τn) to (~a;~h) in M.
R(τ1, . . . , τn)[~a;~h] is true in M if the relation R
M(τM1 [~a;
~h], . . . , τMn [~a;
~h]) is true in
M. Otherwise we say that R(τ1, . . . , τn)[~a;~h] is false in M.
If τ1, . . . , τm are first-order terms then R(τ1, . . . , τm) is a first-order atomic for-
mula.
3.2 The Definition of a Logical System
We now come to our definition of a logical system. It should be noted that in
this document we only ever make use of logical systems which contain first-order
logic (Definition 3.2.4). So whilst the following definition may at first appear to be
somewhat vague, every logical system that is used in the following chapters will be
well-defined.
Definition 3.2.1 A logical system LS consists of the following:
• A set of logical symbols L.
• A set of non-logical symbols N which is a vocabulary.
• A collection of conditions for defining LS-structures.
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• A collection of rules for constructing LS-formulas.
• A collection of rules for defining the truth of each LS-formula in each LS-
structure.
Each LS-structure and each LS-formula is defined using an additional vocabulary
V, where V∩N = ∅. When such a vocabulary is specified we refer to an LS-structure
as an LSV-structure and an LS-formula as an LSV-formula.
Each LSV-structure is an N ∪V-structure in which the elements of N satisfy the
conditions specified by LS.
Each LSV-formula is constructed from elements of L and N∪V-atomic formulas.
Each rule for constructing the LSV-formulas is of the form; “if φ1, . . . , φl are LSV-
formulas and φ1, . . . , φl satisfy conditions C, then the word θ(1,...,l) in ({φ1, . . . , φl} ∪
L)∗ is an LSV-formula.” Words that cannot be constructed in this manner are not
LSV-formulas.
Let M be an LSV-structure with domain M , and let ~a ∈ Mω, ~Q ∈ MωR , and
~h ∈ MωF . For every LSV-formula ψ, we either have M |=LSV ψ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
, in which
case we say that ψ is true in M, or M 6|=LSV ψ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
in which case we say that ψ
is false in M.
If an atomic LSV-formula φ is true in M under assignment [~a;~h], then we write:
M |=LSV φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
,
for any ~Q ∈MωR . Otherwise if φ[~a;~h] is false in M, we then write:
M 6|=LSV φ[~a; ~Q;~h].
For each non-atomic LSV-formula θ(1,...,l) constructed from φ1, . . . , φl there is a rule
of LS of the form:
M |=LSV θ(1,...,l)[~a; ~Q;~h] ⇐⇒ S(φ1, . . . , φl;
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
).
Where S is some statement, the truth of which depends on the truth of M |=LSV
φi
[
~a′; ~Q′;~h′
]
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and some collection of assignments related to(
~a; ~Q;~h
)
.
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Notation 3.2.2 If φ is a first-order formula which does not contain any relation
or function variables, then for any LSV-structure M, we may write M |=LSV φ[~a]
instead of M |=LSV φ[~a; ~Q;~h].
3.2.1 Logical Systems that we will use
In this subsection we will define each of the logical systems that will we use in this
document. For simplicity, all of these logical systems we will be based on first-order
logic [46].
Definition 3.2.3 The logical symbol set of first-order logic is LFO = {¬,∧,∨,→
,↔,∀,∃}.
Definition 3.2.4 A logical system LS with non-logical symbol set N contains first-
order logic, if the following is true for LS and a vocabulary V:
• LFO ⊆ N.
• Every first-order atomic V ∪N-formula is an LSV-formula.
• If φ and θ are LSV-formulas, then ¬φ, φ ∧ θ, φ ∨ θ, φ → θ, and φ ↔ θ are
LSV-formulas. Also for any xi ∈ ΞC if φ does not contain ∀xi or ∃xi then ∀xiφ
and ∃xiφ are LSV-formulas. We refer to LSV-formulas constructed in this
manner from first-order atomic V ∪N-formulas as first-order V ∪N-formulas.
• For each LSV-structure A with domain A, each ~a ∈ Aω, and any LSV-formulas
φ and θ we have:
(A |=LSV ¬φ[~a]) ⇐⇒ (A 6|=LSV φ[~a]),
(A |=LSV (φ ∧ θ)[~a]) ⇐⇒ (A |=LSV φ[~a] and A |=LSV θ[~a]),
(A |=LSV (φ ∨ θ)[~a]) ⇐⇒ (A |=LSV φ[~a] or A |=LSV θ[~a]),
(A |=LSV (φ→ θ)[~a]) ⇐⇒ (A |=LSV ¬φ[~a] or A |=LSV θ[~a]),
(A |=LSV (φ↔ θ)[~a]) ⇐⇒ (A |=LSV (φ→ θ)[~a]) and A |=LSV (θ → φ)[~a]),
(A |=LSV ∀xiφ[~a]) ⇐⇒ (For every bi ∈ A we have A |=LSV φ[~a \ bi]),
(A |=LSV ∃xiφ[~a]) ⇐⇒ (There exists bi ∈ A such that A |=LSV φ[~a \ bi]).
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Where ~a \ bi denotes the word ~a in which the ith symbol ai is replaced by bi.
Definition 3.2.5 First-order logic (denoted by FO) is a logical system which con-
tains first-order logic, has logical symbol set LFO, and non-logical symbol set ∅.
Every V-structure is an FOV-structure. Every FOV-formula is a first-order V-
formula.
Definition 3.2.6 First-order logic with equality (denoted by FO=) is a logical
system which contains first-order logic, has logical symbol set LFO, and non-logical
symbol set {=}, where = is a binary relation.
A V ∪ {=}-structure A is an FO=V -structure if for every a, b ∈ dom(A) we have
a =A b iff a and b are the same element of dom(A). Every FO=V -formula is a first-
order V ∪ {=}-formula.
Definition 3.2.7 First-order real logic (denoted by FOR) is a logical system which
contains first-order logic, has logical symbol set LFO, and non-logical symbol set
NFOR = {=, <,+,×, 0, 1}. Where =, < are binary relation symbols, +,× are binary
function symbols, and 0,1 are constant symbols.
A V∪NFOR-structure A is an FOR-structure if it has domain R and the symbols
=, <,+,×, 0, 1 all have their usual meanings in R1. Every FORV-formula is a first-
order V ∪NFOR-formula.
Definition 3.2.8 First-order complex logic (denoted by FOC) is a logical system
which contains first-order logic, has logical symbol set LFO, and non-logical symbol
set NFOC = NFOR ∪ {R, i}. Where NFOR is as in Definition 3.2.7, R is a unary
relation symbol, and i is a constant symbol.
A V ∪ NFOC-structure A is an FOC-structure if it has domain C, the symbols
=, <,+,×, 0, 1, i all have their usual meanings in C, with R(a) being true iff a ∈
R ⊂ C, and < giving the usual real ordering on this subset 2. Every FOCV-formula
1Which means that every FOR-structure satisfies the real arithmetic axioms in Definition
A.1.7.
2Which means that every FOC-structure satisfies the complex arithmetic axioms in Definition
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is a first-order V ∪NFOC-formula.
Definition 3.2.9 Second-order logic (denoted by SO) is a logical system which
contains first-order logic, has logical symbol set LSO = LFO ∪
⋃
N∈N{∀N ,∃N} ∪⋃
L∈N\{0}{∀
L
,∃L}, and non-logical symbol set ∅.
Every V-structure is an SOV-structure.
For any Rj ∈ ΞR, if φ is an SOV-formula which does not contain ∀NRj or ∃NRj
then ∀NRjφ and ∃NRjφ are SOV-formulas. For any fk ∈ ΞF, if φ does not contain
∀Nfk or ∃Nfk then ∀Nfkφ and ∃Nfkφ are SOV-formulas.
For each SOV-structure A with domain A, each ~a ∈ Aω, ~Q ∈ AωR, ~h ∈ AωF, and
any SOV-formulas φ and θ we have:
(A |=SO ∀NRjφ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
) ⇐⇒ For every N -ary relation Pj ∈ AR
we have A |=SO φ
[
~a; ~Q \ Pj;~h
]
,
(A |=SO ∃NRjφ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
) ⇐⇒ There exists an N -ary relation Pj ∈ AR
such that A |=SO φ
[
~a; ~Q \ Pj;~h
]
,
(A |=SO ∀Lfkφ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
) ⇐⇒ For every L-ary function gk ∈ AF
we have A |=SO φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h \ gk
]
,
(A |=SO ∃Lfkφ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
) ⇐⇒ There exists an L-ary function gk ∈ AF
such that A |=SO φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h \ gk
]
.
Definition 3.2.10 Second-order logic with equality (denoted by SO=) is a logical
system which is the same as second-order logic, except that SO=’s non-logical symbol
set is {=}, and a V∪{=}-structure A is an SO=V -structure if for every a, b ∈ dom(A)
we have a =A b iff a and b are the same element of dom(A).
3.3 Further Logic Definitions
In this section we define some commonly used logical notions [46] in the context of
an arbitrary logical system LS with vocabulary V.
A.1.9.
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Definition 3.3.1 We refer to the logical symbols ∀,∃ ∈ LFO as first-order quanti-
fiers and the logical symbols ∀N , ∃N ,∀L,∃L ∈ LSO for N ∈ N and L ∈ N \ {0} as
second-order quantifiers. Hence a first-order and second-order quantifier is referred
to as quantifier.
Definition 3.3.2 Let φ be an LSV-formula. A variable v ∈ Ξ is free in φ if φ does
not contain Qv for any quantifier Q.
Definition 3.3.3 An LSV-sentence is an LSV-formula that does not contain any
free variables.
Notation 3.3.4 If φ is an LSV-sentence then for any LSV-structure M, we may
write M |=LSV φ if M |=LSV φ[~a; ~Q;~h], in which case we say that φ is true in M.
Definition 3.3.5 Let B be an LSV-structure, and Φ,Θ be sets of LSV-sentences.
We say that B is an LSV-model of Φ if every sentence in Φ is true in B, and we
denote this by B |=LSV Φ.
Definition 3.3.6 We say that Φ semantically implies Θ in LSV if every LSV-
structure that is an LSV-model of Φ is also an LSV-model of Θ. We denote this by
Φ |=LSV Θ.
Definition 3.3.7 If for a given set of sentences Θ there is an LSV-structure in
which Θ is true, then we say that Θ is LSV-satisfiable.
Definitions 3.3.8 Let V1,V2,V3 be vocabularies such that V1 ⊂ V2 ⊂ V3, and let
A2 be an LSV2-structure.
A V1-reduct of A2 is an LSV1-structure A1 such that dom(A1) = dom(A2) and
for every m-ary relation R ∈ V1, n-ary function f ∈ V1, and constant c ∈ V1
we have that RA1(a1, . . . , am) is true iff R
A2(a1, . . . , am) is true, f
A1(b1, . . . , bn) =
fA2(b1, . . . , bn) and c
A1 = cA2 .
We say that an LSV3-structure A3 is a V3-expansion of A2 if A2 is a V2-reduct of
A3.
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Clearly if A1 is a V1-reduct of A2 and dom(A) = A then for any LSV1-formula φ
and each ~a ∈ Aω, ~Q ∈ AωR, and ~h ∈ AωF we have:
(A1 |=LSV1 φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
) ⇐⇒ (A2 |=LSV2 φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
).
Definition 3.3.9 Let A and B be LSV-structures, and let LS have non-logical
symbol set N. An embedding from A to B is an injective map µ : dom(A) →
dom(B) such that:
• For any m-ary relation R ∈ V ∪N and any a1, . . . , am ∈ dom(A) we have:
RA(a1, . . . , am) is true in A ⇐⇒ RB(µ(a1), . . . , µ(am)) is true in B.
• For any n-ary function f ∈ V ∪N and any b1, . . . , bn ∈ dom(A) we have:
µ(fA(b1, . . . , bn)) = f
B(µ(b1), . . . , µ(bn)).
• For any constant c ∈ V ∪N we have µ(cA) = cB.
Definition 3.3.10 We say that two LSV-structures A and B are isomorphic if
there exists an embedding µ from A to B such that its inverse µ−1 is an embedding
from B to A. We then refer to µ as an isomorphism.
For the most part theory machines we will only be able to specify structures up
to isomorphism. However the following theorem demonstrates that this is not a
problem as the output of a theory machine will depend only on the sentences that
are true in its structures.
Theorem 3.3.11 Let LS be one of the logical systems defined in Section 3.2.1 and
let V be a vocabulary. If two LSV-structures A and B are isomorphic, then for any
LSV-sentence φ:
(A |=LSV φ) ⇐⇒ (B |=LSV φ).
Proof: Let A and B have domains A and B respectively, and µ : A → B be an
isomorphism from A to B.
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If LS ∈ {FO,FO=, FOR, FOC} then the set of logical symbols of LS does not
contain any second-order quantifiers, and the LS-formulas are constructed from
first-order terms.
Let LS have non-logical symbol set N, and let τ be a first-order V ∪ N-term.
We wish to show that µ(τA[~a]) = τB[µ(~a)], where if ~a = a1a2 . . . ∈ Aω then µ(~a) =
µ(a1)µ(a2) . . . ∈ Bω. There are 3 possibilities.
If τ = c, where c is a constant symbol in V ∪N, then:
µ(τA[~a]) = µ(cA) = cB = τB[µ(~a)].
If τ = xi, where xi ∈ ΞC, then:
µ(τA[~a]) = µ(ai) = τ
B[µ(~a)].
If τ = f(γ1, . . . , γn), where f is a function symbol in V ∪ N, and for each j ∈
{1, . . . , n} γj is V-term such that γAj [~a] = bj, then:
µ(τA[~a]) = µ(fA(b1, . . . , bn)) = µ(f)
B(µ(b1), . . . , µ(bn)) = τ
B[µ(~a)].
Hence µ(τA[~a]) = τB[µ(~a)] follows by induction on the length of τ .
Now let φ be an LSV-formula of the form φ = R(τ1, . . . , τn) for some m-ary
relation R and some first-order V ∪N-terms τ1, . . . , τn. It is then the case that:
φ[~a] is true in A ⇐⇒ RA(τA1 [~a], . . . , τAn [~a]) is true in A,
⇐⇒ RB(µ(τA1 [~a]), . . . , µ(τAn [~a])) is true in B,
⇐⇒ RB(τB1 [µ(~a)], . . . , τBn [µ(~a)]) is true in B.
Therefore for any first-order atomic LSV-formula φ we have A |=LSV φ[~a] iffB |=LSV
φ[µ(~a)]. This must similarly be true for any LSV-formula constructed without
quantifiers, as we can just decompose such a formula into its atomic parts, which
must each have the same truth value in A and B. Whereas if φ = ∀xiθ(xi) we then
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have:
(A |=LSV ∀xiθ(xi)[~a]) ⇐⇒ (For every bi ∈ A we have A |=LSV θ(xi)[~a \ bi]),
⇐⇒ (For every µ(bi) ∈ B we have B |=LSV θ(xi)[µ(~a) \ µ(bi)])),
⇐⇒ (For every di ∈ B we have B |=LSV θ(xi)[µ(~a) \ di])),
⇐⇒ (B |=LSV ∀xiθ(xi)[µ(~a)]).
The same is similarly true for φ = ∃xiθ(xi). Consequently, by induction on the
length of φ, the result holds for LS ∈ {FO,FO=, FOR, FOC}.
Now if LS ∈ {SO, SO=} then the set of logical symbols of LS does contain
second-order quantifiers, and the LS-formulas are constructed from general terms.
Let τ be a V ∪ N-term. We now wish to show that µ(τA[~a;~h]) = τB[µ(~a);µ(~h)],
where if ~h = h1h2 . . . ∈ AωF then µ(~h) = µ(h1)µ(h2) . . . ∈ BωF where each µ(hj) is a
β(j)-ary function such that µ(fj)(µ(d1), . . . , µ(dβ(j))) = µ(fj(d1, . . . , dβ(j))) for any
d1, . . . , dβ(j) ∈ A.
For τ = c, xi, or f(γ1, . . . , γn), where c is a constant symbol in V ∪ N, xi ∈ ΞC,
and f is a function symbol in V∪N then we have the required equality by our above
reasoning.
Alternatively if τ = gi(γ1, . . . , γn), where gi is a function variable, and for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} γj is V ∪N-term such that γAj [~a;~h] = bj, then:
µ(τA[~a;~h]) = µ(hi(b1, . . . , bn)) = µ(hi)(µ(b1), . . . , µ(bn)) = τ
B[µ(~a);µ(~h)].
Hence as before µ(τA[~a;~h]) = τB[µ(~a);µ(~h)] follows by induction on the length of τ .
Let φ = R(τ1, . . . , τn) for some m-ary relation R and some V∪N-terms τ1, . . . , τn.
We can then follow the same reasoning as above to see that φ[~a,~h] is true in A iff
RB(τB1 [µ(~a), µ(
~h)], . . . , τBn [µ(~a), µ(
~h)]) is true in B.
Therefore for any atomic LSV-formula φ we have A |=LSV φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
iff B |=LSV
φ
[
~a; ~Q;~h
]
. By our above reasoning this must similarly be true for any LSV-formula
constructed without second-quantifiers.
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Suppose ~Q = Q1Q2 . . . ∈ AωR then µ( ~Q) = µ(Q1)µ(Q2) . . . ∈ BωR where each µ(Qi)
is an α(i)-ary relation such that µ(Qi)(µ(b1), . . . , µ(bα(i))) is true iff Qi(b1, . . . , bα(i))
is true for any b1, . . . , bα(i) ∈ A. Now if φ = ∀NRjθ(Rj) then we have:
A |=LSV ∀NRjθ(Rj)
[
~a; ~Q;~h
] ⇐⇒ For every N -ary relation Pj ∈ AR
we have A |=LSV θ(Rj)
[
~a; ~Q \ Pj;~h
]
,
⇐⇒ For every N -ary relation µ(Pj) ∈ BR we
have B |=LSV θ(Rj)
[
µ(~a);µ( ~Q) \ µ(Pj);µ(~h)
]
,
⇐⇒ For every N -ary relation Tj ∈ BR
we have B |=LSV θ(Rj)
[
µ(~a);µ( ~Q) \ Tj;µ(~h)
]
,
⇐⇒ B |=LSV ∀NRjθ(Rj)
[
µ(~a);µ( ~Q;µ(~h)
]
The same is similarly true for φ = ∃NRjθ(Rj). Whereas for φ = ∀Lfkθ(fk):
A |=LSV ∀
L
fkθ(fk)
[
~a; ~Q;~h
] ⇐⇒ For every L-ary function gk ∈ AF
we have A |=LSV θ(fk)
[
~a; ~Q;~h \ gk
]
,
⇐⇒ For every L-ary function µ(gk) ∈ BF we
have B |=LSV θ(fk)
[
µ(~a);µ( ~Q);µ(~h) \ µ(gk)
]
,
⇐⇒ For every L-ary function ek ∈ BF
we have B |=LSV θ(fk)
[
µ(~a);µ( ~Q);µ(~h) \ ek
]
,
⇐⇒ B |=LSV ∀
L
fkθ(fk)
[
µ(~a);µ( ~Q;µ(~h)
]
The same is similarly true for φ = ∃Lfkθ(fk). Consequently, by induction on the
length of φ, the result also holds for LS ∈ {SO, SO=}. o
3.4 Proofs in a Logical System
An important thing for us to be able to do with a logical system is prove statements
from other statements [34]. We therefore define below what it means for a sentence
to be proven in the context of a given logical system LS. Using this we define what
it means for a logical system to be complete which we will be an important concept
in Chapter 8.
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Definition 3.4.1 An LS-proof system P is a finite set of rules of the form:
Γ1 | φ1, . . . ,ΓK | φK
∆ | ψ
.
Where Γ1, . . . ,ΓK ,∆ are sets of LS-formulas, φ1, . . . , φK , ψ are LS-formulas, and
∆ and ψ depend on Γ1, . . . ,ΓK and φ1, . . . , φK .
Example 3.4.2 Examples of FO-proof system rules include:
Γ1 | φ1, Γ2 | φ2
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 | φ1 ∧ φ2
,
Γ ∪ {θ} | φ
Γ | θ → φ
,
Γ1 ∪ {θ1} | φ, Γ2 ∪ {θ2} | φ
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ {θ1 ∨ θ2} | φ
,
Γ | θ
Γ ∪∆ | θ
.
Where the in the last rule ∆ is any set of FO-formulas.
Definition 3.4.3 Let P be an LS-proof system. A P-proof is a finite sequence
Γ1 | φ1, . . . ,ΓN | φN where for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, Γi is a finite set of LS-formulas,
φi is an LS-formula, and either φi ∈ Γi or there exist i1, . . . , iK < i such that:
Γi1 | φi1 , . . . ,ΓiK | φiK
Γi | φi
.
For some rule of P.
Definition 3.4.4 Let P be an LS-proof system, and ∆ be a set of LS-sentences
and θ be an LS-sentence. We say that there is a P-proof of θ from ∆ if there
exists a P-proof Γ1 | φ1, . . . ,ΓN | φN with ΓN ⊆ ∆ and θ = φN . We denote this by
∆ `P θ.
Clearly, given any finite sequence Γ1 | φ1, . . . ,ΓN | φN written as an input word, a
Turing machine may check whether the sequence is a valid P-proof θ from ∆.
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Definition 3.4.5 A logical system LS is complete if there exists an LS-proof sys-
tem P such that for any set of LS-sentences Γ and any LS-sentence φ we have:
Γ |=LS φ ⇐⇒ Γ `P φ.
Theorem 3.4.6 [36, 45] First-order logic, and first-order logic with equality are
complete logical systems.
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“It is my contention that these operations include all those which are
used in the computation of a number. The defence of this contention
will be easier when the theory of machines is familiar to the reader.” -
Alan Turing [67]
As we discussed in Section 1.2, in When does a physical system compute? [48]
Horsman, Stepney, Wagner, and Kendon put forward a minimal collection of re-
quirements that a physical system must satisfy in order for it to be capable of
computation. Crucially Horsman et al. asserted that in order for a person to be
able to compute with a physical system they must be able to abstractly represent
the necessary workings of the system, whilst also possessing a sufficiently correct
theory of how the system behaves.
We assert that this representation and theory can be expressed in terms of the
logical sentences of a theory machine. A theory machine is given by a triple M =
(T, I,O) where T is a set of sentences, and I and O are sets of sets of sentences1.
The theory of the system is given by T, which describes the necessary aspects of the
system we wish to compute with. The set of admissible inputs into the system is
given by I, and the set of measurable outputs from the system is given by O.
1To clarify, each element of I and each element of O is a set of sentences.
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Further we require that for any Φ ∈ I there exists a structure P which satisfies
T ∪Φ, and for which there is at most one true output Θ ∈ O. We then take Θ to be
the outcome of the computation byM on input Φ. This structureP does not need to
contain a clear notion of time, nor does Θ need to follow from I via a clear sequence
of algorithmic steps. Hence the typical notion of a sequential causal computation
does not necessarily occur within a theory machine. However, we shall insist that
the only way Θ can be the output of M on input Φ is if Θ is true in every model of
T ∪Φ. This constraint ensures that the computation cannot in general just happen
in one undefined uncomputable step. Instead, as we shall see, the computation must
typically have a non-trivial amount of structure to it in order to produce an output.
Suppose that in the real world a person has found/built a computational system S.
A key motivation behind the concept of a theory machine is that, for any reasonably
correct theory TS of S and any valid input Φ of S, they can expect that the real world
will provide them with a structure that satisfies TS ∪ Φ. If it did not then either
TS would have to be incorrect or Φ would have to be invalid. So if S already exists
as a real world physical system then we do not have to worry about constructing
its models ourselves. What we need to concern ourselves with is constructing and
understanding S in the first place.
The nature of a theory machine computation is intended to mimic what happens
when we use a physical system1 to carry out a decision process. For example,
suppose we wish to compute with some kinematic system of billiard balls [13], to do
this we can include the axioms of Newtonian mechanics as our theory T to predict
the motions of the system (Newtonian mechanics may not be a perfect description of
reality, but in many cases it is more than good enough for describing the necessary
properties of a kinematic system). Each input Φ ∈ I could be a non-contradictory
description of the positions and velocities of the balls at some initial time t0
2.
Whereas each output Θ ∈ O could be a position measurement at some final time t1.
1See Remark 1.0.1 for an explanation of what we mean by a physical system.
2This description should state what we know to be true about the input configuration, such
knowledge is likely to have a degree of uncertainty around it. For example, part of Φ could state
that at time t0 the x-coordinate of the 1st ball is located between rationals
a
b and
a+1
b .
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As it is a real physical situation we should always be able to create a kinematic
scenario from t0 to t1 in which T ∪ Φ is satisfied. Due to imprecision in the input’s
description Φ and the inexactness of the theory T there are likely to be many sce-
narios that satisfy T∪Φ. However, if we know that in each of them only the output
Θ is true, then the exact scenario created does not actually matter, all that matters
is which element of O is true given an input of Φ.
The fact that multiple models may exist and all point to the correct output is
also key to the theory machine concept (and, notably, differs from Baumeler and
Wolf’s assertions in [5]). Accepting that our description of a system could have
multiple inequivalent models rather than one “true” model allows us to focus on
what properties are necessary to impose on the system in order for it to produce the
correct output. This also helps us see what parts of the process must be shielded
from outside influences for the computation to work.
For example, in the real world an implementation of a Turing machine will exist
within a much larger ambient space. This space is likely to include complex objects
that may lead to computational errors (such as a person). For the purpose of
the computation such objects can be ignored provided we can prevent them from
interfering.
Also, for defining an arbitrary decision process this focus on description rather
than the individual structures is arguably a necessity. In many real world cases, to
know the entirety of a physical system’s structure would require an infinite number
of tests, which a person would arguably never be able to do. However, as noted by
Horseman et al. [48] after a finite number of tests we should be able to infer some of
a system’s properties and construct our own abstract theory about how it behaves.
In this document we will not dwell upon how one may infer/impose a system’s
properties, instead we shall take such properties to be known and implementable,
and look into how assuming these properties effects what is computationally possible.
We believe that the computational aspects of many different kinds computational
device can be described by a theory machine. Indeed in this document we will
demonstrate how theory machines can be used to characterise:
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• A Turing machine in Examples 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 8.1.1, 8.1.3 and 9.1.6.
• A type-2 machine in Examples 5.3.2, and 8.3.1.
• A quantum computer in Example 7.1.6.
• An infinite time Turing machine in Example 7.2.1.
4.1 The Definition of a Theory Machine
We shall now define our principal concept of a theory machine and its method of
computation.
Definitions 4.1.1 Let LS be a logical system and V a vocabulary of LS, an LSV-
theory machine is a triple M = (T, I,O) where:
• T is a set of LSV-sentences,
• I and O are sets of sets of LSV-sentences,
• For every Φ ∈ I the set T ∪ Φ is LSV-satisfiable,
• For every Φ ∈ I and Θ,Ψ ∈ O if Θ 6= Ψ then the set T ∪ Φ ∪ Θ ∪ Ψ is not
LSV-satisfiable.
We call T the theory of M, call I the set of inputs of M, and O the set of outputs
from M.
We say that M computes Θ ∈ O from Φ ∈ I if:
T ∪ Φ |=LSV Θ.
We denote this by M(Φ) = Θ. If for Θ,Ψ ∈ O there exist LSL-models of T ∪ Φ
where Θ is true and Ψ is true, and Θ 6= Ψ then M does not compute anything on
input Φ and M(Φ) is undefined.
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If the logical system does not matter then we may refer to M as just a theory
machine and if the logical system does matter but the vocabulary does not then we
may refer to M as an LS-theory machine.
For a given physical computation system described by a theory machine M, the
theory T is intended to detail the laws that the system obeys.
Each element of the input set I is intended to be a description of some variable
input configuration (e.g. the positions of a collection of dials), it could be finite and
word-like, it could be an infinite real, it could be a function on reals, or any number
of other possibilities. Whatever the case, if an object can be exactly defined by some
set of properties then it can be inputted into a theory machine. The same is true
for the outputs O, allowing us to take the output from one theory machine and plug
it in as an input to another1.
Example 4.1.2 A set of first-order sentences that defines the real number c ∈ [0, 1)
with binary expansion 0.b0b1 . . . is:{
T k(c) ./bk
1
2
}
k∈N
.
Where T (x) = 2x− b2xc, and ./0≡< and ./1≡> (an explanation of why this works
is given in Example 4.2.8). So for example we could have an input or output set of:{{
T k(c) ./bk
1
2
}
k∈N
∣∣∣∣ b0b1 . . . ∈ {0, 1}ω} .
Example 4.1.3 A set of first-order sentences that defines a function from f : N→
N is:
{f(Sn(0)) = Sf(n)(0)}n∈N,
where S is the successor function on N.
In a theory machine we require that for any input Φ ∈ I there exists a model of Φ
together with the machine’s theory. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure
that the concept of inputting Φ into the machine actually makes sense. As if no
1In Section 6.1 and Theorem 6.1.9 we explain how and when theory machines can be concate-
nated together.
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models existed of T∪Φ then the input configuration of Φ would have to be logically
forbidden in such a way that inputting Φ would be physically impossible, and hence
would itself not make sense as an input.
Note that this does not mean that an input is not allowed to cause a theory
machine to “crash” or “break” in some way. If such a scenario is logically possible
then such an input is allowed, and if necessary the machine breaking can be treated
as a potential relevant output.
We also intend that for each input a theory machine produces at most one output.
Hence we have the fourth condition of Definition 4.1.1, which means that not only
can we not have M(Φ) = Θ and M(Φ) = Ψ for Θ 6= Ψ, but there do not even exist
two separate LSV-models of T ∪ Φ in which Θ and Ψ are true. Consequently if we
have a model A of T ∪Φ and we know that the output Θ ∈ O is true in A, then we
know for certain that M(Φ) = Θ as no other output can be true in A if Θ is true in
A.
Example 4.1.4 Let V = {R, f, c} where R is a unary relation, f a unary function,
and c a constant. A simple example of a FOV-theory machine
1 is M = (T, I,O)
where:
• T = {∀x(R(x)↔ R(f(x)))},
• I = {{R(c)}, {¬R(c)}},
• O = {{R(f(c))}, {¬R(f(f(c)))}}.
We then have:
M({R(c)}) = {R(f(c))},
as in any model of T, if R(c) is true then R(f(c)) must also be true, so T ∪
{R(c)} |=FOV {R(f(c))}. Whereas:
M(¬R(c)) = {¬R(f(f(c)))},
1A FO stands for first-order logic (Definition 3.2.5)
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as given ¬R(c) is true in some model of T then we also have ¬R(f(c)) is true in this
model and so ¬R(f(f(c))) is true, hence T ∪ {¬R(c)} |=FOV {¬R(f(f(c)))}.
4.2 Describing Words as Sets of Logical Sentences
As many examples of computation systems use words (or word-like objects) to rep-
resent their inputs and outputs we naturally require a standard manner in which to
write words as sets of logical sentences. Informally, we do this by taking a set which
defines each element in a well-behaved sequence of ground terms [31] to be equal to
a symbol in the word.
Definition 4.2.1 We call a sequence of ground terms X = {χi}i∈N a simple se-
quence if there exist a ground term δ and terms γ(x) and σ(x) with a single free
variable x, such that every element of X is of the form χi = γ(σ
i(δ)).
The idea behind a simple sequence of terms is that it expresses the repeated ap-
plication of a function, such as the “next symbol on the right” function. Hence it
can be easily and simply constructed. For a unary function f and a constant c the
sequence of terms {f i(c)}i∈N is a simple sequence, as is {h((g ◦f)i(h(c, c)), c)}i∈N for
a unary function g and a binary function h.
Remark 4.2.2 When defining a word as a set of sentences we will make use of the
equality relation “=”, which satisfies the usual equality axioms (Definition A.1.1) of
being an equivalence relation that preserves the functions and relations of the logical
system. In an FOV-theory machine M, we may add the set of equality axioms EQ
=
V
to the theory of M to ensure that = ∈ V is an equivalence relation that preserves
the functions and relations of V.
EQ=V can also be defined in exactly the same manner in any logical system which
contains first-order logic1, and if the number of functions and relations in the vo-
cabulary V is finite then EQ=V is also finite.
1Such as those logics mentioned in Subsection 3.2.1
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However, for simplicity, we will often use logical systems that already contain
true equality as part of their fixed set of symbols, in the structures of such a logical
system must EQ=V always be satisfied.
4.2.1 Finite Word Sets
Definitions 4.2.3 Let X = {χi}i∈N be a simple sequence. For a set of constants
A with b 6∈ A, the finite X-word set corresponding to the finite word w =
w0w1 · · ·wn ∈ A∗ is:
Φ∗X(w) = {χi = wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , n}} ∪ {χn+1 = b}.
The set of finite X-word sets from an alphabet A is then:
Aˆ∗X = {Φ∗X(w) | w ∈ A∗}.
Hence a finite X-word set Φ∗X(w) maps each term χi of X to the ith symbol in w. So
whilst X may be “simple” the X-word set may be arbitrarily complex.
Remark 4.2.4 The symbol b is intended to represent the “blank” symbol, hence
χn+1 = b implies that this is the end of the word. Note that if χi = γ(σ
i(δ)) then
by adding the sentence ∀x((γ(x) = b)→ (γ(σ(x)) = b)) to the theory of a machine
with inputs from Aˆ∗X we can ensure that χj = b for each j > n.
We can describe the initial tape configuration of a Turing machine as a finite X-word
set as follows.
Example 4.2.5 Let C be a binary function, S be unary functions, and 0 be a
constant. Suppose that we are describing a Turing machine-like scenario and for
each time step x and cell y the value of C(x, y) corresponds to the contents of the
yth tape square at time x. To define the values of these tape squares at time 0 we
may use the simple sequence:
XTM = {C(0, Sn(0))}n∈N.
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As suppose that we have a second-order theory machine whose theory contains the
Peano successor axioms (Definition A.1.3) with S as the successor function. The
finite XTM -word set:
Φ∗XTM (w) = {C(0, Si(0)) = wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , n}} ∪ {C(0, Sn+1(0)) = b},
then implies that:
C(0, 0) = w0, C(0, 1) = w1, C(0, 2) = w2, . . . , C(0, n) = wn, and C(0, n+1) = b,
where C(0, n+1) = b may be viewed as stating that the n+1th cell square is blank
at time 0.
If the theory machine also contains the sentence:
∀x((C(0, x) = b)→ (C(0, S(x)) = b)),
then Φ∗XTM (w) also implies that C(0,m) = b for all m > n.
It is natural to expect that χi = a and χj = b means that χi 6= χj, however without
specifying that a 6= b it is entirely possible to have a model where two distinct
constants are equal to one another. To avoid the issues that this would cause we
will often use the following set of sentences.
Definition 4.2.6 Let V be a vocabulary and = ∈ V be a binary relation. The set
of distinct constant axioms for V is:
CD=V = {¬(c = d) | c, d ∈ V are constants and c 6= d}.
So clearly if LS contains first-order logic and A is a LSV-structure which satisfies
EQ=V ∪ CD=V then every constant in A is distinct.
4.2.2 Infinite Word Sets
Definitions 4.2.7 Let X = {χi}i∈N be a simple sequence. For a set of constants A,
the infinite X-word set corresponding to the infinite word u = u0u1 · · · ∈ Aω is:
ΦωX(u) = {χi = ui | i ∈ N}.
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The set of infinite X-word sets from an alphabet A is then:
AˆωX = {ΦωX(u) | u ∈ Aω}.
Note how an infinite word has no end, so a blank symbol is not needed. We can
describe a real number as an infinite Y-word set as follows.
Example 4.2.8 Suppose we have a theory machine whose theory contains the real
arithmetic axioms (Definition A.1.7). Let −, ×, and b·c be real functions that cor-
respond to their usual meanings, and let 2 and c be constants, with 2 corresponding
to its normal value R.
Consider the terms:
σ(x) ≡ (2× x)− b(2× x)c, and γ(x) ≡ b(2× x)c,
with free variable x. Using these we may construct the simple sequence:
Y = {γ(σn(c))}n∈N.
Let c ∈ [0, 1] and u ∈ {0, 1}. The infinite Y-word set:
ΦωY(u) = {γ(σn(c)) = ui | i ∈ N},
then corresponds to the statement that c = 0.u0u1 . . . in binary.
To see why this is the case note that b2cc = 0 if c ∈ [0, 1
2
) and b2cc = 1 if
c ∈ [1
2
, 1). Thus γ(c) = u0 iff u0 is the first digit of the binary expansion of c. Now if
c ∈ [0, 1
4
)∪[1
2
, 3
4
) then 2c−b2cc ∈ [0, 1
2
), and if c ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
)∪[3
4
, 1) then 2c−b2cc ∈ [1
2
, 1).
Hence γ(σ(c)) = u1 iff u1 is the second digit of the binary expansion of c. We can
then see by induction that γ(σn(c)) = ui iff ui is the ith digit of the binary expansion
of c.
Lemma 4.2.9 Let LS be a logical system which contains first-order logic, let X =
{χi}i∈N be a simple sequence in a vocabulary V of LS, let A ⊂ V be a set of
constants, and let a ∈ {∗, ω}.
For any w, v ∈ Aa, if w 6= v then: ΦaX(w) ∪ ΦaX(v) ∪ EQ=V ∪ CD=V is not LS-
satisfiable.
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Proof: If a = ∗ let w = w1 · · ·wn and v = v1 · · · vm. We then have Φ∗X(w) = {χi =
wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , n}}∪{χn+1 = b}, and Φ∗X(v) = {χi = vi | i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}}∪{χm+1 =
b}. Since w 6= v it must be the case that either |w| 6= |v| or wj 6= vj for some j ∈ N.
If |w| 6= |v| then without loss of generality let |w| < |v|, in which case we must have
{χn+1 = b} and {χn+1 = vn+1} which together with EQ=V ∪CD=V is a contradiction
as b 6∈ A.
If wj 6= vj for some j ∈ N then we have {χj = wj} and {χj = vj} which together
with EQ=V ∪ CD=V must also be a contradiction.
If a = ω let w = w1w2 · · · and v = v1v2 · · · . We then have ΦωX(w) = {χi =
wi | i ∈ N}, and ΦωX(v) = {χi = vi | i ∈ N}. Since w 6= v it must be the case that
wj 6= vj for some j ∈ N.
We have {χj = wj} and {χj = vj} which together with EQ=V ∪ CD=V must also
lead to a contradiction. o
4.2.3 Computing with Word Sets
We can now define what it means for a theory machine to compute a word problem.
Definition 4.2.10 Let A be a set of symbols and A ⊆ Aa for a ∈ {∗, ω} be a deci-
sion problem. We say that an LSV-theory machine M = (T, I,O) in the vocabulary
of V is able to compute A if there exists a set of constants A ⊆ V and a simple
sequence X such that AˆaX ⊆ I, and for two distinct finite output sets Θ,Ψ ∈ O we
have that for every w ∈ Aa:
(w ∈ A ⇐⇒ M(ΦaX(w)) = Θ) and (w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ M(ΦaX(w)) = Ψ).
So a theory machine is able to compute a word problem if there exists a way in
which we can configure each input word into the machine, such that the output of
the function can clearly determined from the machine. Note that a problem can
only be computed by a theory machine if every possible input word can be encoded
into the machine, as we cannot just ignore troublesome inputs.
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Definition 4.2.11 Let A and B be sets of symbols, and let f :⊆ Aa → Bb for
a, b ∈ {∗, ω} be a word function problem.
We say that an LSV-theory machine M = (T, I,O) is able to compute f if
there exist sets of constants A,B ⊆ V and simple sequences X,Y such that AˆaX ⊆ I,
BˆbY ⊆ O, and for every u ∈ dom(f) we have:
M(ΦaX(u)) = Φ
b
Y(f(u)).
So a theory machine is able to compute a word function problem if there exists a
simple way for a user to configure each input word into the machine, such that the
function’s output can be simply read off from the machine.
As with a decision problem, a theory machine is only able to compute a function
problem if every possible input and output word is contained within the input and
the output sets. This is required, as we do not expect to know before hand exactly
what words lie in f ’s domain and co-domain. Hence we cannot compute a partial
function by just removing the undefined elements from the input or output sets,
they must be undefined by the computation as well.
Also note the similarities between Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.11, with Definitions
2.2.8 and 2.1.5.
Definition 4.2.12 Let LS be a logical system and P be either a word problem
or a word function problem. We say that P is LS-computable if there exists an
LS-theory machine that is able to compute P.
Remark 4.2.13 Instead of using simple sequences as a basis for describing a theory
machine’s computation of a word problem, we could have just used computable
mappings. That is, we could have just required that there existed Turing computable
mapping from a set of input words to the set of input sets, and the set of output
sets to a set of output words.
Such a requirement would have allowed for a much more general way of defining
the inputs/outputs. However it would have also conflicted with our goal of devising
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a general overarching concept of computation. As our concept would have had to
rely on another formulation of computation in order to make sense.
Another issue is that the computable mappings could themselves carry out a
computation. Meaning that any form of computation defined in this way would, by
default, be at least as powerful as a Turing machine.
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Examples of Theory Machines
Computational systems can take on many real world forms that are clearly not
identical to one another. For example two different Turing machines may be built
using completely different materials. However when we as observers look at these
different realisations it is usually clear to us when they are exhibiting the same basic
computational system. Similarly there may be multiple different inequivalent theory
machines that characterise a given computational system, however it should be clear
(or at least demonstrable) when such a characterisation occurs.
Definition 5.0.14 We say that a computational system S is characterised by a
theory machine M = (T, I,O), if every input ι of S corresponds to an input Φι in I,
in such a way that every model of M with input Φι corresponds to the computation
of S on input ι. Every output of S should also correspond to an output in O, so that
M is able to compute any problem that is computed by S.
Correspondence is of course not quite a formal mathematical notion, however it
should be clear (or at least be demonstrable) when a correspondence does occur.
For example the input of a word w into a Turing machine may correspond to the
finite word set Φ∗XTM(w) = {C(0, Si(0)) = wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , n}}∪{C(0, Sn+1(0)) = b}
in Example 4.2.5. Whereas the placement of an object at point c = 0.u0u1 . . . ∈ [0, 1)
may correspond to the input set {γ(σn(c)) = ui | i ∈ N} in Example 4.2.8.
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In this chapter we will demonstrate how various well-known examples of compu-
tation can be characterised by theory machines.
5.1 Turing Machines
In the following example we will demonstrate how we can characterise a Turing
machine which decides a word problem with a theory machine that uses second-
order logic with equality (Definition 3.2.10).
Example 5.1.1 Let M = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, 〈sa, sr〉,R) be a Turing machine1 which
computes the decision problem A ⊆ A∗.
We can then characterise M by an SO=VM -theory machine
2:
TMM = (TMTM , Aˆ
∗
XTM
, {{I(h) = sa}, {I(h) = sr}}),
with vocabulary:
VM = {<,S,C,H, I, 0, h} ∪ Λ ∪ Π.
Where < is the usual binary ordering relation of Z and S is the unary successor
function. C,H, I are functions such that for a cell y, the cell’s content at time step
x is given by C(x, y), the cell pointed to by the head at time x is given by H(x),
and the machine’s internal state at time x is given by I(x).
The constant 0 represents both the centre of the tape and the starting time.
Whereas the constant symbol h represents the halting time, which means that the
value of h within the structure depends on when the machine reaches a halting state.
Finally, Λ and Π are sets of constant symbols each corresponding to an element of
Λ or Π.
To input TMM uses the simple sequence:
XTM = {C(0, Sn(0))}n∈N,
1As in Definition 2.1.1 Λ is M ’s tape alphabet, Π is the set of internal states, b is the blank
symbol, A is the input alphabet, s0 is the initial state sa is the accepting state, sr is the rejecting
state, and R is M ’s set of rules.
2A SO= stands for second-order logic with equality (Definition 3.2.10).
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which as in Example 4.2.5 ensures that each input provides a full description of how
the input word is written on the tape at time 0. The theory of TMM is:
TMTM = ISA ∪ CD=VM ∪ ITs0 ∪ ETR ∪HT(sa,sr),
where ISA is the set of integer successor axioms (Definition A.1.5), and CD=VM is the
set of distinct constant axioms for VM (Definition 4.2.6). The set of sentences ITs0
defines the initial configuration of the machine, the set ETR describes the evolution
of the machine, and the set HT(sa,sr) ensures that the machine halts when it reaches
sa or sr.
As ISA ⊂ TMTM , by Proposition A.1.6, any model of TMTM must be isomorphic
to an expansion of the usual ordered structure of the integers 〈Z;<,S, 0〉.
Explicitly, the initial configuration is given by:
ITs0 =

(H(0) = 0) ∧ (I(0) = s0),
∀y(((C(0, y) = b) ∧ (0 < y)→ (C(0, S(y)) = b)),
∀y((y < 0)→ (C(0, y) = b))
 .
So by ITs0 , in any model A of TMTM ∪ Φ∗XTM (w) at time 0 the head points to cell
0 and the internal state is s0. The input:
Φ∗XTM (w) = {C(0, Si(0)) = wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , |w| − 1}} ∪ {C(0, S|w|(0)) = b},
specifies that at time 0 in A the word w ∈ A∗ is written on the tape starting from the
0th tape cell. Φ∗XTM (w) also states that w is followed by a cell containing the blank
symbol b, so by the second sentence of ITs0 and induction, the contents of every
cell to the right of the input must be blank at time 0. Similarly by the last sentence
of ITs0 , every cell to the left of the input is blank. Hence the initial configuration
of A must be the same as it is for M with input w.
For evolving the configurations of the machine we have:
ETR =
 ∀x((0 < S(x)) ∧ µ(t,b)(x, x))→(µ(u,c)(S(x), x) ∧ pi(p)(x) ∧ ν(x)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (t, b;u, c, p) ∈ R
 .
After time step 0, each sentence of ETR implements a rule of R via the following
three sorts of terms. Firstly for each s ∈ Π, and a ∈ Λ we have the term:
µ(s,a)(x1, x2) ≡ ((I(x1) = s) ∧ (C(x1, H(x2)) = a)),
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which indicates that at time x1 the internal state is s, and the cell pointed to by the
head at time x2 contains an a at time x1. Secondly for each p ∈ {LEFT, PAUSE,
RIGHT} we have the term:
pi(p)(x) ≡

H(S(x)) = S(H(x)) if p = RIGHT,
H(S(x)) = H(x) if p = PAUSE,
S(H(S(x))) = H(x) if p = LEFT,
that states that at the time step after x, if p = RIGHT then the head is shifted to
the succeeding tape position, if p = LEFT then the head is shifted to the preceding
tape position, and if p = PAUSE then the head stays where it is. Finally we have:
ν(x) ≡ ∀y(¬(H(x) = y))→ (C(x, y) = C(S(x), y))),
which ensures that the tape contents of any cell that is not being pointed to by a
tape head, is preserved moving from time x to time S(x).
Hence for each (t, b;u, c, p) ∈ R the sentence ∀x((0 < S(x))∧µ(t,b)(x, x))→ (µ(u,c)
(S(x), x) ∧ pi(p)(x) ∧ ν(x))) states that at any time x > 01 if the internal state is s
and the head is pointing to a cell containing a b, then at time x + 1 the internal
state becomes u, the symbol b is replaced with c, and the head position is moved
p. Also, the contents of every cell not pointed to by the head at time x is the same
at time x+ 1 as it is at time x. Therefore this sentence clearly implements the rule
(t, b;u, c, p). So since ETR contains a sentence that implements each rule of R, if the
configuration of A at time x is the same as M at time x then the configurations of
A and M are the same at time x+ 1.
For halting we have the set:
HT(sa,sr) =
 ∀x((I(x) = sa)→ (h = x)),∀x((I(x) = sr)→ (h = x))
 .
So by HT(sa,sr) if at time x the machine is in the internal state sa or the internal state
sr then x = h, the halting time step of A. The output, which is either {I(h) = sa}
or {I(h) = sr} is therefore defined at this time.
10 < S(x) means that 0 < (x+ 1), which means that x > 0.
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So the configuration of A at time 0, along with the configuration evolution of A
is same as it is for the Turing machine M with input w. Therefore by induction,
for any t ∈ N the configuration of A at time t is the same as it is for M at time t.
Which means that A reaches sa or sr and therefore halts at the same time that M
does.
Clearly the outputs {I(h) = sa} and {I(h) = sr} are unique and completely de-
pendent on the configurations of the machine prior to time h. The outputs therefore
cannot be affected by whatever occurs afterwards in A without making A logically
inconsistent. Thus we have that, A |=SO=
VM
(I(h) = sa) if and only if M accepts w,
and A |=SO=
VM
(I(h) = sr) if and only if M rejects w.
The above description of a Turing machine machine may seem to be worryingly
complicated, leading one to question the utility of the theory machine formalism.
However it is worth noting that the Turing machine formalism is itself fairly compli-
cated to explain to someone unfamiliar with it (the original definition given by Alan
Turing took over two pages to explain [67]). The definition also relies on concepts
such as the integers and a discretely order-able notion of time. These concepts may
seem to be intuitively obvious but if we are going to be rigorous then they must
be defined in order to be enforced. Indeed, paying such careful attention to the
definition of a computational system may reveal inherent contradictions about one’s
assumptions.
Regardless, the usefulness of the theory machine formalism will be retroactively
justified by our results in future chapters.
We shall now demonstrate how we can use a theory machine to characterise a
Turing machine that computes a word function problem.
Example 5.1.2 Let M ′ = (Λ′,Π′,b,A, s′0, 〈s1〉,R′) be a Turing machine1 which
computes the function f :⊆ A∗ → B∗.
In a similar manner to Example 5.1.1 characterise M ′ with an SO=VM′ -theory
1By Definition 2.1.1 since M ′ has only one halting state, M ′ carries out the computation of a
function.
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machine:
TMM ′ = (TMTM ′ , Aˆ
∗
XTM
, Bˆ∗YTM ),
with vocabulary:
VM ′ = {<,S,C,H, I, 0, h} ∪ Λ′ ∪ Π′.
Where each element of {<,S,C,H, I, 0, h} is as it is in VM in Example 5.1.1, and
each of the symbols in Λ′ ∪ Π′ is a constant.
To input and output the theory machine TMM ′ uses the simple sequences:
XTM = {C(0, Sn(0))}n∈N and YTM = {C(h, Sn(H(h)))}n∈N.
So as in Example 5.1.1 XTM describes how the input word is written to the right of
cell 0 at time 0. Whereas YTM describes the output word and how it is written to
the right of cell pointed to by the tape head at time the halting time h.
The theory of TMM ′ is:
TMTM ′ = ISA ∪ CD=VM′ ∪ ITs′0 ∪ ETR′ ∪HTs1 ,
where ISA, ITs′0 , CD
=
VM′
, ETR′ are as they are in Example 5.1.1, with s
′
0 and R
′
replacing s0 and R. Whereas HTs1 ensures that the machine halts only when its
internal state is s1. Explicitly this is achieved by:
HTs1 = {∀x((I(x) = s1)→ (h = x))}.
So if at time x the internal state reaches s1 then x is at the halting time h of any
model A′ of TMTM ′ ∪ Φ∗XTM (w). The output:
Φ∗YTM (v) = {C(h, Si(H(h))) = vi | i ∈ {0, . . . , |v| − 1}} ∪ {C(h, S|v|(H(h))) = b},
is then defined at this time.
Hence by the same reasoning as in Example 5.1.1, the configurations of A′ evolve
from time 0 exactly as they do in the Turing machine M ′ with input w, and likewise
the model outputs at the time step when the state s1 is reached. By definition when
M ′ halts the word f(w)b is written on the tape going rightwards from the tape
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head. Hence we must have A′ |=SO=
VM′
Φ∗YTM (f(w)), and this output is unique since
by definition b 6∈ B.
Therefore for any input w ∈ dom(f):
TMM ′(Φ
∗
XTM
(w)) = Φ∗YTM (f(w)).
Conversely, if w 6∈ dom(f) then M ′ on input w must never halt, hence I(p) 6= s1
for any p ∈ dom(A′). Which means that h could take any value in A′, including
negative numbers, where C(x, y) could take any value. Consequently any output
Φ∗YTM (v) ∈ Bˆ∗YTM can be true in some model of TMTM ′ ∪ Φ∗XTM (w), and therefore
TMM ′(Φ
∗
XTM
(w)) is undefined.
Theorem 5.1.3 Any word problem A ⊆ A∗ or function problem f :⊆ A∗ → B∗
that is computable by a Turing machine can be computed by a theory machine.
Proof: Let M be a Turing machine that computes A ⊆ A∗. The theory machine
TMM in Example 5.1.1 is then able to compute A.
To see that TMM is indeed a theory machine, note firstly that the theory of TMM
is clearly a set of SO=VM -sentences, and the inputs and outputs are clearly sets of
sets of SO=VM -sentences. Secondly, since CD
=
VM
⊂ TMTM the outputs {I(h) = sa}
and {I(h) = sr} are clearly not mutually satisfiable regardless of the input.
Thirdly, for any Φ∗XTM (w) ∈ Aˆ∗XTM the set TMTM∪Φ∗XTM (w) is satisfied by a model
such as A above in which between time 0 and the halting time the configurations of
A are identical to M with input w. However A is an expansion of Z, so times prior
to 0 or after h exist and the configurations of A must also be defined at such times.
Though these configuration are, for the most part, independent by TMTM∪Φ∗XTM (w).
So for example, at any time x where x < 0 or x > h we can have A be such that
C(x, y) = b for every cell y, H(x) = 0 and I(x) = q, where q 6∈ Π. Clearly no rule
of ETR can be applied at such times so there is no need for any evolution of these
configurations, and since I(x) 6= sa or sr we do not have h = x1 and h = x2 for
x1 6= x2, which would give a logically inconsistent model.
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To see that TMM is able to compute A observe how Aˆ
∗
XTM
is the set of inputs of
TMM , and for any w ∈ A∗ by our reasoning in in Example 5.1.1 we have:
w ∈ A ⇐⇒ M accepts w ⇐⇒ M(Φ∗XTM (w)) = {I(h) = sa},
and:
w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ M rejects w ⇐⇒ M(Φ∗XTM (w)) = {I(h) = sr}.
Similarly, let M ′ be a Turing machine that computes f :⊆ A∗ → B∗. The theory
machine TMM ′ in Example 5.1.2 is then able to compute f . By the same reasoning
as above, TMM ′ is a theory machine, the only difference being the output set, and
by Lemma 4.2.9 since CD=VM ⊂ TMTM no two elements of Bˆ∗YTM are mutually
satisfiable.
Finally, to see that TMM ′ is able to compute f note how Aˆ
∗
XTM
and Bˆ∗YTM are the
input and output sets of TMM ′ , and by our reasoning in in Example 5.1.2 for any
w ∈ dom(f) we have:
TMM ′(Φ
∗
XTM
(w)) = Φ∗YTM (f(w)).
o
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We may also utilise various analogue physical systems to carry out the computation
of a problem. For example, a point light source placed in front of a pair of slits
may be used to factorise integers [17] (see Subsection 5.2.2 below). However more
typically a physical system A is used to figure out how a larger physical system B
behaves. For example, one might want to calculate the flow of air around the wings
of an aircraft before building it, to do this one could build a small scale model of
the aircraft and place it in a wind tunnel with some sensors attached.
Remark 5.2.1 Suppose we have a theory machine M = (T, I,O) that characterises
a physical system S, with I corresponding to a collection of possible input states, and
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O to a collection of relevant measurable properties. S may be too large/complicated
to actually construct, and computationally infeasible to simulate with a classical
computer. However, M may have many possible models, and if for any input Φ ∈ I
there exists a much smaller/simpler model ofM, then we know that we can construct
this model of T∪Φ and use it to figure out the what the properties of S are on input
Φ.
It is also possible that some aspects of M can be adjusted whilst still leading to
analogous outcomes. That is, we may transform M into a theory machine M′ =
(T′, I′,O′) in such a way that for any Φ ∈ I there exists a Φ′ ∈ I′ such that M′(Φ′) =
Θ′ if and only if M(Φ) = Θ. If we can show this is the case and M′ has easily
constructible models then we may use M′ to discern the properties of S.
The above demonstrates that we can use theory machines to carry out the concept
of model-based computation [7].
5.2.1 Physical Systems Satisfying Differential Equations
Various different physical systems (e.g. fluid-mechanical systems [55] and electro-
magnetic systems [33, 49]) are defined via a collection of smooth functions with do-
main R3×R. That is, the domain of each function consists of the usual 3-dimensions
of space, together with 1-dimensional time. The evolution of these functions typ-
ically depends on a set of differential equations (e.g. the Navier-Stokes equations
[55] or the electromagnetic wave equations [33, 49]). Given an initial state and some
boundary conditions, this set of differential equations will often define every future
state of the system. MONIAC [14] (Figure 1) is an example of a computation system
which can be defined in such a manner.
We can characterise this sort of physical system S, which computes from an
initial time of τ0 to an end time of τ1, by a theory machine MS = (TS, IS,OS) that
uses first-order real logic (Definition 3.2.7). First-order real logic (FOR) contains
{<,+,×, 0, 1} as pre-defined symbols, and every FOR-model is an expansion of
usual structure of real arithmetic 〈R;<,+,×, 0, 1〉. So the domain of any model of
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MS is R, which means that any quaternary function f of MS is a function from R4
to R. To describe a vector-valued function g : R4 → R3 in MS we can split it up
into its 3 component functions g1, g2, g3 : R4 → R.
For each dimension i of R4 we can define using first-order real logic a quaternary
function ∂if to be equal to the partial derivative of f in the ith dimension. As
typically the partial derivative of a function f in the 1st dimension is defined to be:
∂1f(x, y, z, t) = lim
δ→0
f(x+ δ, y, z, t)− f(x, y, z, t)
δ
.
In a first-order real logic such a statement can be expressed by:
∀x∀y∀z∀∃δ(((0 < )→
((0 < δ) ∧ (|(((f(x+ δ, y, z, t)− f(x, y, z, t))/δ)− ∂1f(x, y, z, t))| 6 ))).
(5.1)
Where “/” is an additional binary function symbol defined by adding the sentence
∀x∀y∀z(x = (y × z))→ ((x/y) = z) to TS1.
The partial derivative of f in the other dimensions of R4 can be defined similarly,
and from the ∂if functions we can define the second partial derivatives of f .
A differential equation of the form ∂f
∂x
= f + 1 can then be implemented within
MS by including in TS a sentence of the form:
∀x∀y∀z∀t(∂1f(x, y, z, t) = (f(x, y, z, t) + 1)).
Similarly, a boundary condition of the form ∂f
∂z
= 0 on the xy-plane where x = 0 = y
is implemented by adding to TS the sentence:
∀z∀t(∂3f(0, 0, z, t) = 0).
The theory of MS can then be of the form:
TS ≈ Derivative definitions + Differential equations + Boundary conditions.
1Note that this sentence does not define the value of x/y for y = 0. Typically division by 0 is
of course taken to be undefined, however in any model of TS it will have a value as every function
in an FOR-structure is total. As it’s undefined, this value could be any element in R. However,
if we define TS appropriately then this value will affect neither the rest of the structure, nor the
output of any computation of MS.
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Meanwhile the input and output sets of MS can be of the form:
IS ≈ Initial states, and OS ≈ End states/Measurements.
The initial state of MS can be defined in various ways, we could for example define
the f at time τ0 to be equal some polynomial function, say:
f(x, y, z, τ0) = axyz + bx
2y + cxy3z5.
In which case we would write the above as a sentence of TS with constants a, b, c,
these constants could then be specified within the input in similar manner to how
we defined a real number in Example 4.2.8.
If OS is a set of end states then its elements could take a similar form to an input
state. For example, if we knew at the end time τ1 that f was of the form:
f(x, y, z, τ1) = px
2yz2 + y.
then an output could be a description of the value of the constant p. However, in
many real word cases we are unlikely to already know the form of the end state,
and even if we did, its not clear how we would learn its coefficients. Instead, an
output of such a system is more likely to take the form of measurement, which can
be described in terms of a threshold at some point in the domain for example we
could have the output set:
OS = {{(f(1, 1, 0, τ1) < 1)}, {(1 6 f(1, 1, 0, τ1))}}.
Which describes whether or not the value of f is less than 1 at point (1, 1, 0) at time
τ1.
Remark 5.2.2 More generally if f : D×R→ R is a smooth function and D ⊆ R3
is convex, then the state of f at time τq ∈ R may be described via a single infinite
word set. This is due to Taylor’s Theorem in n-variables [40], which states that the
function f at time τq is equal to a 3-dimensional Taylor series of the form:
f(x1, x2, x3, τq) =
∞∑
m=0
1
m!
3∑
i1,...,im=1
∂mf
∂yi1 · · · ∂yim
(a)
m∏
j=1
(xij − aij).
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Where a is some element of D × {τq}, the collection of values of ∂mf∂yi1 ···∂yim (a) for
i1, . . . , im ∈ {1, 2, 3} and m ∈ N then defines f everywhere in D × {τq}. This is
a countable set of real numbers, which means that it can be defined with a single
infinite word, and can therefore be described via a single infinite word set.
Further, if D is not convex but is compact, then we are able to cover D by a
finite set of convex balls {Ui}Ki=1. Hence we can describe f at time τq within each
ball Ui via a 3-dimensional Taylor series defined using the partial derivatives of f(c)
for some c ∈ Ui. The state of f at time τq can therefore be entirely defined via an
infinite word set which describes each of these Taylor expansions.
5.2.2 Blakey’s Double Slit Factoriser
A specific example of a physical computational system that can be described via a
collection of functions that satisfies a set of differential equations is Blakey’s double
slit factoriser. Blakey’s double slit factoriser was described by Blakey in [17], notably
the device is capable of factorising integers in polynomially bounded space and time
whilst still being describable with classical physics.
Blakey’s factoriser (Figure 5.2.2) consists of a screen with a pair of slits of distance
1 apart at points A = (0, 0) and B = (1, 0) with a light source placed in front of the
two slits at C = (1
2
, −1
2
). A detector runs perpendicular to the screen from A which
detects where sufficiently strong instances of radiation hit the screen.
To factorise the integer n ∈ N one makes the light source emit radiation of wave-
length 1
2
√
n
from C. The two slits then diffract the light wave, causing an interference
pattern on the detector. Blakey showed in [17] that if maximal constructive inter-
ference is detected at a distance h from the screen then
√
n(
√
h2 + 1 + h) must be
a factor of n.
We can describe the propagation of the light wave via an electromagnetic wave
function E : R4 → R3 that satisfies the electromagnetic wave equations for a point
charge [33, 49] at (0.5, -0.5, 0) with magnitude m, which is a differential equation of
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Figure 5.1: A diagram of the wave propagation in Blakey’s double-slit factoriser.
the form: (
v2ph∇2 −
∂2
∂t2
)
E = -mδ(~x− (0.5, -0.5, 0)), (5.2)
where ∇2 = ∂2
∂x2
+ ∂
2
∂y2
+ ∂
2
∂z2
is the Laplacian, vph is the speed of light in the medium
of the wave, and δ is the Dirac delta function1.
Hence we can characterise Blakey’s factoriser with an FOR-theory machine whose
theory contains the electromagnetic wave equations for a point charge. The screen
and slits can be implemented as boundary conditions. Whereas the wavelength of
the light source may be defined using the an integer input n ∈ N, which itself can
be defined as binary word. The point of maximal constructive interference h may
be similarly defined as the lowest point on the y-axis such that |E| = 2α, where α is
the amplitude of the wave. From h, the factor
√
n(
√
h2 + 1 + h) can be outputted
by the machine as another binary word.
1So δ(~y) =
 1 if ~y = (0, 0, 0),0 otherwise. for any ~y ∈ R3 [49].
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5.3 Extensions of the Turing Machine Model
Turing machines take finite words as inputs and give finite words as outputs. How-
ever, as indicated by Definitions 4.2.7 we are able to input infinite words into a
theory machine, and a theory machine is able to compute infinite output words.
An extension of the Turing machine model that admits infinite inputs and outputs
is the type-2 machine (See Section 2.3 for details). Type-2 machines are them-
selves an extension of the multi-tape Turing machine model (Definition 2.1.8), and
in this section we will demonstrate how both of these models of computation can be
characterised by theory machines.
5.3.1 Multi-tape Turing machines
If both the input and output sets of a type-2 machine are of type ∗ then it behaves
identically to a multi-tape Turing machine. Indeed to highlight their similarities we
shall firstly characterise a multi-tape Turing machine before demonstrating how its
description can be simply converted into a type-2 machine.
Example 5.3.1 Let Mm = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, 〈s1〉,P) be a multi-tape Turing machine1
which computes the function g :⊆ A∗ → B∗.
We can then characterise Mm by an SO
=
VMm
-theory machine:
TMMm = (TMTMm , Aˆ
∗
XTM1
, Bˆ∗YTMm ),
with vocabulary:
VMm = {<,S, I, 0, h} ∪ {C1, . . . , Cm} ∪ {H1, . . . , Hm} ∪ Λ ∪ Π.
Where <,S, I, 0, h are as in Example 5.1.1, and Λ ∪Π is a set of constant symbols.
Whereas C1, . . . , Cm are binary functions and H1, . . . , Hm are unary functions such
that Cn(x, y) gives the symbol in cell y, on tape n ∈ {1, . . . ,m} at time x, and the
cell pointed to by the nth tape head at time x is given by Hn(x).
1So as in Definition 2.1.8 Λ,Π,b,A, s0, and 〈s1〉 are as they are for a Turing machine and each
rule of P is an element of Π \ {s1})× Λm ×Π× Λm × {LEFT, PAUSE,RIGHT}m.
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To input and output TMMm uses the simple sequences:
XTM1 = {C1(0, Sm(0))}n∈N and YTMm = {Cm(h, Sn(0))}n∈N.
The theory of TMMm is then:
TMTMm = ISA ∪ CD=VMm ∪ IT(s0,m) ∪ ETP ∪HTs1 ,
where exactly as in Example 5.1.2 ISA is the set of integer successor axioms (Defini-
tion A.1.5), CD=VMm is the set of distinct constant axioms for VMm (Definition 4.2.6),
and HTs1
1 ensures that the machine halts when it reaches s1. Whereas IT(s0,m) de-
fines the initial configuration of every tape, and each sentence of ETP describes a
multi-tape rule of the machine.
As before, since the theory contains ISA, any model of TMTMn must be isomor-
phic to an expansion of the usual ordered structure of the integers. Explicitly, the
initial configuration of the multi-tape Turing machine is given by:
IT(s0,m) =

∧m
n=1(Hn(0) = 0) ∧ (I(0) = s0),
∀y(((C1(0, y) = b) ∧ (0 < y))→ (C1(0, S(y)) = b)),
∀y((y < 0)→ (C1(0, y) = b)),
∀y∧mn=2(Cn(0, y) = b)

.
This points every tape head to cell 0 at time 0, and as in Example 5.1.2 ensures
that every tape cell on tape 1 not defined by the input is blank at time 0. The last
sentence of IT(s0,m) then implies that every tape cell not on tape 1 is also blank at
time 0. For applying the rules of Mn we have:
ETP =
 ∀x((0 < S(x)) ∧ µ(tl,~bl)(x, x))→(µ(~ul,~cl)(S(x), x) ∧ pi(~pl)(x) ∧ νm(x)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (tl,~bl;ul,~cl; ~pl) ∈ P
 .
As in Example 5.1.1 each sentence of ETP implements a rule of P via three sorts of
terms, this time in a multi-tape form. So firstly for each s ∈ Π and ~a ∈ Λm we have:
µ(s,~a)(x1, x2) ≡ (I(x1) = s) ∧
m∧
n=1
(Cn(x1, Hn(x2)) = an),
1Recall that HTs1 = {∀x((I(x) = s1)→ (h = x))}.
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which indicates that at time x1 the internal state is s, and the cell pointed to by
head n at time x2 contains an at time x1, for each n ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Secondly for
p ∈ {LEFT, PAUSE,RIGHT} and n ∈ {1, . . . ,m} let:
pi(p,n)(x) ≡

Hn(S(x)) = S(Hn(x)) if p = RIGHT,
Hn(S(x)) = Hn(x) if p = PAUSE,
S(Hn(S(x))) = Hn(x) if p = LEFT,
For ~p ∈ {LEFT, PAUSE,RIGHT}m we then have:
pi(~p)(x) ≡
m∧
n=1
pi(p,n)(x).
which states that at the time step after x the head on each tape is shifted in the
manner indicated by p. Finally we have:
νm(x) ≡ ∀y
m∧
n=1
(¬(Hn(x) = y)→ (Cn(x, y) = Cn(S(x), y))),
which ensures that the tape contents of any cell that is not being pointed to by a
tape head is preserved moving from time x to time S(x).
Hence by same reasoning as in Examples 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 the configurations of
any model C of TTMMm ∪ Φ∗XTM1 (w) evolve from time 0 exactly as they do in the
multi-tape Turing machine Mm with input w ∈ dom(g). Like in Example 5.1.2 HTs1
ensures that when C reaches the state s1 the machine halts, labelling the time step
that this happens at by h. By definition of Mm tape m should then contain the
word g(w)b written from tape square 0 at time h, and as the configurations of C
are identical to those of Mm we have that C models the output:
Φ∗YTMm (g(w)) =
{Cm(h, Si(0)) = g(w)i | i ∈ {0, . . . , |g(w)| − 1}}
∪ {Cm(h, S|g(w)|(0)) = b},
Therefore for any w ∈ dom(g):
TMMm(Φ
∗
XTM1
(w)) = Φ∗YTMm (g(w)).
5.3.2 Type-2 Machines
We shall now demonstrate how we can characterise a type-2 machine with a theory
machine.
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Example 5.3.2 Let T = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, s1,U, a, b) be a type-2 machine with m
tapes1 that computes the function f :⊆ Aa → Bb.
We can then characterise T by an SO=VT -theory machine:
T2MT = (T2MTT , Aˆ
a
XTM1
, BˆbYT2),
with vocabulary:
VT = {<,S,O, I, 0, h} ∪ {C1, . . . , Cm} ∪ {H1, . . . , Hm} ∪ Λ ∪ Π.
where O is a unary function used in defining the output, and everything in VT \{O}
is as it is for VMm in Example 5.3.1. The input sequence XTM1 is as it is in Example
5.3.1, whereas the output sequence is:
YT2 = {O(Sn(0))}n∈N.
The theory of T2MT is:
T2MTT = ISA ∪ IT(s0,m) ∪ ETU ∪HT bs1 .
Where ISA, CD=VT , IT(s0,m), and ETU are as they are in Example 5.3.1, with the
constants of VT replacing those of VMm and P replaced by U. The setHT
b
s1
deals with
defining the output and halting, however T should only halt if Bb = B∗, otherwise
if Bb = Bω then T should never halt. Hence we have:
HT bs1 =
 HTs1 ∪ {∀y(O(y) = Cm(h, y))} if b = ∗,{∀x∀y(¬(Cm(x, y) = b)→ (O(y) = Cm(x, y))} if b = ω.
Where as in Example 5.3.1 HTs1 = {∀x((I(x) = s1) → (h = x))}, so if b = ∗ the
additional sentence ensures that O(y) gives the contents of the yth cell of tape m
at time h. If T never halts then there is no point at which the whole output will
be written on tape m, so in order to extract it we have HT ωs1 which defines O(y)
to be equal to whatever the contents of cell y of tape m are when it is not blank.
1As in Definition 2.3.1; Λ is the alphabet of tape symbols, Π is the set of internal states, b ∈ Λ
is the blank tape symbol, A ⊆ (Λ \ b) is the alphabet of input symbols, s0 ∈ Π is the initial state,
s1 ∈ Π is the halting state, U is a set of m-tape Turing machine rules, and a, b ∈ {∗, ω} are the
input and output types.
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This value is well-defined as, by the definition of a type-2 machine, each square of
the mth tape eventually has a non-blank symbol written on it, and afterwards this
symbol remains fixed.
Let D be a model of T2MTT ∪ ΦaXTM1 (w) for some w ∈ dom(f). Clearly by the
input and IT(s0,m), for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and y ∈ N the values of Ci(0, y), Hi(0),
and I(0) in D correspond exactly to the initial configuration of T . As D |=SO=
VT
ETU
the evolution of these values moving from Ci(n, y) to Ci(S(n), y) should similarly
correspond exactly to the evolution of T . Therefore by induction for every x ∈ N
the values of Ci(x, y), Hi(x), and I(x) correspond exactly to the configurations of
T at every time x.
Now there are two possible cases.
Case 1. b = ∗, in which case if w ∈ dom(f) then T on input w must eventually
halt. By HT ∗s1 , at this time step in D the values of O(y) are defined for each y ∈ N
to be equal to the contents of tape m. So as in Example 5.3.1 since tape m should
contain the word f(w)b written from square 0, we have that:
D |=SO=
VT
{O(Si(0)) = f(w)i | i ∈ {0, . . . , |f(w)| − 1}} ∪ {O(S|f(w)|(0)) = b}.
Conversely if w 6∈ dom(f) then T on input w must never halt, in which case we
have the same scenario as in Example 5.1.2 and any possible output in BˆbYT2 could
be true in a model of T2MTT ∪ ΦaXTM1 (w). Therefore T2M(Φ
a
XTM1
(w)) is undefined
for such w.
Case 2. b = ω, in which case if w ∈ dom(f) then T must on input w eventually
write a symbol on each cell of tape m. The value of Cm(x, y) in D for each y ∈ N is
therefore eventually defined to be f(w)y. Hence by HT
ω
s1
and the reasoning above
the value of O(y) in D is then defined to be equal to f(w)y. Thus we have that:
D |=SO=
VT
{O(Si(0)) = f(w)i | i ∈ N}.
Conversely if w 6∈ dom(f) then T on input w must either halt at some point, or
eventually cease to write symbols onto the mth tape. In either scenario there must
exist an N ∈ N such that Cm(x, Sn(0)) = b for all n > N . Hence O(Sn(0)) is not
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specified by T2M∪ΦaXTM1 (w) and could take any value. Therefore T2M(Φ
a
XTM1
(w))
is undefined for such w.
In both of the above cases D was an arbitrary model of T2MTT ∪ΦaXTM1 (w), hence
we have that T2MT (Φ
a
XTM1
(w)) = ΦbYT2(f(w)) for each w ∈ Aa.
Notably, the output function O of T2MT is unary. Only taking a cell position as an
input, so O does not have any apparent time dependency. In a sense his means that
O’s value exists outside of time, whilst still depending on the temporally ordered
computation. The atemporal nature of this output is therefore an example of how
a theory machine is able to compute without conforming to the usual assertion that
the entirety of a computational process must follow a causal temporal order.
Theorem 5.3.3 Any word function problem f :⊆ Aa → Bb for a, b ∈ {∗, ω} that
is computable by a type-2 machine can be computed by a theory machine.
Proof: Let T be a type-2 machine that computes f :⊆ Aa → Bb, so for any w ∈ Aa
we have T (w) = f(w). The theory machine T2MT in Example 5.3.2 is then able to
compute f .
To see that T2MT is indeed a theory machine we can follow the same reasoning
as in the proof of Theorem 5.1.3, noting that a type-2 machine with input w ∈ Aa
provides a model of T2MTT ∪ ΦaXTM1 (w) provided that at negative time steps the
internal state of the machine is not in Π. The fact that the outputs are mutually
unsatisfiable also follows from Lemma 4.2.9.
To see that T2MT is then able to compute f observe how Aˆ
a
XTM1
and BˆbYT2 are
the input and output sets of T2MT , and by our reasoning in Example 5.3.2, for any
w ∈ dom(f) we have:
T2MT (Φ
a
XTM1
(w)) = ΦbYT2(f(w)).
o
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Chapter 6
Properties of Theory Machine
Computation
We used to think that if we knew one, we knew two, because one and
one are two. We are finding that we must learn a great deal more about
‘and.’ - Sir Arthur Eddington
In Chapter 5 we saw that various sorts of computation devices and frameworks can
be characterised with theory machines. For finite word problems, the computational
power of each of these examples has so far been less than or equal to that of a Turing
machine1. So naturally one might be led to speculate that the computational power
of any theory machine is it at most that of a Turing machine. However, the following
result demonstrates that such an assertion is quite spectacularly false.
Proposition 6.0.4 For any word problem A ⊆ A∗ and any word function problem
f :⊆ A∗ → B∗ there exists an FO-theory machine that is able to compute A and
an FO-theory machine that is able to compute f .
Proof: Consider the FOVA-theory machine:
MA = (TA, Aˆ
∗
XC
, {{P}, {¬P}}),
1Note that by Remark 2.1.6 and Theorem 2.1.12 there exist finite word problems that are not
computable by a Turing machine.
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in vocabulary:
VA = {=, S, C, P, 0,b} ∪A,
where = is a binary relation, S,C are unary functions, P is a 0-ary relation, and
{0,b} ∪A are constant symbols. Let the input sequence be:
XC = {C(Sn(0))}n∈N,
and let MA have theory:
TA = EQ
=
VA
∪

|w|−1∧
n=0
(C(Sn(0)) = wn) ∧ (C(S|w|(0)) = b)
→ P
∣∣∣∣∣∣ w ∈ A

∪

|w|−1∧
n=0
(C(Sn(0)) = wn) ∧ (C(S|w|(0)) = b)
→ ¬P
∣∣∣∣∣∣ w 6∈ A
 .
Clearly then TA ∪ Φ∗XC (w) |=FO P iff w ∈ A and otherwise TA ∪ Φ∗XC (w) |=FO ¬P .
Therefore MA is able to compute A.
Similarly, consider the FOVf -theory machine:
Mf = (Tf , Aˆ
∗
XC
, Bˆ∗XW ),
in vocabulary:
Vf = VA ∪ {W} ∪B,
where W is a unary function, and B is a set of constant symbols. Let the output
sequence be:
XW = {W (Sn(0))}n∈N,
and let Mf have theory:
Tf = EQ
=
Vf
∪ T′f ,
where:
T′f =

|w|−1∧
n=0
(C(Sn(0)) = wn) ∧ (C(S|w|(0)) = b)

→
|f(w)|−1∧
n=0
(C(Sn(0)) = f(w)n) ∧ (C(S|f(w)|(0)) = b)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w ∈ dom(f)

.
Clearly then Tf ∪ Φ∗XC (w) |=FO Φ∗XW (f(w)) for every w ∈ dom(f). Therefore Mf is
able to compute f . o
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So with first-order theory machines we are able to compute any finite word prob-
lem. Arguably, this result is quite problematic as not only do MA and Mf above
compute in a manner which provides no real insight into the problems that they are
calculating. But it is also very difficult to see how real world computational devices
that model MA or Mf could ever be constructed for the majority of problems, even
if we already knew A or f in its entirety.
Furthermore the issue here is not just not limited to first-order theory machines.
In any logical system which contains first-order logic we can characterise exactly the
same sort of device.
Crucially though the theories of MA and Mf are both countably infinite in size,
and it is this infinite amount of information that really enables these theory machines
to compute arbitrary finite word problems. If we restricted ourselves to considering
only theory machines with finite theories (consisting of only finite sentences) then
questionable examples such as MA and Mf would not be possible. Indeed each of the
theory machine examples we gave in Chapter 5 had finite theories. Furthermore,
a finite theory can be finitely described, which conforms with Horsman et al.’s
assertion in [48] that we can only ever obtain a finite amount of information about
a physical system that we are computing with.
Definition 6.0.5 Let LS be a logical system. A finite LS-theory machine is an
LS-theory machine M = (T, I,O) such that T is a finite set of sentences.
In Chapter 8 we will we will show that a finite word problem is computable by a
finite first-order theory machine if and only if it is computable by a Turing machine
(Theorem 8.2.1). However in this chapter we will consider consider computation
with more general logical systems.
Definition 6.0.6 Let LS be a logical system. We say that a problem P is finite
LS-computable if there exists a finite LS-theory machine that is able to compute
P .
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Though the class of finite LS-theory machines is clearly a very general object, as
we shall see, the collection of problems that machines within the class are able to
compute satisfies several interesting properties.
Proposition 6.0.7 Let LS be a logical system. If a word problem A ⊆ Aa for
a ∈ {∗, ω} is computable by a finite LS-theory machine then the problem A∗ \A is
computable by a finite LS-theory machine.
Proof: Let M be a finite LS-theory machine such that M is able to compute A.
There then must exist a simple sequence X such that AˆaX ⊆ I, and two distinct finite
output sets Θ,Ψ ∈ O such that for every w ∈ Aa:
(w ∈ A ⇐⇒ M(ΦaX(w)) = Θ) and (w 6∈ A ⇐⇒ M(ΦaX(w)) = Ψ).
It is then the case that M is itself able to compute Aa \ A by simply swapping the
interpretation Θ and Ψ, taking Ψ to indicate that w ∈ Aa \ A and Θ to indicate
that w 6∈ Aa \ A. o
The fact that the collection of decision problems that are computable by the class
of finite LS-theory machines is in fact closed under complementation may seem a
little surprising. As there are many classes of decision problems, such as Σ01 and
NP, which are not closed under complementation (or at least not believed to be).
However decision a problem B ⊆ A∗ is in Σ01 or NP not because there is a definite
machine which is able to decide it, but because the elements of B and only B can
be found in some way. The elements of A∗ \B are not necessarily obtainable in any
specified manner.
Proposition 6.0.7 follows from the fact that a finite LS-theory machine can only
compute A ⊆ A∗ if it can decide whether w ∈ A or w 6∈ A given any element of A∗.
So we can just use the same machine to compute A∗ \ A.
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6.1 Combining Theory Machines
Suppose functions f :⊆ Aa → Bb and g :⊆ Bb → Cc are both computable by finite
LS-theory machines, an important question is whether g ◦ f :⊆ Aa → Cc is also
computable by a finite LS-theory machine. Similarly, if A,B ⊆ Aa are both finite
LS-computable then are both A ∩B and A ∪B finite LS-computable?
For many sorts of computational device [50, 65], this functional concatenation
along with the intersection and union of problems follows trivially. But the theory
machines in a given class may characterise many different sorts of computational
device, so as we shall see, these properties do not always hold.
6.1.1 Joining Theories
Given a finite LS-theory machine M1 which is able to compute f :⊆ Aa → Bb
and a finite LS-theory machine M2 which is able to compute g :⊆ Bb → Cc,
we wish to construct a finite theory machine which is able to compute g ◦ f :⊆
Aa → Cc. An obvious candidate would be a LS-theory machine whose models are
exactly the structures which consist of a model of M1 unified with a model of M2.
Ideally providing a structure which characterises a computation of M1 followed by
a computation of M2.
Such a machine requires a logical system in which this structural unification can
be described. But before we can describe these logical systems, we give the following
definition which explains what we formally mean when we refer to the unification
of two LS-structures.
Definition 6.1.1 Let LS be a logical system, V1 and V2 be disjoint LS-vocabularies,
and V ⊇ V1 ∪ V2. Let A1 be an LSV1-structure, and A2 be an LSV2-structure.
An LSV-structure A is a join of A1 and A2 if dom(A) = dom(A1)∪dom(A2), and
A|dom(A1) and A|dom(A2) are LSV-extensions of A1 and A2 respectively. We denote
this by A = A1 ∪ A2.
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Suppose that we are given two LS-theories T1 and T2. Our goal is to construct
an LS-theory S whose collection of models are exactly the structures which are a
model of T1 unified with a model of T2. Formally we require that S is as follows.
Definition 6.1.2 Let LS be a logical system, and V1 and V2 be disjoint LS-
vocabularies. Let T1 be an LSV1-theory and T2 be an LSV2-theory.
Suppose that S is an LS-theory such that A is a model of S iff A = A1 ∪ A2, for
some A1 |=LSV1 T1 and some A2 |=LSV2 T2. We then say that S joins T1 and T2.
Definition 6.1.3 A logical system LS is joinable if for any LSV1-theory T1 and
any LSV2-theory T2 such that V1 and V2 are disjoint, there exists an LS-theory S
that joins T1 and T2.
We shall demonstrate below that if LS is joinable, then functional concatenation
can be achieved within the class of finite LS-computable problems.
As we shall prove in Lemma 6.1.7 first-order logic is joinable. To join together two
theories of first-order logic T1,T2 we add two new unary relation symbols P1, P2 6∈
(V1∪V2) to the vocabulary with P1(x) meaning “x is within a structure that models
T1” and P2(x) meaning “x is within a structure that models T2”. In each sentence of
Ti we then modify each instance of quantification to quantify only over the elements
in the appropriate structure.
Definition 6.1.4 [39, 66] Let LS contain first-order logic. For any LS-sentence
φ and unary predicate P let φP denote the sentence obtained by replacing each
instance of ∀ with ∀P and ∃ with ∃P . Where:
∀Px(ψ(x)) ≡ ∀x(P (x)→ ψ(x)) and ∃Px(ψ(x)) ≡ ∃x(P (x) ∧ ψ(x)).
We then say that φP is the sentence φ sorted by P .
For a set of first-order sentences T let TP = {φP | φ ∈ T}, and say that TP is the
set T sorted by P .
Example 6.1.5 Let V = {Q,S, f, g, c} where Q is a binary relation, S is a unary
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relation, f is a binary function, g is a unary function, and c is a constant. Consider
the theory:
T =

S(c),
∀xS(g(x)),
∃x∀y(Q(x, c) ∨ S(f(x, y))),
∀1R∃x(R(x)→ S(x))

.
Let P 6∈ V be a unary relation. We can then sort T by P , obtaining the set of
sentences:
TP =

S(c),
∀PxS(g(x)),
∃Px∀Py(Q(x, c) ∨ S(f(x, y))),
∀1R∃Px(R(x)→ S(x))

,
which is equivalent to:
S(c),
∀x(P (x)→ S(g(x))),
∃x(P (x) ∧ ∀y(P (y)→ (Q(x, c) ∨ S(f(x, y))))),
∀1R∃x(P (x) ∧ (R(x)→ S(x)))

.
The set of sentences TP then applies exactly to the elements in which P (x) is true.
Implicitly we take logical structures to be closed under functional assignments
and to contain all of a vocabulary’s constants. These properties are not usually
specified, but might well be necessary in order for a theory to specify the appropriate
structures. We therefore have the following definition.
Definition 6.1.6 For a unary relation P , a constant c, and an n-ary function f let:
PPc ≡ P (c), and
PPf ≡ ∀Px1 · · · ∀PxnP (f(x1, . . . , xn)).
For a vocabulary V the set of P -preservation sentences for V is:
PPV = {PPs | s is a constant or a function in V}.
Lemma 6.1.7 First-order logic is joinable.
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Proof: Let T1 and T2 be two first-order theories in disjoint vocabularies V1 and V2
respectively. Let P1, P2 6∈ V1 ∪ V2 be unary relations, and V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ {P1, P2}.
Consider the V-theory:
J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
= TP11 ∪ PP1V1 ∪ TP22 ∪ PP2V2 .
This theory joins T1 and T2.
To see this, suppose that A1 |=LSV1 T1 and A2 |=LSV2 T2. Let A′1 be a V-expansion
of A1 in which P1(p) is true for every p ∈ dom(A′1), and let A′2 be a V-expansion of
A2 in which P2(q) is true for every q ∈ dom(A′2).
The join A = A′1∪A′2 then FOV-models J(P1,P2)(T1,T2;V1,V2) as clearly A satisfies PP1V1∪PP2V2 ,
since A′1 and A
′
2 are by definition closed under the functions of V1 and V2 respectively.
We also have A |=FOV TP11 , as the truth of TP11 depends only on the elements of A for
which P is true, which are exactly the elements in A′1, for which T1 holds. Similarly
A |=FOV TP22 as the truth of TP22 depends only on the elements in A′2, for which P2
is true.
Now suppose thatB |=FOV J(P1,P2)(T1,T2;V1,V2), then clearlyB has two partial-substructures
BP1 and BP2 , such that x ∈ dom(BPi) iff Pi(x) is true. As B models PP1V1 ∪ PP2V2 ,
both BP1 and BP2 must be respectively V1-closed and V2-closed. Hence B
′
P1
the
V1-reduct of BP1 , and B
′
P2
the V2-reduct of BP2 are FOV-structures. Now as T
P1
1
does not reference any element of dom(B) that lies outside of dom(BP1), the struc-
ture B′P1 must satisfy T1. Similarly as T
P2
2 only references elements of dom(BP2),
the structure B′P2 satisfies T2. Therefore B must be a join of structures that satisfy
T1 and T2. o
Lemma 6.1.8 Any logical system which contains first-order logic 1 is joinable.
Proof: If a logical system LS contains first-order logic then the theory J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
from proof of Lemma 6.1.7 can be defined in exactly the same manner and we can
follow exactly the same argument as above with LS replacing first-order logic.
1Such as every logical system defined in Subsection 3.2.1
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In some logical systems (such as first-order real logic) every LS-model must have
the same domain, in which case the sorting relations are unnecessary and the theory
T1 ∪ T2 joins T1 and T2.
o
6.1.2 Concatenating and Combining Theory Machines
Theorem 6.1.9 Let LS be a logical system which contains first-order logic. If the
word function problems f : Aa → Bb and g : Bb → Cc where a, b, c ∈ {∗, ω} are
computable by a finite LS-theory machine, then g ◦ f is computable by a finite
LS-theory machine.
Proof: Let M1 = (T1, I1,O1) be a finite LSV1-theory machine that is able to com-
pute f with inputs AˆaX1 ⊆ I1 and outputs BˆbY1 ⊆ O1, as well as equality relation
=1 ∈ V1, which satisfies the equality axioms EQ=1V1 ⊆ T1 (Definition A.1.1).
Similarly, let M2 = (T2, I2,O2) be a finite LSV2-theory machine that is able to
compute g with inputs BˆbX2 ⊆ I2 and outputs CˆcY2 ⊆ O2, as well as equality relation
=2 ∈ V2, with EQ=2V2 ⊆ T2.
Clearly B ⊆ (V1 ∩ V2), so V1 and V2 are not disjoint. However to ensure dis-
jointness we can just replace V2 with V2 = {v | v ∈ V2} and relabel the sentences
of M2 = (T2, I2,O2) to give us the finite LSV2-theory machine M2 = (T2, I2,O2).
Clearly M2 and M2 are able to compute exactly the same problems as each model
of M2 is isomorphic to a model of M2.
Also let the output simple sequence of M1, and the input simple sequence of M2
be:
Y1 = {γ1(σn1 (δ1))}n∈N and X2 = {γ2(σn2 (δ2))}n∈N.
Consider the LSV-theory machine M
′ = (T′, I1,O2) with vocabulary:
V = V1 ∪ V2 unionsq {P1, P2, ϑ},
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where P1, P2 are unary relations and ϑ is a unary function. Let M
′ have theory:
T′ = J(P1,P2)(T1,T2;V1,V2) ∪K
P1
(B;Y1,X2;ϑ)
.
Where J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
is as in proof of Lemma 6.1.7. Whereas KP1(B;Y1,X2;ϑ)
defines ϑ to
be a function that maps every output in BˆbY1 onto its corresponding input in Bˆ
b
X2
:
KP1(B;Y1,X2;ϑ)
=

ϑ(δ1) =2 δ2,
∀P1x(ϑ(σ1(x)) =2 σ2(ϑ(x))),
∀P1x
∧
s∈(B∪{b})
((γ1(x) =1 s)→ (γ2(ϑ(x)) =2 s))
 .
J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
and KP1(B;Y1,X2;ϑ)
are finite, so M′ is also a finite LS-theory machine.
Let A be a model of T′. For any p, q ∈ dom(A) if p = σn1 (δ1) and q = σn2 (δ2) for
some n ∈ N, then we have ϑ(p) =2 q in A, this follows from the first and second
sentences of KP1(B;Y1,X2;ϑ)
and induction on n. Hence, by the third sentence we must
also have that if γ1(p) =1 s in A then γ2(q) =2 s in A.
Therefore if A |=LSV ΦbY1(v) for some v ∈ Bb, then we must also have A |=LSV
ΦbX2(v).
Now let A |=LSV T′∪ΦaX1(w) for some w ∈ Aa. By Lemma 6.1.8, since J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
⊂
T′ the structure A is a join of a model A1 of T1 and a model A2 of T2. Additionally
A1 |=LSV ΦaX1(w), so since M1 computes f we also have A1 |=LSV ΦbY1(f(w)).
Hence A |=LSV ΦbY1(f(w)), so by our reasoning above A |=LSV ΦbX2(f(w)). Which
means that A2 |=LSV ΦbX2(f(w)), and asM2 computes g we have A2 |=LSV ΦcY2(g(f(w))).
Therefore A |=LSV ΦcY2(g(f(w))), and as A was arbitrary we have:
M′(ΦaX1(w)) = Φ
c
Y2
(g ◦ f(w)),
for any w ∈ Aa. o
Definition 6.1.10 Let M1 and M2 be LS-theory machines as in the proof of The-
orem 6.1.9 above. We then refer to M′ above as the (B;Y1,X2)-concatenation of M1
and M2 which we denote by M2 ◦(B;Y1,X2) M1.
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Note how f and g in Theorem 6.1.9 are total functions, an obvious question is
whether the above result works for partial functions as well. It so happens that the
concatenation of two finite LS-computable partial functions is not in general finite
LS-computable, see Corollary 8.3.7 for details.
However as the below example indicates, the concatenation of two Turing com-
putable finite word functions is necessarily Turing computable.
Example 6.1.11 Let M1 and M2 be Turing machines that compute functions f :⊆
A∗ → B∗ and g :⊆ B∗ → C∗ respectively. We can then characterise M1 and M2 as
in Example 5.1.2 by SO=-theory machines:
TMM1 = (TMTM1 , Aˆ
∗
XTM
, Bˆ∗YTM ), and TMM2 = (TMTM2 , Bˆ
∗
XTM
, Cˆ∗YTM ).
The (B;YTM ,XTM)-concatenationM2◦(B;YTM,XTM )M1 is then able to compute g◦f :⊆
A∗ → C∗.
Theorem 6.1.12 Let LS be a logical system which contains first-order logic. If
word problems A,B ⊆ Aa where a ∈ {∗, ω} are computable by a finite LS-theory
machine then A ∩B and A ∪B are computable by a finite LS-theory machine.
Proof: Let M1 = (T1, I1,O1) be a finite LSV1-theory machine that is able to com-
pute A ⊆ Aa, with inputs AˆaX1 ⊆ I1, and outputs Θ1,Ψ1 ∈ O1 corresponding to
accepting and rejecting1 respectively. Also let M1 have equality relation =1 ∈ V1,
which satisfies the equality axioms EQ=1V1 ⊆ T1.
Similarly, let M2 = (T2, I2,O2) be a finite LSV2-theory machine that is able to
compute B ⊆ Aa, with inputs AˆaX2 ⊆ I2, and outputs Θ2,Ψ2 ∈ O2 corresponding
to accepting and rejecting respectively. Also let M2 have equality relation =2 ∈ V2,
which satisfies the equality axioms EQ=2V2 ⊆ T2.
As in the proof of Theorem 6.1.9 we can replace V2 with V2 to ensure that
V1 ∩ V2 = ∅.
1As in Definition 4.2.10
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By definition, Ψ1 must be a finite set of sentences, so let ψ1 =
∧
φ∈Ψ1 φ. We then
have Ψ1 |=LSV1 ψ1 and ψ1 |=LSV1 Ψ1. Similarly let ψ2 =
∧
φ∈Ψ2 φ.
Consider the finite LSV-theory machine M
′′ = (T′′, I1,O′′), with vocabulary V =
V1 ∪ V2 unionsq {P1, P2, ϑ}, where P1, P2 are unary relations and ϑ is a unary function.
Let M′′ have theory:
T′ = J(P1,P2)(T1,T2;V1,V2) ∪K
P1
(A;X1,X2;ϑ)
.
where J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
and KP1(A;X1,X2;ϑ)
are as in the proof of Theorem 6.1.9, with the
terms of X1 replacing those of Y1.
Let B be a model of T′′. By our reasoning in the proof of Theorem 6.1.9, we can
see that if B |=LSV ΦaX1(w) for some w ∈ Aa, then B |=LSV ΦaX2(w). So each input
of M1 is copied and becomes an input of M2 as well.
Let M′′ have output set:
O′′ = {Θ1 ∪Θ2, {ψ1 ∨ ψ2}}.
So let B |=LSV T′′ ∪ΦaX1(w) for some w ∈ Aa. By Lemma 6.1.8, since J
(P1,P2)
(T1,T2;V1,V2)
⊂
T′′ the structure B is a join of a model B1 of T1 ∪ ΦaX1(w) and a model B2 of
T2 ∪ ΦaX2(w).
If w ∈ A ∩ B then by the definition of M1 and M2 we have B1 |=LSV Θ1 and
B2 |=LSV Θ2. Hence B |=LSV Θ1 ∪ Θ2. Otherwise if w 6∈ A ∩ B then either
B1 |=LSV Ψ1, in which caseB1 |=LSV ψ1, orB2 |=LSV Ψ2, in which caseB2 |=LSV ψ2.
Therefore B |=LSV ψ1 ∨ ψ2. Consequently M′′ is able to compute A ∩B.
To compute A ∪B, let θ1 =
∧
φ∈Θ1 φ and θ2 =
∧
φ∈Θ2 φ. By replacing the output
set O′′ in M′′ with:
O′′′ = {{θ1 ∨ θ2},Ψ1 ∩Ψ2},
we find as above that if w ∈ A ∪ B then B1 |=LSV θ1 or B2 |=LSV θ2, so therefore
B |=LSV θ1∨θ2. Otherwise if w 6∈ A∪B then w 6∈ A and w 6∈ B, hence B1 |=LSV Ψ1
and B2 |=LSV Ψ2, and therefore B |=LSV Ψ1 ∪Ψ2. o
Remark 6.1.13 By Proposition 6.0.7, and Theorems 6.1.9 and 6.1.12, if LS is
one of the logical systems we defined in Subsection 3.2.1, then the collection of
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problems computable by the class of finite LS-theory machines is closed under
complementation, intersection, union, and functional concatenation.
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Chapter 7
Further Examples of Theory
Machines
In this chapter we explain how we can characterise quantum computers and infinite
time Turing machines with finite theory machines.
7.1 Quantum Computers
As we explained in Section 2.4, the circuit model of quantum computation involves
using a classical computer to computably generate a quantum circuit before imple-
menting a quantum computation on that circuit [50, 59]. We can therefore use the
concept of concatenating theory machines that we developed in the previous chap-
ter to characterise this model of quantum computation by a finite theory machine.
This is done by combining the quantum circuit implementing machine detailed in
Examples 7.1.3 and 7.1.5 below with a Turing machine like the one in Example 5.1.2.
As noted in Section 2.4, we can efficiently approximate any computable quantum
circuit using just the Hadamard, pi
4
, and controlled-not gates [59]. We can completely
describe such a quantum circuit using words constructed from:
Υ = {H˜, T˜ , ⊕˜, ′1, ′1, ′2, ′2}. (7.1)
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This is sufficient for describing a quantum circuit as the qubit(s) that each gate
is applied to can be specified by two pointers which begin at the 0th qubit, and
are moved up and down by 1, 1 and 2, 2. The symbols H˜ and T˜ then indicate
that the Hadamard and the pi
4
gate are respectively applied to the qubit pointed to
by the first pointer. The symbol ⊕˜ indicates that the controlled-not gate should
be implemented with the first pointer pointing to the control qubit and the second
pointing to the target qubit. In this way the whole circuit can be specified by a
word read from left to right, with the gates being implemented in the order that
they are written.
Example 7.1.1 A word of the form H˜ 1 T˜ H˜ 1 T˜ describes the circuit:
H T
T H
H˜ 1 T˜ H˜ 1 T˜
The first symbol H˜ of the word indicates that a Hadamard gate should be applied
to the 0th qubit, as the first pointer points to the 0th qubit at the start of the
computation. The next symbol 1 then indicates that this pointer should now point
to the 1st qubit, which means that the following symbols T˜ and H˜ indicate that
the pi
4
and Hadamard gates should be applied to this qubit. 1 then moves the first
pointer back to qubit 0, and so the final symbol T˜ means that the pi
4
gate is applied
to this qubit.
Example 7.1.2 A word of the form 2 2 ⊕˜H˜ 1 T˜ 1 H˜ 2 ⊕˜ describes the circuit:
• H
T
H •
2 2 ⊕˜ H˜ 1 T˜ 1 H˜ 2 ⊕˜
So after the first two symbols 2 2 of the word move the second pointer to the 2nd
qubit, the next symbol ⊕˜ indicates that a controlled-not gate is applied, with the
2nd qubit as the target qubit and the 0th as the control, since the first pointer still
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points to the 0th qubit. The following string of symbol H˜ 1 T˜ 1 H˜ then indicate
that a Hadamard, a pi
4
, and a Hadamard gate should be applied to the 0th, 1st, and
2nd qubits respectively. Finally 2 moves the second pointer to the 1st qubit, so ⊕˜
now indicates that a controlled-not gate is applied with the 1st qubit as the target
qubit and the 2nd as the control.
Though describing a circuit via this sort of word does imply a sequential imple-
mentation of the gates, it is worth noting that the above circuits are equivalent
to:
H T
T H
and
• H
T
H •
So circuits in which single-qubit gates are applied to different qubits simultaneously
may still be effectively described in the above manner.
The basis set for N qubits is {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, . . . , 2N − 1}}, for simplicity in
the examples below we will order the qubits from right to left. So for example
|11001〉 = |1〉4|1〉3|0〉2|0〉1|1〉0, indicates that the 0th, 3rd and 4th qubits are in state
|1〉, whereas the 1st and 2nd qubits are in state |0〉.
To apply a single-qubit quantum gate U =
 u00 u01
u10 u11
 to the lth qubit of
|ψ〉 = ∑2N−1m=0 αm|m〉 we apply the transformation I⊗(N−l−1) ⊗ U ⊗ I⊗(l−1). Such a
transformation is fairly complicated to describe, to do so we can look at the binary
expansion of each element of m ∈ {0, . . . , 2N − 1}.
Indeed let B and O be binary functions, such that B(x, y) gives the binary value
of the yth digit of x for each x, y ∈ N. Whereas O(x, y) = z if z and x have the same
binary expansion as each other except for the yth digit. So formally for x, y ∈ N
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where x = · · · 00bN−1bN−2 · · · b1b0 in binary1, we have:
B(x, y) = by. (7.2)
O(x, y) = z if z = · · · 00bNbN−1 · · · by+1(1− by)by−1 · · · b1b0 (7.3)
The values of I⊗(N−l−1) ⊗ U ⊗ I⊗(l−1) = (umn)2Nm,n=1 (a 2N × 2N complex-valued
matrix) are then:
vmn =

u00 if n = m and B(m, l) = 0,
u01 if n = O(m, l) and B(m, l) = 0,
u10 if n = O(m, l) and B(m, l) = 1,
u11 if n = m and B(m, l) = 1,
0 otherwise.
Therefore I⊗(N−1) ⊗ U ⊗ I⊗(l−1) applied to |ψ〉 results in:
2N−1∑
m=0
((1−B(m, l))(u00αm + u01αO(m,l))) +B(m, l)(u10αO(m,l) + u11αm)))|m〉.
Note that since B(m, l) ∈ {0, 1}, for each m, the mth component of the summation
above must be equal to either (u00αm + u01αO(m,l))|m〉 or (u10αO(m,l) + u11αm)|m〉.
Specifically, applying the Hadamard gate to the lth qubit of |ψ〉 results in:
2N−1∑
m=0
((1−B(m, l)) 1√
2
(αm + αO(m,l))) +B(m, l)
1√
2
(αO(m,l) − αm)))|m〉, (7.4)
whereas applying the pi
4
gate to the lth qubit of |ψ〉 gives:
2N−1∑
m=0
((1−B(m, l))αm +B(m, l)e ipi4 αm)|m〉. (7.5)
To apply the controlled-not gate to |ψ〉 = ∑2N−1m=0 αm|m〉 with control qubit l and
target qubit k we swap the values of αm and αO(m,k) if B(m, l) = 1, otherwise they
remain as they are. Hence we obtain:
2N−1∑
m=0
((1−B(m, l))αm +B(m, l)αO(m,k))|m〉. (7.6)
1Note that like with qubits we number the digits of a binary expansion from right to left,
allowing for an infinite sequence of zeros on the left.
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In the following example we characterise a quantum device by a theory machine in
first-order complex logic (FOC) (Definition 3.2.7). This device takes as its input a
state |w〉 where w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a quantum circuit description written as a word
of Υ∗ (from Equation 7.1 above). The device calculates the result of this circuit on
input |w〉 and outputs whether the first qubit is measured to be |1〉 with a probability
greater than 2
3
, or with probability less than or equal to 1
3
.
Example 7.1.3 Consider the finite FOC-theory machine:
QC = (QCT, IQ, {{α}, {β}}),
in the vocabulary of:
VQ = VC+ ∪ {V,B,O, I, C, P1, P2,M, s, d} ∪Υ,
where as in Definition A.1.11 the symbols in VC+ = {6,N,−, /, ·2,
√·, | · |, 2∧, 2, eipi4 }
have their usual meanings in C. Whereas V,B,O are binary functions such that
V (x, y) gives the complex value of the yth basis state at time x, and B,O are
defined as in Equations 7.2 and 7.3 above. C, I, P1, P2,M are unary functions where
I(m) and C(m) give the mth symbol of the input state and circuit word respectively.
Whereas P1(x) and P2(x) represent the circuit pointers mentioned above at time x,
and M expresses the probability that qubit 0 is measured to be |1〉 at the end of the
computation. Finally s, d and the elements of Υ are constants, with s corresponding
to the input state, d corresponding to the measurement time, and Υ consisting of
the set of symbols used to describe the circuit as in Equation 7.1.
To input a quantum state together with a circuit we have:
IQ =
{
Φ∗XQS(w) ∪ Φ∗XQC (v)
∣∣∣ w ∈ {0, 1}∗ and v ∈ Υ∗}
So the inputs are formed from a finite XQS-word set and a finite XQC-word set,
where:
XQS = {I(nˆ)}n∈N and XQC = {C(nˆ)}n∈N.
Where nˆ ≡ 1 + · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
for n ∈ N. So the finite word set:
Φ∗XQS(w) =
{
I(kˆ) = wk | k ∈ {0, . . . , |w| − 1}
}
∪
{
I( ˆ|w|) = b
}
,
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gives the integer binary expansion of the input state via I, with for example w =
001010 corresponding to the binary number 10100. Whereas the finite word set:
Φ∗XQC (v) =
{
C(jˆ) = vj | k ∈ {0, . . . , |w| − 1}
}
∪
{
C( ˆ|v|) = b
}
,
ensures that C(m) maps to the mth symbol of the circuit word v for each m ∈ N.
The output sentences α and β (defined below in 7.7 and 7.8) indicate whether
the quantum circuit should accept, or reject its input. The theory is:
QCT = CD=VQ ∪ ACA ∪BODN ∪ ITQN ∪ EV QN ∪MTQN ∪ PN{B,O,P1,P2,M}.
Where CD=VQ is the set of distinct constant axioms for VQ (Definition 4.2.6), and
ACA is the set of additional real axioms (Definition A.1.11), which ensures that
in each model of QCT the symbols in VC+ have their usual definitions (Corollary
A.1.13). The set BODN defines the functions B and O. The initial configuration
of the quantum circuit is defined by the sentences in ITQN, and is evolved in ac-
cordance with those in EV QN. The function M which expresses the measurement
outcome is defined by MTQN. Finally as in Definition 6.1.6 PN{B,O,P1,P2,M} ensures
that B,O, P1, P2,M map natural numbers to natural numbers.
Note that much of the theory of QC is sorted by N (Definition 6.1.4), this is
because the time step and the qubit states are natural numbers. So the quantified
inputs in BOD∪ ITQ∪EV Q∪MTQ will all lie in N, but since V is not mentioned
in PN{B,O,P1,P2,M}, it may map to any element of C.
Let Q be an FOC-model of QCT ∪ Φ∗XQS(w) ∪ Φ∗XQC (v), by definition, such a
model is an expansion of the usual structure of the complex numbers, and since
ACA ⊆ QCT the symbols of VC+ have their usual definitions in Q.
So formally, to define B and O as in Equations 7.2 and 7.3 we have:
BOD =

∀x∀y(B(x, y) = 0) ∨ (B(x, y) = 1),
∀x∀y(x < (2∧(y))))→ (B(x, y) = 0)),
∀x∀y¬(B(x, y) = B(x+ (2∧(y)), y)),
∀x∀y∀z((B(x, z) = B(O(x, y), z))↔ ¬(y = z))

.
104
7.1 Quantum Computers
B(x, y) corresponds to a bit value, so it always maps to 0 or 1. As BODN ⊆ QCT,
the values of B(x, y) for x, y ∈ N are defined through induction. The second sentence
of BODN serves as a base case. If x < 2y then the yth entry of the binary expansion
of x must be 0 as we can view such an expansion to be preceded on the left by an
infinite sequence of 0’s1. The third sentence of BODN provides the inductive step,
as adding 2y to x must change the value of the yth entry of x’s binary expansion
since this corresponds to adding the binary number 1 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
×(y−1)
to x. The value can
only be 0 or 1, so any change must cause this value to flip.
The final sentence of BODN then states that the function O(x, y) maps to a
natural number n such that B(n, z) = B(x, z) for every z ∈ N except y, which
corresponds to taking:
n = . . . B(n,N) . . . B(n, y + 1)(1−B(n, y))B(n, y − 1) . . . B(n, 1)B(n, 0).
As mentioned before, to express the values of the whole qubit state at each time
step we have the function V . Where V (x, y) gives the complex value of the yth basis
state at time x, meaning that the whole state of the circuit at time x is:∑
y∈N
V (x, y)|y〉.
The functions P1 and P2 act as the two pointers of the quantum circuit indicating
which qubit is to be transformed by the next quantum operation. So at the start
of the quantum computation the pointers should both point to the 0th qubit. To
ensure this and to define the initial state of V at time 0 we have:
ITQ =

∀x((I(x) = b)→ (I(x+ 1) = b)),
∀x((C(x) = b)→ (C(x+ 1) = b)),
∀x(¬(I(x) = b)→ (B(s, x) = I(x))),
∀x((I(x) = b)→ (B(s, x) = 0)),
V (0, s) = 1,
∀y(¬(y = s)→ (V (0, y) = 0)),
(P1(0) = 0) ∧ (P2(0) = 0)

.
1This corresponds to taking the state of any qubit not affected by the circuit as existing but
remaining fixed as |0〉.
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From the input we have Q |=FOC {I(|w|+1) = b}∪{C(|v|+1) = b}. Hence the first
two sentences of ITQN ensure through induction that I(m) = b and C(n) = b in Q
for all m > |w| and n > |v| (as in Example 4.2.5). The third and fourth sentences
of ITQN then define the binary expansion of s in Q to be 0−ωw.
Hence for any basis state |ψ〉, where ψ ∈ N the input Φ∗XQS(w) together with
BODN and the fifth and sixth sentences of ITQN ensure that V (0, ψ) = 1 in Q iff
|ψ〉 = |w〉, and otherwise V (0, ψ) = 0. Meaning that at time 0 the quantum state
of the circuit is exactly |w〉.
To evolve V via the quantum circuit described by v ∈ Υ we have:
EV Q =

∀x((C(x) = 1)→ (P1(x+ 1) = (P1(x)− 1))),
∀x((C(x) = 1)→ (P1(x+ 1) = (P1(x) + 1))),
∀x((C(x) = 2)→ (P2(x+ 1) = (P2(x)− 1))),
∀x((C(x) = 2)→ (P2(x+ 1) = (P2(x) + 1))),
∀x((C(x) = H˜)→ ∀y(η1(x, y) ∧ η2(x, y)),
∀x((C(x) = T˜ )→ ∀y(υ1(x, y) ∧ υ2(x, y)),
∀x((C(x) = ⊕˜ )→ ∀y(κ1(x, y) ∧ κ2(x, y)),
∀x(((C(x) = b) ∧ ¬(C(x− 1) = b))→ (d = x),

The first four sentences of EV QN define how the pointers move given symbols
1, 1, 2, or 2 on the input word Φ
∗
XQC
(w). So at time step x pointer j points
to qubit a in Q if Pj(x) = a, and if C(x) = vx = j, then at time x + 1 pointer
j should point to a − 1, and so we have Pj(x + 1) = a − 1 in Q. Whereas if
C(x) = vx = j then the pointer should point to a + 1 at time x + 1, and so
Pj(x+ 1) = a+ 1 in Q.
Given the symbol H˜ a Hadamard gate is applied to the qubit at P1(x) via the
fifth sentence of EV QN and the formulas:
η1(x, y) ≡ (B(y, P1(x)) = 0)→ (V (x+ 1, y) = (V (x, y) + V (x,O(y, P1(x))))/
√
2),
η2(x, y) ≡ (B(y, P1(x)) = 1)→ (V (x+ 1, y) = (V (x, y)− V (x,O(y, P1(x))))/
√
2).
So as in Equation 7.4 η1(x, y)∧η2(x, y) ensures that if pointer 1 is pointing to the lth
qubit in Q and the complex value of the basis state |y〉 is αy at time x, then at time
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x+ 1 it becomes 1√
2
(αy +αO(y,l)) in Q if the lth digit of y is a 0 and
1√
2
(αy−αO(y,l))
if the lth digit is a 1.
Given the symbol T˜ a pi
4
gate is applied to the qubit at P1(x) via the sixth sentence
of EV QN and the formulas:
υ1(x, y) ≡ (B(y, P1(x)) = 0)→ (V (x+ 1, y) = V (x, y)),
υ2(x, y) ≡ (B(y, P1(x)) = 1)→ (V (x+ 1, y) = (eipi4 × V (x, y))).
As in Equation 7.5 υ1(x, y) ∧ υ2(x, y) maps αy|y〉 at time x to αy|y〉 at time x + 1
in Q if P1(x)th digit of y is a 0, and to e
ipi
4 αy|y〉 at time x+ 1 otherwise.
Given the symbol ⊕˜ a controlled-not gate is applied to the qubits at P1(x) and
P2(x) via the seventh sentence of EV Q
N and the formulas:
κ1(x, y) ≡ (B(y, P1(x)) = 0)→ (V (x+ 1, y) = V (x, y)),
κ2(x, y) ≡ (B(y, P1(x)) = 1)→ (V (x+ 1, y) = V (x,O(y, P2(x)))).
As in Equation 7.6 if pointer 1 is pointing to the lth qubit then this is the control
qubit. So if the lth digit of y is a 0 then κ1(x, y) just maps αy|y〉 at time x to αy|y〉
at time x + 1 in Q. Whereas if the lth digit of y is a 1 and pointer 2 is pointing
to the kth qubit then κ2(x, y) makes the value of the yth basis state equal to the
value of the O(y, k)th basis state at time x+ 1. Since O(O(y, k), k) = y the seventh
sentence swaps the values of yth and O(y, k)th basis states in Q for each y ∈ N with
B(y, l) = 1.
Recall that the circuit input Φ∗XQC (w) together with the third sentence of ITQ
N
implies that (C(x) = b) ∧ ¬(C(x − 1) = b) is true iff x = |v|. So at time |v| the
circuit ends, hence the quantum computation should end as well, and so the final
sentence of EV QN fixes this time to be d in Q.
Finally, we take the quantum circuit as accepting the input if the probability of
measuring that the first qubit is |1〉 is greater than 2
3
, and rejecting if the probability
is less than 1
3
. This measurement can happen for a basis state |y〉 if and only if
B(y, 0) = 1, which is true if and only if y ∈ N is odd. Therefore the probability of
measuring |1〉 is equal to ∑∞y=0 |V (e, 2y + 1)|2.
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To calculate this probability we use the function M , where we define M(m) =∑m
y=0 |V (e, 2y + 1)|2 inductively as follows:
MTQ =
 M(0) = |V (d, 1)|2,∀y(M(y + 1) = (M(y) + |V (d, ((2× y) + 1)|2))
 .
The outputs are then {α} and {β} where:
α ≡ ∃Ny((2/(2 + 1)) < M(y)), (7.7)
β ≡ ∀Ny(M(y) 6 (1/(2 + 1))). (7.8)
Clearly, M is an increasing function, and we may only have
∑∞
y=0 |V (e, 2y + 1)|2 >
2
3
if there exists some m ∈ N such that ∑my=0 |V (e, 2y + 1)|2 > 23 . Conversely∑∞
y=0 |V (e, 2y + 1)|2 6 13 only if
∑l
y=0 |V (e, 2y + 1)|2 6 13 for every l ∈ N.
Therefore α is true in Q iff the probability of measuring a |1〉 in the first qubit
of the output of the circuit described by v and given input |w〉 is greater than to 2
3
.
Whereas β is true in Q iff the probability of this scenario is less than or equal to 1
3
.
If the probability is between 1
3
and 2
3
then the output is undefined.
Remark 7.1.4 Whilst the output of the theory machine QC describes the proba-
bility of an event, the result is not itself probabilistic. Instead, the measurement
probability of at least 2
3
or no greater than 1
3
is obtained by each model of QC with
certainty.
In Example 7.1.6 below we shall describe how we can combine a theory machine like
QC above with a Turing machine, creating a device which is able to decide problems
in exactly the same way that a quantum computer does (Definition 2.4.5). That is,
for a quantum circuit Q = {QN}n∈N and each input w ∈ {0, 1}∗ the device computes
with its Turing machine component a word that describes Q|w| before applying Q|w|
to |w〉 and measuring.
However, to concatenate two theory machines they must both use the same logical
system. So firstly we shall explain how QC can also be characterised in second-order
logic with equality, before in Example 7.1.6 combining such a machine with the SO=
description we gave of a Turing machine in Example 5.1.2.
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Example 7.1.5 Consider the finite SO=V′Q
-theory machine:
QC′ = (QCT′, IQ, {{α}, {β}}),
in the vocabulary of:
V′Q = VQ ∪ {<,R,+,×, 0, 1, i},
where VQ is as in Example 7.1.3 and <,R,+,×, 0, 1, i are the usual symbols of
complex arithmetic, with R being the unary characteristic function of the reals in
C. Further let IQ, α and β be exactly as they are in Example 7.1.3, and let QC′
have the theory:
QCT′ = QCT ∪ CAA.
Where QCT is as in Example 7.1.3, and CAA is the set of complex arithmetic axioms
(Definition A.1.9), which by Proposition A.1.10 ensures that every model of QCT′ is
isomorphic to an expansion of the usual structure of complex arithmetic.
QCT′ is otherwise the same as QCT, and the inputs and the outputs of QC′ are
identical to those of QC. Hence by our reasoning in Example 7.1.3, any model of
QC′ with input Φ∗XQS(w)∪Φ∗XQC (v) must satisfy α if the probability of measuring |1〉
in the first qubit of the output of the circuit described by v and given input |w〉 is
greater than to 2
3
, and β if this probability is less than or equal to 1
3
.
Example 7.1.6 Let K = (Kn)n∈N be a computable sequence of quantum circuits
constructed from the gate set {H,T,CNOT, }. Further let MK be a Turing machine
with input alphabet {0, 1} which on input w ∈ {0, 1}∗ computes the word v where
v ∈ Υ∗ describes the circuit K|w|.
We can characterise MK with the finite SO
=-theory machine:
TMMK = (TMTMK ,
ˆ{0, 1}∗XTM , Υˆ∗YTM ),
where the theory TMTMK corresponds to TMTM ′ in Example 5.1.2 with the rules
and states of M ′ replaced by those of MK . Let:
QC′ ◦
(Υ;YTM,XQC )
TMMK = (T◦,
ˆ{0, 1}∗XTM , {{α}, {β}}),
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be the (Υ;YTM ,XQC)-concatenation of TMMK and QC
′ with vocabulary V◦ = VMK ∪
VQ ∪ {P1, P2, ϑ}, where as in the proof of Theorem 6.1.9 we have replaced VQ with
VQ so as to ensure disjointness.
We can then characterise the computation of the computable quantum circuit K
by the finite SO=-theory machine:
CQCK = (CQCTK , ˆ{0, 1}
∗
XTM
, {{α}, {β}}),
with vocabulary VCQK = V◦ ∪ {%}. Where CQCK ’s theory is:
CQCTK = T◦ ∪KP1({0,1},XTM ,XQS ;%).
The set KP1({0,1},XTM ,XQS ;%) is as in the proofs of Theorems 6.1.9 and 6.1.12, and serves
to map the input word of TMMK into an input state of QC
′.
Since T◦ ⊂ CQCTK , any model K of CQCTK is a join of a model A of TMTMK and
a model Q of QCT.
Now if K |=SO=
VCQK
Φ∗XTM (w) then A |=SO=VMK Φ
∗
XTM
(w), and so A |=SO=
VMK
Φ∗YTM (v). Therefore by T◦ it follows that Q |=SO=VQ Φ
∗
XQC
(v).
From KP1(XTM ,XQS ;%)
and our reasoning in the proof of Theorem 6.1.9 we also have
Q |=SO=
VQ
Φ∗XQS(w). Consequently by our reasoning in Example 7.1.3 we have
Q |=SO=
VQ
α if the first qubit is measured to be |1〉 with a probability greater than
2
3
, and Q |=SO=
VQ
β if it is measured to be |1〉 with probability less than or equal to
1
3
.
K models α or β only if the same scenarios hold. Therefore if the computable
quantum circuit K is able to decide the problem A ⊆ {0, 1}∗, then our finite theory
machine CQCK is also able to decide A.
7.2 Infinite Time Turing Machines
As we described in Section 2.5, infinite time Turing machines (IIT machines) [44]
generalise the concept of a multi-tape Turing machine by allowing the computation
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to take an ordinal number (Definition 2.5.3) of time steps. In the following we
characterise an ITT machine by a finite theory machine.
Example 7.2.1 Let V = (Π, s0, sλ, s1, S) be an ITT machine with m − 2 work
tapes1. We can then characterise V by the finite SO=VV -theory machine:
ITV = (ITTV , ˆ{0, 1}
ω
XTM1
, ˆ{0, 1}ωYTMm ),
with vocabulary:
VV = {<,L, S, I, h} ∪ {C1, . . . , Cm} ∪ {H1, . . . , Hm} ∪ {0, 1} ∪ Π.
Where the symbols in VV \ {L} are as they are in Example 5.3.1 with 0 taking the
place of the blank symbol b. Whereas L is a unary relation such that L(x) is true iff
x is a limit ordinal. The sequences XTM1 and YTMm are also the same as in Example
5.3.1, describing the cell contents of the first tape at time 0 and the mth tape at
time h respectively.
The theory of ITTV is then:
ITTV = UOSA ∪ CD=VV ∪ IT(s0,m) ∪ ETS ∪HTs1 ∪ LCsλ .
Where UOSA is the set of uncountable ordinal successor axioms (Definition A.1.16),
and CD=VV is the set of distinct constant axioms for VV (Definition 4.2.6). Whereas
the sets, ITs0,m, ETS, and HTs1 are as in Example 5.3.1 for a multi-tape Turing
machine with m tapes, blank symbol 0, and rule set S. The definition of the limit
relation L together with how the limit configuration is defined is then given in LCsλ .
As UOSA ⊂ ITTV , by Proposition A.1.17, any SO=VV -model of ITTV must be
isomorphic to an expansion of an uncountable limit ordinal structure 〈Oδ;<,L, S, 0〉,
where Oδ is the set of ordinals less than some uncountable limit ordinal δ, and L
characterises the set of limit ordinals.
So if O |=SO=
VV
ITTV ∪ΦωXTM1 (w) for some w ∈ {0, 1}
ω then since IT(s0,m) ⊂ ITTV ,
the structure must have the same initial configuration as that of a 3-tape Turing
1As in Definition 2.5.4; Π is the set of internal states, s0 ∈ Π is the initial state, sλ ∈ Π is the
limit state, s1 ∈ Π is the halting state, and S is a set of m-tape Turing machine rules.
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machine. Notably, there is no ordinal below 0, so the sentence ∀y((y < 0) →
(C1(0, y) = b)) in IT(s0,m) is redundant.
Also, ETS ⊂ ITTV , so by our reasoning in Examples 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, for any time
step x if the configuration of O at time x is equal to the configuration of V at time
x, then the configuration of O at time S(x) must be the same as the configuration
of V at time S(x).
The configuration at each limit stage is determined by:
LCsλ =

∀Lx((I(x) = sλ) ∧
∧m
i=1(Hi(x) = 0)),
∀x∀y∧mi=1((Ci(x, y) = 0) ∨ (Ci(x, y) = 1),
∀Lx∀y∧mi=1((Ci(x, y) = 0)↔
(∃z1∀z2((z1 < x) ∧ (z1 < z2) ∧ (z2 < x))→ (Ci(z2, y) = 0)))

.
The first sentence of LCsλ ensures that at limit ordinal time steps the internal state
is sλ, and each tape head is placed back at square 0. The second sentence states
that each square contains either a 0 or a 1. Combining this with the final sentence
then dictates what the contents of each square is at each limit time step. At limit
step x, the yth cell of tape i contains a 0 iff there exists a time step z1 prior to x such
that for every step z2 between z1 and x the yth cell of tape i contains 0. Otherwise
the cell contains a 1. Hence Ci(x, y) = lim supz→xCi(z, y).
So O and V have both the same initial configuration, and the configurations of
O at successor and limit time steps evolve as they do in V . Therefore by transfinite
induction, every configuration of O at every time step of O is the same as it is in V .
Finally by Proposition 2.5.6, every halting ITT machine computation is count-
able, so if the halting state s1 is eventually reached in V , it must be reached at some
countable ordinal time step. Now as O is an expansion of an uncountable limit
ordinal structure dom(O) it contains every countable ordinal. So if the halting state
s1 is reached by V then it must occur at some time in O.
We also have HTs0 ⊂ ITTV , so the ordinal time step at which O halts is h. The
output is then ΦωYTMm (v) for some v ∈ {0, 1}ω, where clearly v is exactly what is
written on the mth tape of V on input w at the halting time step.
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Theorem 7.2.2 Any decision problem A ⊆ {0, 1}ω or function problem f :⊆
{0, 1}ω → {0, 1}ω, that is computable by an infinite time Turing machine can be
computed by a finite SO=-theory machine.
Proof: Let V be an infinite time Turing machine that computes the decision prob-
lem f :⊆ {0, 1}ω → {0, 1}ω. By Definition 2.5.5 for any w ∈ {0, 1}ω we have
V (w) = f(w). The finite SO=-theory machine ITV in Example 7.2.1 is then able to
compute f with each input w encoded as ΦωXTM1
(w) and by our reasoning in Example
7.2.1 we have that for any w ∈ {0, 1}ω:
ITTV (Φ
ω
XTM1
(w)) = ΦωYTMm (f(w))).
The fact that ITV is indeed a theory machine follows by the same reasoning as in
the proof of Theorem 5.1.3, with an ITT machine with input w ∈ {0, 1}ω giving
a model of ITTV ∪ ΦωXTM1 (w) provided that at time steps after h the internal state
of the machine is not in Π. Whilst the fact that each of the possible outputs are
mutually unsatisfiable follows from Lemma 4.2.9.
Similarly, let W be an infinite time Turing machine that computes the decision
problem A ⊆ {0, 1}ω. By Definition 2.5.5 for any w ∈ {0, 1}ω the ITT machine W
outputs 10ω if w ∈ A and 0ω otherwise. Now the finite SO=-theory machine ITW
is not able to compute A as the outputs ΦωYTMm (10
ω) and ΦωYTMm (0
ω) are not finite.
However, if we replace the output set ˆ{0, 1}ωYTMm of ITW with {Θ,Ψ} where:
Θ =
 Cm(h, 0) = 1,∀x((¬(x = 0) ∧ ∀y(L(y)→ (x < y)))→ (Cm(h, x) = 0)
 ,
and:
Ψ = {∀x(∀y(L(y)→ (x < y))→ (Cm(h, x) = 0)},
then:
IT′W = (ITTV , ˆ{0, 1}
ω
XTM1
, {Θ,Ψ}),
is an SO=-theory machine that is able to compute A. This follows from the above
reasoning and the fact that Θ and Φ are both finite sets of sentences. Also in any
model of ITTW∪ΦωXTM1 (w)), the truth of Θ is equivalent to the truth of Φ
ω
YTMm
(10ω) =
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{Cm(h, Si(0)) = 1} ∪ {Cm(h, Si(0)) = 0 | i ∈ N \ {0}} whereas the truth of Ψ is
equivalent to the truth of ΦωYTMm (0
ω) = {Cm(h, Si(0)) = 0 | i ∈ N}, hence the two
outputs are mutually unsatisfiable. o
Remark 7.2.3 There is a potential problem with how an ITT machine is defined,
namely that there is a left-most point and it is not clear what would happen if an
ITT machine tried to move past this point. This is particularly problematic as an
ITT machine does not appear to have any way of knowing where this left-most point
is. Hamkins and Lewis did not discuss this issue in [44], and presumably they did
not expect an ITT machine to have a problem when reaching the end of the tape.
One solution is to add a new symbol L to the language and place it only at the
start point of each tape [75], so if the machine sees L it knows not to move further
left. However, such a solution can be implemented without adding to the alphabet
(and complicating what happens at limit stages). All we have to do is encode 0, 1,
and L in the language of {0, 1}∗ as 00, 11, and 01 respectively, and have the ITT
machine rewrite the symbols on the input tape and place 01 at the beginning of
every tape. Hence we do not need modify our description of an ITT machine above
to obtain Hamkins and Lewis’ results for the computational capabilities of an ITT
machine.
Remark 7.2.4 By definition, an ITT machine has no blank tape cells and only two
sorts of tape symbols. So without altering the input word the only unambiguous
finite words that we can input into an ITT machine are unary words, that is, words
from {1}∗. An input 1n can then be written on the input tape as 1n0ω. Though
unary encoding is significantly less efficient than binary encoding, through Go¨del
numberings [27] we may encode any finite word from A∗ as a unary word of {1}∗.
Theorem 7.2.5 [44] Every arithmetical relation (Definition 2.1.11) is decidable by
an infinite time Turing machine.
Proof (sketch): To see that any relation R ∈ Σ01 is ITT computable, let P be
such that R(~x) ≡ ∃~yP (~x, ~y). Given any input ~x ∈ ∏ni=1A∗ (~x may be inputted
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into an ITT machine by encoding it as a word of A∗ (as in Remark 2.1.9) and
encoding this word as a word of {1}∗), we can compute the truth of R(~x) with an
infinite time Turing machine VR which computably checks the truth of P (~x, ~y) for
each ~y ∈ ∏ni=1A∗ in turn. If VR finds a ~y for which P (~x, ~y) holds then VR halts
and accepts. Otherwise VR keeps computing and eventually reaches the limit time
step ω with internal state sλ, in which case we know that there does not exist a
~y ∈∏ni=1A∗ such that P (~x, ~y) is true, hence R(~y) must be false and so VR halts and
rejects.
In similar manner we can compute any relation in the arithmetical hierarchy of
the form ∃~y1∀~y2 · · · ∃~yn−1∀~ynP (~x, ~y1, . . . , ~yn) with an ITT machine which checks the
truth of each possible entry of a given relation within α to α + ω time periods. o
Corollary 7.2.6 There exists a problem which is finite SO=-computable that is
not Turing machine computable.
Proof: By Theorem 7.2.5, for any R ∈ ⋃n∈N(Σ0n ∪ Π0n) there exists an ITT ma-
chine which is able to compute R. By Theorem 2.1.12 we know that there exist
arithmetical relations that are not Turing machine computable, so let P be such a
relation.
So since we can encode P as a decision problem, by Theorem 7.2.2 P is finite
SO=-computable whilst not being Turing machine computable. o
Therefore, like infinite theory machines, finite SO=-theory machines are able to
compute a wide variety of finite problems beyond the Turing machine computable
problems.
Remark 7.2.7 Infinite time Turing machines are not the only example of a super-
Turing system that can be characterised by a finite theory machine. Blum-Shub-
Smale machines, which can algebraically compute with real numbers are also capable
of such feats. We explained how such computational system can be characterised
by a finite theory machine in [75].
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When characterising a computational process using a theory machine any encoding
of an input should really happen within the theory machine itself. So to characterise
this encoding we have the following example in which we have a type-2 machine
which encodes words from A∗ into words of {0, 1}ω, concatenated with an ITT
machine.
Example 7.2.8 Let TE be a type-2 machine with input alphabet A, input type ∗
and output type ω. Given any finite input word w ∈ A∗ let TE output w˜0ω, where
w˜ is an encoding of w in {0, 1}∗.
Let VR be an ITT machine such that for some R ⊆
∏n
i=1A
∗ we have that VR
accepts w˜0ω iff w = 〈w1, . . . , wn〉1 and (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ R.
As in Example 5.3.2 we can characterise TE by the finite SO
=
VTE
-theory machine:
T2MTE = (T2MTTE , Aˆ
∗
XTM1
, ˆ{0, 1}ωYT2).
Whereas as in Example 7.2.1 we can characterise VR by the finite SO
=
VVR
-theory
machine:
ITVR = (ITTVR ,
ˆ{0, 1}ωXTM1 ,
ˆ{0, 1}ωYTMm ),
We can then describe a machine which takes inputs from A∗ and computes whether
w ∈ R by encoding w into an ITT machine VR which is able to decide R, via the
({0, 1};YT2,XTM1)-concatenation ITVR ◦({0,1};YT2,XTM1 ) T2MTE .
1As in Remark 2.1.9.
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Physical Computation and
Complete Theories
So far in this document we have presented various computational systems and ex-
plained how such systems can be characterised by theory machines. While some
of these computational systems are grounded in what is clearly physically possible
(e.g. Turing machines [27, 67], quantum computers [50, 59], and physical computers
[16]), other systems instead find utility in computing in ways that are questionably
achievable (e.g. Type-2 machines [72] and infinite time Turing machines [44])1.
The diverse inequivalent nature of these formulations presents the question of
what a computation actually is, and if computation can be “unphysical” then where
does the boundary between “physical” and “unphysical” computation lie? For ex-
ample, is it the transfinite aspect of an infinite time Turing machine that makes it
“unphysical”? If so, then why is a quantum computer able to “physically” compute
with an infinite continuous space?
One resolution to these questions is to invoke the Church-Turing thesis [27, 29, 67],
which as we noted in Chapter 1 is often rendered as:
“Every effectively calculable function is computable by a Turing machine,”
1Though notably these models have not been proven to be physically impossible, however its
not clear what form such a proof would take.
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and assume that it applies to any physical process that we compute with.
Now this may seem to be a perfectly natural assumption, as the physical world
provides us with the means to compute. So if it provided us with the means to
compute a function that was not Turing computable then the Church-Turing thesis
would have to be false. However, the Turing machine was designed to mimic and
describe how a person mathematically computes something [67], rather than how
a physical system might go about computing it. Indeed there are many aspects of
physics we (humanity as a whole) do not yet understand, so we cannot in good faith
disregard computational structures capable of violating the Church-Turing thesis
and label them “unphysical” just because we do not like what they can do.
That being said, in Quantum theory, the Church-Turing principle and the uni-
versal quantum computer [29] Deutsch suggested that there is at least sufficient
evidence to assert that the Church-Turing thesis applies to physical systems that we
are able to construct. He stated the modified thesis:
“Every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal
model computing machine operating by finite means.”
There is some theoretical justification for this thesis. In Church’s thesis and princi-
ples for mechanisms [35] Gandy formulated a concept of what it meant for a problem
to be computed by an arbitrary constructible mechanism, proving that a problem
is computable by such a device if and only if it is computable by a Turing machine.
However, as well as being highly complex and involving a large number of as-
sumptions, Gandy’s formulation focussed on devices that were entirely human-
constructible. This is of course rather questionable, as the universe we live in is
not human-constructed, physical reality exists without us having to build it. It
could therefore be possible that there exist elements of reality that are not human-
constructible which provide us with the ability to compute problems that are not
Turing computable. For example in [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] Beggs and Tucker described
various physical experiments that used the physical word as a computational oracle.
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Now as we noted in Section 1.2 and Chapter 4, in When does a physical system
compute? [48] Horsman et al. argued that in order for a person to be able to
compute with a physical system they must possess an abstract representation of the
system along with a sufficiently correct theory of how the system behaves. Such a
theory must also be testable through measurement of the system. Therefore if there
did exist elements of reality capable of computing problems that are not Turing
computable, then in order to utilise them a person would also have to know and
understand how such elements worked. This knowledge and understanding would
of course take the form of the person’s representation and theory of the system.
As already noted, we assert that this representation and theory can be expressed
in terms of logical sentences. This theory should also be finite as it is should be a
theory that can be understood by a human and is derived from a finite number of
tests. However as we proved in Corollary 7.2.6, for some logical systems there exist
finite theory machines which can characterise computational systems that are capa-
ble of violating the Church-Turing thesis. This suggests that such logical systems
have unreasonable descriptive power, in that they are able to characterise unphysical
computation systems.
Instead we assert that a computational system is physically realisable only if its
computational aspects can be characterised by a finite first-order theory (FFOT)
machine, that is a theory machine which is either a finite FO-theory machine or a
finite FO=-theory machine.
In this chapter we will prove that a finite problem may be computed by a FFOT
machine if and only if it is computable by a Turing machine (Theorem 8.2.1). There-
fore if we assume that the Church-Thesis applies to physical process then FFOT
machine characterisable systems may also be physically realisable. Further, if the
computational aspects of a system cannot be characterised by a FFOT machine then
such a system should not be physically realisable.
We will also prove in this chapter that a general word problem may be computed
by a FFOT machine if and only if it is computable by a type-2 machine (Theorem
8.3.3). Thereby providing an explanation of how we can compute with infinite inputs
119
Chapter 8. Physical Computation and Complete Theories
and outputs (such as real numbers) in a manner which is physically justifiable.
The key results in this chapter (Theorem 8.2.1 and Theorem 8.3.3), along with
many of the concepts, featured in our paper “Physical Computation and First-Order
Logic” [75].
8.0.1 Some Useful Results
As the following result demonstrates, finite FO-computability and finite FO=-
computability are equivalent, which is why we may collectively refer to finite FO-
theory machines and finite FO=-theory machines as FFOT machines.
Proposition 8.0.9 A problem is finite FO-computable if and only if it is FO=-
computable.
Proof: (⇒) LetM be a finite FOV-theory machine. If V contains the binary relation
= as one of its symbols then we may replace = with =′ 6∈ V in every sentence of M.
This gives us a new FO-theory machine M′ with vocabulary V′ = (V∪{=′}) \ {=},
and clearly M′ is able to compute any problem that M is able compute. Also, M′
can be interpreted as a finite FO=V -theory machine that does not mention the true
equality relation, which means that any problem computable by M is then finite
FO=-computable.
(⇐) Let N = (T, I,O) be a finite FO=U -theory machine that is able to compute a
decision problem A ⊆ Aa or a function problem f :⊆ Aa → Bb. As T is finite the set
of symbols used in T must be finite. Similarly the set of symbols used in the set of
input sets AˆaX and the set of output sets Bˆ
b
Y must be finite since the sentences within
them are constructed from simple sequences, and A and B are finite. Without loss
of generality we may then suppose that U is a finite vocabulary. Therefore EQ=U is a
finite set and so there exists a finite FOU∪{=}-theory machine N′ = (T ∪EQ=U , I,O)
which is able to compute any problem that N is able to compute.
To see why this is the case, for any Φ ∈ I, suppose that N(Φ) = Θ. If M is an
FO=U -model of T ∪ Φ, then M is also an FOU∪{=}-model of T ∪ EQ=U ∪ Φ, where
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the equality relation is interpreted as one of the normal relations of the vocabu-
lary, rather than a non-logical symbol of the logical system. We then still have
M |=FOU∪{=} Θ.
For the other direction, let N be an FOU∪{=}-model of T ∪ EQ=U ∪ Φ, as noted
in Remark A.1.2 it is possible that that there may be two distinct elements p, q ∈
dom(N) where p = q in N. In which case, by EQ=U the function and relation
assignments of p and q must all be identical in N.
There therefore exists an FOU∪{=}-structure N′ which elementarily embeds into
N and for any p, q ∈ dom(N′) we have p = q in N′ iff p and q are the same element
of dom(N′). It is then the case that N′ is an FO=U -structure, and as N
′ |=FO=
U
Θ
then we must also have that N |=FOU∪{=} Θ. Therefore N′(Φ) = Θ. o
Remark 8.0.10 So far in this document we have avoided giving specific examples
of theory machines that are also FFOT machines. This is in part because the
models of a FFOT machine tend to be far from unique. Indeed, if there exists an
infinite model of a FFOT machine, then by the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem [46]
there must exist models of any infinite cardinality. This highly variable description
of a system would have seemed odd to begin with, however Examples 8.1.1, 8.1.1
and 8.3.1 should demonstrate that this varied description can still give clear and
computationally sensible outputs.
When describing Turing machines and type-2 machines in Examples 5.1.1, 5.1.2,
5.3.1, and 5.3.2 we made repeated use of the integer successor axioms ISA [56]
(Definition A.1.5). However, these are clearly not first-order axioms, instead to
characterise Turing machines and type-2 machines with FFOT machines we will use
the following set of first-order sentences.
Definition 8.0.11 The first-order integer successor axioms in the vocabulary of
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{=, <, S}, where =, < are binary relations, and S is a unary function, is the set:
ISA− =

ZAx(1) ∀x∀y(S(x) = S(y))→ (x = y),
ZAx(2) ∀x∃y(S(y) = x),
ZAx(3) ∀x(x < S(x)),
ZAx(4) ∀x¬∃y((x < y) ∧ (y < S(x)),
ZAx(5) ∀x¬(x < x),
ZAx(6) ∀x∀y(x < y)→ ¬(y < x),
ZAx(7) ∀x∀y∀z((x < y) ∧ (y < z))→ (x < z)

.
The following set is also useful.
Definition 8.0.12 The set of second-order axioms in ISA is:
ISASO =
 ZAx(8) ∀
1Z(((∃xZ(x)) ∧ (∀y(Z(y)↔ Z(S(y))))→ ∀zZ(z)),
ZAx(9) ∃1N(((∃xN(x)) ∧ (∀y(N(y)→ N(S(y))) ∧ (∃z¬N(z)))

Note how:
ISA− = ISA \ ISASO.
Thus ISA− is just the usual successor axioms for the ordered integers ISA without
its two second-order axioms. This means that the usual ordered structure of the
integers 〈Z;<,S〉 is also a model of ISA−. However there also exist other non-
standard models of ISA− that are not isomorphic to 〈Z;<,S〉. For example the
structure with domain {(n, 1) | n ∈ Z} ∪ {(n, 2) | n ∈ Z}, such that S((n, i)) =
(n+ 1, i), and (n, i) < (m, j) if either n < m and i = j, or i = 0 and j = 1.
Remark 8.0.13 Due to Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem [27, 37] it is impossi-
ble to give a first-order axiomatisation of the ordered integers.
Despite the existence of these non-standard models we still have the following useful
result.
Proposition 8.0.14 Let V = {<,S, 0ˇ} where 0ˇ is a constant symbol1, and let
M |=FO=
V
ISA−.
10ˇ has been given an accent so as to distinguish it from 0 in Z.
122
Then the map µ : Z→M given by µ(n) = Sn(0ˇ) (where S0(0ˇ) = 0ˇ and S−m(0ˇ) =
q iff Sm(q) = 0ˇ) is a well-defined embedding of Z onto M. Also, for any n ∈ Z there
does not exist a p ∈ dom(M) such that µ(n) < p and p < µ(n+ 1).
Proof: By definition µ(0) = 0ˇ. Further, by the definition of µ we also have
S(µ(a)) = µ(a+ 1), since S(µ(a)) = S(Sa(0ˇ)) = Sa+1(0ˇ) = µ(a+ 1).
For each n ∈ Z where n > 0 each value of Sn(0ˇ) is distinct. To see this, note that
by ZAx(3) for any p in dom(M) we have p < S(p), as < is also defined by ZAx(7)
to be a transitive relation, by induction we have Sn(0ˇ) < Sl(0ˇ) for any l ∈ Z such
that n < l in Z. As p 6< p by ZAx(5) for any p ∈ dom(M), the value of µ(n) must
be distinct for each n.
For each k ∈ Z where k < 0 the value of µ(k) must also be well-defined. As
clearly S−1(0ˇ) is well-defined since by ZAx(2) an element q ∈ dom(M) such that
S(q) = 0ˇ is guaranteed to exist. q is also unique, as if S(q′) = 0ˇ then by ZAx(1)
we have q′ = q. By similar reasoning S−2(0ˇ) must also be well-defined, and as such
reasoning can be repeatedly applied, by induction µ(k) is well-defined. Also by the
same argument as above we have µ(k) < µ(l) if k < l, hence for every n ∈ Z the
value of µ(n) is distinct, and therefore a = b iff µ(a) = µ(b).
By the above reasoning we also know that if a < b in Z then µ(a) < µ(b) in
M. Now conversely, if a 6< b in Z then b 6 a, and if a = b then by ZAx(5)
¬(µ(a) < µ(b)), whereas if b < a then µ(b) < µ(a) and by ZAx(6) ¬(µ(a) < µ(b)).
Consequently µ is an embedding of Z into M.
Finally for any n ∈ Z there does not exist a p ∈ dom(M) such that µ(n) < p and
p < µ(n + 1). As suppose that µ(n) = q then µ(n + 1) = S(q), and so by ZAx(4)
there does not exist a p such that q < p and p < S(q). o
Remark 8.0.15 Let M be any FO or FO=-model of ISA−. In this chapter we
will refer to the part of M that contains 0 and is isomorphic to Z as the standard
part of M.
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In this chapter a key property for a logical system will be completeness. Recall from
Definition 3.4.5 that a logical system LS is complete if there exists an LS-proof
system P such that for any sets of LS-sentences Γ,∆ we have Γ |=LS ∆ ⇐⇒
Γ `P ∆. Which means that ∆ is true in any LS-model of Γ iff there exists a finite
LS-proof of every sentence in ∆ from Γ. Go¨del’s completeness theorem states that
first-order logic is complete, and the same is true for first-order logic with equality
[34, 36, 45].
An important property of a complete logical system is the following.
Lemma 8.0.16 Let LS be a complete logical system, and Γ,∆ be sets of LS-
sentences. If Γ |=LS ∆ then for every finite subset Ω ⊆ ∆ there exists a finite subset
Υ ⊆ Γ such that Υ |=LS Ω.
Proof: By the definition of complete logical system, if Γ |=LS ∆ then Γ `P ∆,
and so Γ `P Ω. Therefore for each φ ∈ Ω there exists a finite P-proof of φ from
Γ. Clearly such a proof can only reference a finite number of sentences in Γ, so let
Υφ ⊆ Γ be the finite set of sentences in Γ that are used to prove φ ∈ Ω.
Now let Υ =
⋃
φ∈Ω Υφ, which is clearly finite, and it must also be the case that
exists a P-proof of every element of Ω from Υ. Hence we have Υ `P Ω, and so by
the definition of completeness we have that Υ |=LS Ω. o
8.1 Examples of FFOT Machines
8.1.1 Turing Machines
We may characterise a Turing machine computing a decision problem with a FFOT
machine in much the same manner as how we characterised it by a finite SO=-theory
machine in Example 5.1.1.
Example 8.1.1 Let M = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, 〈sa, sr〉,R) be a Turing machine which
computes the decision problem A ⊆ A∗.
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We can characterise M via the finite FO=VM -machine:
TM−M = (TMT
−
M , Aˆ
∗
XTM
, {{I(h) = sa}, {I(h) = sr}}),
in the same vocabulary, VM , as TMM in Example 5.1.1 and with the same input
sequence XTM . The theory of TM
−
M is:
TMT−M = TMTM \ ISASO.
Where TMTM is the theory of TMM in Example 5.1.1
1, which except for ISASO ⊂
ISA is a finite first-order theory.
As ISA− ⊂ TMT−M , for any w ∈ A∗ any FO=VM -model D of TMT−M ∪ Φ∗XTM (w)
must be an expansion of an FO={<,S,0}-model D
′ of ISA−.
Clearly the input Φ∗XTM (w) = {C(0, Si(0)) = wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , |w|−1}}∪{C(0, S|w|(0)) =
b} defines C within the standard part of D. Similarly ITs0 ⊂ TMT−M defines the
remainder of the initial configuration of M at time 0 in D. The rules of R are then
applied by ETR ⊂ TMT−M , and so as in Example 5.1.1 at times S(0), S2(0), S3(0), . . .
the evolution of the configurations of M is represented correctly in D.
As M computes A, it must halt on every input. That is, there must exist a
finite time step at which the internal state of M is either sa or sr. Hence by
HT(sa,sr) ⊂ TMT−M the halting time step h must occur within the standard part
of D. The truth of the output I(h) = sa or the output I(h) = sr in D therefore
depends entirely on what happens in the standard part of D.
Crucially, as in Example 5.1.1, all the configurations of M on input w necessarily
occur within D, and necessarily lead to the same output. The output cannot be
changed by what happens in the non-standard part of the model, as if it was then
this would lead to a logical contradiction. Nor can h occur at a non-standard time
step, as constants must have a unique value in any FO= model.
It must therefore be the case that D |=FO=
VM
{I(h) = sa} iff M accepts w, and
D |=FO=
VM
{I(h) = sr} iff M rejects w.
1Recall that TMTM = ISA∪CD=VM ∪ ITs0 ∪ETR ∪HT(sa,sr), where ITs0 describes the initial
configuration, ETR describes the application of the rules of R, and HT(sa,sr) describes how M
halts.
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Hence we have that TM−M is able to compute A, even though TM
−
M has models
which are highly non-standard.
Remark 8.1.2 Unlike TMM there are of course models of TM
−
M which have non-
standard elements, and these elements are not present in the definition of a Turing
machine. However, these non-standard elements are transfinite and so in the real
world they are unreachable and unobservable. So whilst such a model of TM−M may
not correspond to a Turing machine M in the manner we typically view it, there
is no way of us knowing for certain that a real world actualisation of M does not
have these transfinite elements an infinite distance/time away from our position.
Also, the non-standard parts of these models do not have any effect on the proper
computation. We therefore argue that TM−M characterises the Turing machine M .
In a similar manner to Example 5.1.2 we may also characterise a Turing machine
computing a function problem as a FFOT machine.
Example 8.1.3 Let M ′ = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, 〈s1〉,R) be a Turing machine which com-
putes the function problem f :⊆ A∗ → B∗.
We can characterise M ′ via the finite FO=VM′ -machine:
TM−M ′ = (TMT
−
M ′ , Aˆ
∗
XTM
, Bˆ∗YTM ),
in the same vocabulary, VM ′ , and with the same input and output sequences, re-
spectively XTM and YTM , as TMM ′ in Example 5.1.2. The theory of TM
−
M ′ is then:
TMT−M ′ = TMTM ′ \ ISASO.
Where TMTM ′ is the theory of TMM ′ in Example 5.1.2.
As in Example 8.1.1 above we have ISA− ⊂ TMT−M ′ . So for any w ∈ A∗ any
FO=VM′ -model E of TMT
−
M ′ ∪Φ∗XTM (w) contains a standard part which is isomorphic
to Z. Similarly to in Example 8.1.1 it must then follow that the entire computation
of M ′ is described within the standard part of E, and if M ′ halts then it must do
so within the standard part of E.
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Consequently if w ∈ dom(f) then M ′ on input w halts and outputs f(w), and
so by our reasoning in Example 5.1.2 we have E |=FO=
VM′
Φ∗YTM (f(w)). Whereas if
w 6∈ dom(f) then M ′ on input w never halts, hence I(p) 6= s1 for all p > 0 in the
standard part of E. Therefore, as in Example 5.1.2, any output Φ∗YTM (v) ∈ Bˆ∗YTM
can be true in some model of TMT−M ′∪Φ∗XTM (w), and consequently TM−M ′(Φ∗XTM (w))
is undefined.
Therefore TM−M ′ is able to compute f :⊆ A∗ → B∗.
Remark 8.1.4 By Proposition 8.0.9 both of the finite FO=-theory machines TM−M
and TM−M ′ above can be converted into finite FO-theory machines, and so every
Turing machine computable problem is finite FO-computable.
8.1.2 Differential Equation Systems
In Subsection 5.2.1 we discussed how we may characterise a physical system S that
obeys a set of differential equations with an FOR-theory machine MS. We can
also characterise such a system with an SO=V -theory machine M
′
S in which the non-
logical symbols of FOR are included as part of the vocabulary V. All we have to
do is add the real arithmetic axioms RAA (Definition A.1.7) to the theory of M′S.
It then follows from Proposition A.1.8 that any model of M′S must be isomorphic
to an expansion of the usual structure of real arithmetic 〈R;<,+,×, 0, 1〉, and so
such a model is also an FOR-structure. However, the real arithmetic axioms are a
second-order set of sentences, so to characterise S with a FFOT machine we use the
following set.
Definition 8.1.5 [28] The set of first-order dense ordered field axioms in the vo-
cabulary of VR = {=, <,+,×, 0, 1}, where =, < are binary relations, +,× are binary
functions, and 0,1 are constants, is:
DOF = RAA \
 ∀
1Q((∃uQ(u) ∧ ∃v∀w(Q(w)→ (w < v)))
→ ∃x∀y(∀z(Q(z)→ (z < y))↔ ((x < y) ∨ (x = y))))
 .
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Much like with ISA− and ISA, the models of DOF include the usual structure
of real arithmetic 〈R;<,+,×, 0, 1〉 as well as other structures such as the usual
structure of rational arithmetic 〈Q;<,+,×, 0, 1〉. Indeed there exists an embedding
from the usual structure of rational arithmetic into any model of DOF [28].
We may then characterise a differential equation system S (such as MONIAC [14]
or Blakey’s double slit factoriser [17]) with an FO=-theory machine M−S , where M
−
S
is the same as M′S above but with DOF included in the theory of M
−
S instead of
RAA.
Though there do exist FO=-models of M−S that are not expansions of the usual
structure of real arithmetic, the necessary aspects of real arithmetic must hold in
any such model. That is, any model of DOF must be closed under addition, mul-
tiplication, have non-zero multiplicative inverses, and contain a dense total order.
Further, if a real number r is defined by the theory of M−S , then any model of M
−
S
must contain r whilst still being closed under addition, multiplication etc.
Crucially if a function f is defined in M−S , then its partial derivative ∂1f can
still be defined within the theory of M−S in the exact same manner as in MS (see
Equation 5.1 in Subsection 5.2.1). By definition, the value of ∂1f(~a) will then be
equal to the usual value of ∂f
∂x
at point ~a, or the two values will be infinitesimally
close to one another. That is, the distance between them is less than  for all  > 01.
Therefore functions described in M−S will either be equal to, or infinitesimally
close to their values in MS. So the same output will be obtained provided that for
any input each of the possible outputs of M−S is bounded away from one another.
For example, if OS = {{f(τ1) < 0}, {1 < f(τ1)}} then the two possible outputs are
of distance 1 away from one another.
1Which is possible in a non-standard model of DOF , such as the hyperreals [61].
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8.2 FFOT Machines and Turing Computability
In the previous section we saw how various examples of computational systems may
be characterised with FFOT machines. A natural question to ask is whether there
exist computational systems that can be characterised by FFOT machines which are
able to compute problems that are not Turing machine computable. The following
theorem demonstrates that the answer to this question is “no”.
Theorem 8.2.1 A finite problem is Turing machine computable if and only if it is
finite FO-computable.
We split up the proof of Theorem 8.2.1 into two Lemmas.
Lemma 8.2.2 A finite decision problem A ⊆ A∗ is Turing machine computable if
and only if it is finite FO-computable.
Proof: (⇒) This follows from Example 8.1.1 and Remark 8.1.4.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that we are able to compute A ⊆ A∗ with the finite
FOV-theory machine M = (T, I,O) with input set Aˆ
∗
X ⊂ I and outputs Θ,Ψ ∈ O
corresponding to accepting and rejecting respectively.
By definition, for any w ∈ A∗ if w ∈ A we have T∪Φ∗X(w) |=FOV Θ. Hence by the
completeness of first-order logic (Theorem 3.4.6)[36, 45] we have T ∪ Φ∗X(w) `P Θ
for some FO-proof system P, and there exists a finite P-proof of the truth of Θ
given T ∪ Φ∗X(w). Conversely if w 6∈ A we have T ∪ Φ∗X(w) |=FOV Ψ and there exists
a finite formal proof of the truth of Ψ given T ∪ Φ∗X(w).
As T ∪ Φ∗X(w) is a finite set of FOV-sentences the set of all first-order sentences
provable from it is computably enumerable. We can therefore construct a Turing
machine MM that, on an input of w, enumerates all sentences provable from T ∪
Φ∗X(w).
By the definition of a theory machine, only one of Θ,Ψ ∈ O will be provable
from T ∪ Φ∗X(w). Further, Θ and Ψ must also be finite, so if w ∈ A then MM must
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eventually enumerate every element of Θ, and will never enumerate every single
element of Ψ. Conversely if w 6∈ A then MM must eventually enumerate every
element of Ψ, and will never enumerate every single element of Θ.
We can then define MM to halt and accept if it enumerates every element of Θ,
and halt and reject if it enumerates every element of Ψ. The Turing machine MM
then computes A ⊆ A∗ and thus A is Turing machine computable. o
Lemma 8.2.3 A finite function problem f :⊆ A∗ → B∗ is Turing machine com-
putable if and only if it is finite FO-computable.
Proof: (⇒) This follows from Example 8.1.3 and Remark 8.1.4.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that we are able to compute f :⊆ A∗ → B∗ with the
finite FOV-theory machine M
′ = (T, I,O) with input set Aˆ∗X ⊂ I and output set
Bˆ∗Y ⊂ O.
By definition, for each w ∈ dom(f) we have T ∪ Φ∗X(w) |=FOV Φ∗Y(f(w)) and for
any Ψ ∈ Bˆ∗Y\{Φ∗Y(f(w))} we have T∪Φ∗X(w) 6|=FOV Ψ. Hence by the completeness of
first-order logic [36, 45] we have T ∪Φ∗X(w) `P Φ∗Y(f(w)) for some FO-proof system
P, and there exists a finite P-proof of the truth of Φ∗Y(f(w)) given T ∪ Φ∗X(w).
As T ∪ Φ∗X(w) is a finite set of FOV-sentences the set of all first-order sentences
provable from it is computably enumerable. Similarly as Y is a simple sequence,
the sentences of Bˆ∗Y are computably enumerable. We can therefore construct a
Turing machine MM′ that, on an input of w, enumerates all sentences provable from
T ∪ Φ∗X(w), while concurrently enumerating the elements of Bˆ∗Y.
By our reasoning above we know that Φ∗Y(f(w)) is the only set of sentences Bˆ
∗
Y
that can be entirely proven from T∪Φ∗X(w). So by repeatedly checking whether every
sentence in each enumerated element of Bˆ∗Y have been proven, MM′ will eventually
find Φ∗Y(f(w)). The output word f(w) can then be extracted from the set of sentences
Φ∗Y(f(w)).
If w 6∈ dom(f) then for no element Ψ ∈ Bˆ∗Y is T ∪ Φ∗X(w) |=FOV Ψ true. which
means that no set in Bˆ∗Y is provable from T ∪ Φ∗X(w), and so MM′ on input w will
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never halt.
Consequently MM′ is able to compute f , and so f is Turing machine computable.
o
By the above result, if the Church-Turing thesis is true and applies to physical cal-
culations, then it must be the case that the computational aspects of any obtainable
physical system is describable by a finite first-order theory machine. Hence the
Church-Turing thesis can be reformulated as:
Every effectively calculable function is computable by a finite first-order
theory machine
(8.1)
This modified thesis fits in with what Kripke discussed in The Church-Turing Thesis
as a Special Corollary of Go¨dels Completeness Theorem [53]. Kripke asserted that:
“A computation is just another mathematical deduction, albeit one of a very spe-
cialized form.” He also argued in favour of what he called “Hilbert’s thesis” that the
steps of any mathematical argument can be given in first-order logic (with equality).
The Church-Turing thesis is then a consequence of Go¨del’s completeness theorem as
for any mathematical argument there must exist a Turing machine which can carry
it out.
Now we do not quite agree that a computation is necessarily a mathematical de-
duction, as we of course assert that an arbitrary computation can be characterised
by a theory machine in some logic LS. Such a computation cannot necessarily be
described as a deduction as LS may not be complete, meaning the truth of some
results does not necessarily follow from a finite proof. However, given Theorem
8.2.1 above (as well as Theorem 8.2.4 below) along with our assertions about phys-
ical computation, we do agree that any physically realisable computation can be
described by a mathematical deduction.
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8.2.1 Complete Logical Systems and Turing Computability
The above result is not in fact limited to first-order logic or first-order logic with
equality. As the proof of Theorem 8.2.1 relies on just two facts; the fact that we can
characterise any Turing machine by a finite first-order theory machine, and the fact
that first-order logic (with equality) is complete.
Neither of these properties are held by only first-order logic and first-order logic
with equality. We therefore have the following generalisation.
Theorem 8.2.4 If LS is a complete logical system and any Turing machine can
be characterised by a finite LS-theory machine then the class of finite problems
that are finite LS-computable is equal to the class of Turing machine computable
problems.
Proof: By definition, if a finite LS-theory machine characterises a Turing machine
M then it is able to compute the finite problem that is computed by M . Therefore
the class of Turing machine computable problems is contained within the class of
finite problems that are LS-computable. Equality follows from LS being a complete
logical system, as we can just replace every instance of FO in the proofs of Lemmas
8.2.2 and 8.2.3 with LS to obtain a Turing machine that is able to compute each
finite LS-computable finite problem. o
Therefore if we can finitely describe the computational aspects of a system P using a
logical system such as LS above then everything computable by P is Turing machine
computable. Conversely, if we can use P to compute finite problems that are not
Turing machine computable, then P is not characterisable by a finite LS-theory
machine.
Corollary 8.2.5 Let LS be as in Theorem 8.2.4. The infinite theory machines
defined in the proof of Proposition 6.0.4 that are capable of computing any finite
problem are not in general characterisable by a FFOT machine or a finite LS-theory
machine.
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8.3 FFOT Machines and Type-2 Computability
As we shall see, FFOT machines are not limited to computing finite problems, they
are perfectly capable of computing with infinite inputs and outputs. Indeed we may
characterise a Type-2 machine by a FFOT machine in a similar manner to how we
characterised it with a finite SO=-theory machine in Example 5.3.2.
Example 8.3.1 Let T = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, s1,U, a, b) be a type-2 machine with m
tapes that computes the function f :⊆ Aa → Bb. We can characterise T via the
FO=VT -theory machine:
T2M−T = (T2MT
−
T , Aˆ
a
XTM1
, BˆbYT2),
in the same vocabulary VT , and with the same input and output sequences, XTM1
and YT2, as T2MT in Example 5.3.2. The only difference is the theory of T2M
−
T ,
which is:
T2MT−T = (T2MTT \ ISASO) ∪ EQVT .
As in Example 8.1.3 since ISA ⊂ T2MT−T , every model F of T2MT−T ∪ΦaXTM1 has a
standard part which is isomorphic to the usual ordered structure of the integers. In
addition, even though the input set may be infinite, as each element of ΦaXTM1
is of
the form {C1(0, Si(0)) = wi}, the input set defines the values of C1(0, y) only within
the standard part of F.
Following the same reasoning as in Example 5.3.2 together with Example 8.1.1
we can see that the computation of T on input w is entirely described within the
standard part of F.
As before in Example 5.3.2, there are two possible cases.
Case 1. b = ∗, in which case if w ∈ dom(f) then the halting state s1 should
eventually be reached at time h and the output word {O(Si(0)) = f(w)i | i ∈
{0, . . . , |f(w)| − 1}} ∪ {O(S|f(w)|(0)) = b} is defined within the standard part of F
(that is, if O(p) is described by the output then p is in the standard part of F) via
{∀y(O(y) = Cm(h, y))} ⊂ T2MT−T . Whereas if w 6∈ dom(f) then as in Example 5.3.2
the values of O(y) could be anything in F, and hence T2M−T (Φ
a
XTM1
) is undefined.
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Case 2. b = ω in which case, if w ∈ dom(f) then for each n ∈ N there exists
an l ∈ N such that Cm(Sl(0), Sn(0)) 6= b. Also, {∀x∀y(¬(Cm(x, y) = b)→ (O(y) =
Cm(x, y))} ⊂ T2MT−T , and the output word {O(Si(0)) = f(w)i | i ∈ N} is therefore
defined in F. Notably, the value of O(q) depends on the non-blank values of Cm(p, q)
for all p ∈ dom(F), not just the p that are in the standard part of F. However this
cannot prevent the output from being defined, as if Cm(t, q) is not blank at any
time step t ∈ dom(F) then we must have Cm(t, q) = Cm(p, q) to prevent a logical
contradiction within the model.
Alternatively, if w 6∈ dom(f), then as in Example 5.3.2 the value of O(Sk(0))
is eventually unspecified for some large enough k ∈ N. Hence there are multiple
possible outputs that could be true in F and T2M−T (Φ
a
XTM1
) is undefined.
Therefore T2M−T is able to compute f :⊆ A∗ → B∗.
Remark 8.3.2 As in Remark 8.1.4, it follows from Proposition 8.0.9 that we can
also characterise any type-2 machine by a finite FO-theory machine. Therefore any
type-2 computable problem is finite FO-computable.
Do there exist computational systems that can be characterised by FFOT machines
which are able to compute problems that are not Turing machine computable? The
following Theorem 8.2.1 implies that the answer to this question is, again, “no”.
Theorem 8.3.3 Let a, b ∈ {∗, ω}. A word function problem g :⊆ Aa → Bb is
computable by a type-2 machine if and only if g is finite FO-computable.
Proof: (⇒) This follows Remark 8.3.2.
(⇐) Suppose that g :⊆ Aa → Bb is computable by some finite FOV-theory
machine M = (T, I,O) with input set AˆaX ⊂ I and output set BˆbY ⊂ O.
As in the proof of Lemma 8.2.3 for every w ∈ dom(g) we have T ∪ ΦaX(w) |=FOV
ΦbY(g(w)). By the completeness of first-order logic [36, 45] (Theorem 3.4.6) and
Lemma 8.0.16, for any finite subset Ω ⊂ ΦbY(g(w)), there exists a finite subset
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Υ ⊂ ΦaX(w), such that T ∪ Υ |=FOV Ω. Hence again by the completeness of first-
order logic there must exist a finite formal proof of the truth of Ω given T ∪Υ.
Thus we can construct a type-2 machine TM, that on input w ∈ Aa enumerates
the elements of ΦaX(w), and from this enumeration, TM enumerates all sentences
provable from T ∪ ΦaX(w). Let TM then record each provable sentence of the form
υi = d, for Y = {υi}i∈N and d ∈ B. Through such sentences TM can clearly obtain
g(w) from which it may then sequentially output g(w).
If w 6∈ dom(g) then there is some l ∈ N such that υl = e is not provable for any
e ∈ B. Therefore TM is unable to record the lth symbol on the output tape, and
hence TM(w) is similarly undefined. o
In the original Church Turing thesis an effectively calculable function was intended
to be finite [27, 67]. However if we were to assume that it could also be an infinite
function, then Theorem 8.3.3 and our reformulation of the Church Turing thesis (8.1)
collectively imply that every effectively calculable function (whether its infinite or
not) is computable by a type-2 machine.
This does in fact fit in with the usual view of computability for functions from Aω
to Bω, in that such a function is computable iff it is type-2 computable [71, 72]. This
view is justified by the fact that a type-2 machine computes an infinite word problem
in a Turing machine-like manner, and the fact that we can stop a type-2 machine
computation at any point and know that whatever has so far been outputted is a
prefix of the output word.
Our result provides an alternative justification of this view; a FFOT machine
that is able to compute an infinite function problem f :⊆ Aω → Bω is just a FFOT
machine which is able to admit the infinite word sets of AˆωX and Bˆ
ω
Y as inputs and
outputs. So infinite problems that are computable in such a manner provide a
natural infinite extension to finite FFOT machine computable problems. Now as
these finite problems are Turing computable and the infinite problems are type-2
computable, type-2 computability naturally extends Turing computability .
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Another consequence of Theorem 8.3.3 is that if a computational system is able
to compute problems that are not type-2 computable, then such a system is not
characterisable by a FFOT machine.
Corollary 8.3.4 Infinite time Turing machines are not in general describable by a
FFOT machine.
Corollary 8.3.5 Blum-Shub-Smale machines are not in general describable by a
FFOT machine.
8.3.1 Complete Logical Systems and Type-2 Computability
Like in Subsection 8.2.1 our result is not limited to first-order logic or first-order
logic with equality. We instead have the following generalisation of Theorem 8.3.3.
Theorem 8.3.6 If LS is a complete logical system and any type-2 machine can
be characterised by a finite LS-theory machine then the class of function problems
that are finite LS-computable is equal to the class of type-2 computable function
problems.
Proof: If a finite LS-theory machine characterises a type-2 machine T then it is able
to compute the function problem that is computed by T , and so the class of type-
2 computable problems is contained within the class of LS-computable function
problems. Equality then follows from LS being a complete logical system, as we
can just replace every instance of FO in the proof of Theorem 8.3.3 with LS to
obtain a type-2 machine that is able to compute each finite LS-computable word
problem. o
We can therefore extend the Church-Turing thesis even further and assert that
a computational system with finite or infinite inputs and outputs (such as real
numbers) is physically realisable only if it is characterisable by a FFOT machine.
We also have the following corollary.
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Corollary 8.3.7 Let LS be a complete logical system that contains first-order
logic. If the word function problems f :⊆ Aa → Bb and g :⊆ Bb → Cc where
a, b, c ∈ {∗, ω} are finite LS-computable and b = ∗ or c = ω, then g ◦ f :⊆ Aa → C∗
is finite LS-computable.
Otherwise if b = ω and c = ∗ then for both a = ∗ and a = ω, there exists a
finite LS-computable function f :⊆ Aa → Bω and a finite LS-computable function
g :⊆ Bω → C∗ such that g ◦ f :⊆ Aa → C∗ is not finite LS-computable.
Proof: From Theorem 8.3.6, the functions f, g, and g◦f are finite LS-computable if
and only if they are type-2 computable. Therefore the result follows by Proposition.
2.3.4 o
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Chapter 9
Theory Machine Complexity
“The field, created as it was to cater primarily for Turing-like mod-
els of computation, fails to capture the true complexity of many non-
standard (analogue, chemical, quantum, etc.) computers.” - Ed Blakey
In the 1960’s Cobham and Edmonds [26, 30] asserted that a computational problem
is feasibly computable if and only if it can be decided in polynomial time on a
Turing machine (and thereby lies in P). Though not within its originally intended
scope, it has been suggested [70] that Cobham and Edmonds assertion should also
apply to what is feasibly computable by any physical system. However, this idea
has since been challenged by results from quantum computation [59], such as Shor’s
factorisation algorithm [63], which suggest that the class of problems decidable by
a quantum computer in polynomial time (BQP) may include problems that do not
lie in P. These results lead naturally to the questions of what it is about quantum
systems that makes them capable of feasibly deciding problems that may lie outside
of P, and whether there exist other physical systems with such capabilities.
Now as we noted in Subsection 1.1.1, in [5] Baumeler and Wolf looked into the
computational power of polynomially bounded circuits acting within closed time-
like curves of polynomial length. They asserted that a computation may occur
on such a circuit if it is logically consistent and unique, demonstrating that with
these assumptions the computational power of these non-causal circuits is equal to
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UP ∩ co-UP. Notably, BQP problems such as the factorisation problem also lie
in UP ∩ co-UP, suggesting that there may be a non-causal aspect to the quantum
computational speed-up.
Baumeler and Wolf’s innovative non-causal circuit model did not have the goal of
describing the feasible computational aspects of a general physical system. However,
as we saw in Chapter 8, our concept of a FFOT machine appears to be able to
characterise the computational aspects of an arbitrary physical system. So in this
chapter we shall develop the concept of theory machine complexity, with the goal
that the complexity of a physical computation may be understood through the
complexity of a corresponding FFOT machine computation.
Notably, rather than describing each computation as a discrete ordered sequence
of structures, in a theory machine the whole computation is described via a single
consistent structure. Hence any temporal evolution of the machine is described
within this structure. This inclusion of the evolution within the structure allows a
theory machine to compute in a consistent non-causal and atemporal manner.
Further, in [16] Blakey argued that in order to measure the complexity of un-
conventional computation devices require unconventional notions of complexity. So
the general resource usage of a computation, such as its space, energy, and precision
usage (as well as its time usage) should be taken into account when considering the
complexity of a problem.
From the computability standpoint, by Theorem 8.2.1 finite-input FFOT ma-
chines are exactly as powerful as Turing machines. But as we shall see with Theorem
9.3.1, from the complexity standpoint this equivalence appears to break down.
Much of the work in this chapter has appeared in our publication An Atemporal
Model of Physical Complexity [74].
9.0.2 Observations on Computational Resource Usage
Though a Turing machine is typically defined as being unbounded in time and space,
a halting computation on a Turing machine is usually understood to be finite in time
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and space. Hence it should be possible to describe a Turing machine computation
in time t and space s via a structure with a domain of size max(t, s).
Similarly we typically may view a kinematic system as occurring within a contin-
uously infinite space. But if when implementing such a system for the purpose of a
computation we require only bounded precision, along with bounded space and time,
then such a computation may be described by a finite structure that approximates a
continuously infinite space. For example a computation of precision , taking time t
and within a space of diameter r, may be described via a structure of size max(t, r

).
We therefore argue that if a theory machine on input Φ is satisfied by a finite
structure of size n, then the amount of computational resources required to carry
out a computation on input Φ is of order at most n.
Definition 9.0.8 Let A ⊆ A∗ be a finite word problem, and q : N→ N be a strictly
increasing function. We say that an LSV-theory machine M = (T, I,O) is able to
compute A with q resources if M is able to compute A via some simple sequence X
and Σˆ∗X ⊆ I, such that for every w ∈ A∗ there exists an LSV-structure A where:
T ∪ Φ∗X(w) |=LSV A, and |dom(A)| = O(q(|w|)),
where |dom(A)| denotes the cardinality of the domain of A.
So the idea behind the above definition is that the theory machine M compute A
with q resources if for any input w there exists a model of M on input w which
requires at most order q(|w|) resources to correctly compute an output. Clearly this
mimics the concepts of time and space complexity for Turing machines1.
Further, as per our reasoning in Chapter 8, we argue that if physical system S can
compute A, and S can be characterised by a FFOT machine that is able to compute
A with q resources then on input w the physical system S requires at most order
q(|w|) resources to decide A.
Definition 9.0.9 A theory machine M = (T, I,O) is finitely modelable if for every
Φ ∈ I there exists a model M of T ∪ Φ, in which |dom(M)| is finite.
1See Definitions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
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Clearly, it is a necessary requirement that a theory machine is a finitely modelable
in order for it to be a able to compute a problem with q resources for any q : N→ N.
Definition 9.0.10 Let A ⊆ A∗ be a finite decision problem. We say that a theory
machine M = (T, I,O) is able to compute A with polynomial resources if M is able
to compute A with p resources, and p is a polynomial function1.
If M is a theory machine that is able to compute A but M is not able to compute A
with polynomial resources then we say that M requires super-polynomial resources
to compute A. The primary reason why P is considered to be the class of problems
that are feasibly computable with a Turing machine is because polynomial time
growth is relatively slow. For the similar reasons we argue that a problem A ⊆ A∗
can be feasibly computed with a theory machine M if and only M is able to compute
A with polynomially resources.
Further, we believe that a randomness-free physical system S is able feasibly
compute A only if S can be characterised by a FFOT machine which is able to
compute A with polynomial resources.
Remark 9.0.11 The reason why we believe that this feasible characterisation only
works for randomness-free system is because in order to properly characterise a
probabilistic computation system2, a theory machine has to model every possible
computation path of the system. This is due to the fact that a theory machine
computation only gives outputs that it is certain of, and in order to be certain that
one has the correct output of a probabilistic computer one must ensure that it is the
most likely outcome. This means that a probabilistic Turing machine that computes
in polynomial time but has an exponentially growing number of computation paths
can only be characterised with a theory machine with super-polynomial resource
growth.
1See Definition 2.2.5
2Such as a probabilistic Turing machine [4] or quantum computer [50, 59]
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9.1 Boundedly Characterising a Turing machine
Despite the fact that a halting Turing machine computation takes place over a finite
time period and uses a finite number of tape squares, our characterisation of a
Turing machine TM−M in Example 8.1.1 is not finitely modelable. This is because
every structure which satisfies the machine’s theory contains an expansion of Z and
therefore has a domain with infinite cardinality.
However it is possible to characterise a Turing machine with a FFOT machine
that has bounded models of arbitrary finite size. We just need to replace ISA− in
the theory of TM−M with the bounded first-order integer successor axioms BISA
−
defined below.
BISA− is modelled by structures that are similar to Z, but have a specified
greatest number r, with S(r) = r, and a specified least number l which has no
predecessor. We will demonstrate in Proposition 9.1.3 that the set of FO=-models
of BISA− includes finite structures with domain {a, a+1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , b−1, b}.
Definition 9.1.1 The set of bounded first-order integer successor axioms in the
vocabulary of {=, S, 0, l, r}, where = is a binary relation, S is a unary function, and
l, r are constants, is:
BISA− =

BZAx(1.1) ∀x¬(S(x) = l),
BZAx(1.2) (S(r) = r),
BZAx(1.3) ∀x∀y((S(x) = S(y))→ ((x = y) ∨ (S(x) = r))),
BZAx(2) ∀x((x = l) ∨ ∃y(S(y) = x)),
BZAx(3.1) ∀x((x < S(x)) ∨ (x = r)),
BZAx(3.2) ∀x((l = x) ∨ (l < x)),
BZAx(3.3) ∀x((r = x) ∨ (x < r)),
ZAx(4) ∀x¬∃y((x < y) ∧ (y < S(x)),
ZAx(5) ∀x¬(x < x),
ZAx(6) ∀x∀y(x < y)→ ¬(y < x),
ZAx(7) ∀x∀y∀z((x < y) ∧ (y < z))→ (x < z)

.
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BZAx(1.1)-BZAx(1.3) correspond to a bounded version of the axiom ZAx(1) in
ISA−. Similarly BZAx(2) corresponds to ZAx(2) and BZAx(3.1)-BZAx(3.3) corre-
spond to ZAx(3) in ISA−. The remaining axioms are then identical to the remaining
axioms in ISA−.
Notation 9.1.2 For any a,∈ Z, where a < 0 and b > 0, let Z[a,b] denote the set
{a, a+ 1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , b− 1, b} ⊂ Z.
Proposition 9.1.3 Let V = {<,S, 0ˇ, l, r}. For each a, b ∈ Z where a < 0 < b let
K[a,b] = 〈Z[a,b], <, S, 0ˇ, l, r〉 have the usual ordering and a successor function such
that S(b) = b and S(x) = x+ 1 if x 6= b. Also let l = a, r = b, and 0ˇ = 0. It is then
the case that K[a,b] is an FO
=
V -model of BISA
−.
Proof: BZAx(1.1) holds in K[a,b] as by definition a−1 does not lie in Z[a,b], similarly
BZAx(1.2) holds as S(b) = b. BZAx(2) is then true as for every p ∈ (Z[a,b] \ {a}) we
know that p − 1 lies in Z[a,b]. Also BZAx(1.3) holds in K[a,b] as in (Z[a,b] \ {b}) the
function S is an injection, whereas if S(q) = S(q′) and q 6= q′ then we must have
q, q′ ∈ {b− 1, b} and so S(q) = b = r, which by BZAx(1.3) is also fine.
The ordering on Z[a,b] is the same as the usual ordering on Z, which means that
< in K[a,b] is still a strict total order, hence ZAx(5)-ZAx(7) are satisfied. As with
Z, for every p ∈ (Z[a,b] \ {b}) the value of S(p) = p + 1 is greater than p, hence
BZAx(3.1) is true in K.
Also, as in Z for each q ∈ Z[a,b] there are no elements of Z[a,b] between q and S(q).
Since if q = b then S(q) = q, and otherwise if there existed an element between q
and S(q) then it would also be present in Z, which would mean that Z would not
satisfy ZAx(4). However from Proposition A.1.6 we know that ZAx(4) is satisfied
in Z, hence it is also true in K[a,b]. Finally BZAx(3.2) and BZAx(3.3) are satisfied
as clearly by definition a is the least element of Z[a,b] and b is the greatest element
of Z[a,b]. o
Corollary 9.1.4 The bounded first-order integer successor axioms are finitely mod-
elable.
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Proposition 9.1.5 Let V = {<,S, 0ˇ, l, r} and V′ = {<,S, 0ˇ}. Let M be an FO=V -
model of BISA−.
Suppose that there exists a d ∈ dom(M) and an N ∈ N \ {0, 1} such that for any
m,n ∈ {0, . . . , N} if m 6= n then Sm(d) 6= Sn(d) in M, and for some j ∈ {0, . . . , N}
we have that Sl(d) = 0ˇ.
Let a = −j and b = N − j. Also let K[a,b] be as in Proposition 9.1.3. Then the
map µ : K[a,b] →M given by µ(n) = Sn(0ˇ) (where as in Proposition 8.0.14 S0(0ˇ) = 0ˇ
and S−m(0ˇ) = q iff Sm(q) = 0ˇ) is well-defined and such that:
• µ(0) = 0ˇ.
• For any p1 ∈ Z[a,b] \ {b} and p2 ∈ Z[a,b] we have p1 + 1 = p2 in K[a,b] iff
S(µ(p1)) = µ(p2) in M
1.
• For any p1, p2 ∈ Z[a,b] we have p1 < p2 in K[a,b] iff µ(p1) < µ(p2) in M.
Proof: By assumption µ is a well-defined mapping, as dom(K[a,b]) = Z[a,b], and so
for any p ∈ Z[a,b] we have µ(p) = Sp(0ˇ) = Sp(Sj(d)) = Sp+j(d).
Clearly by definition µ(0) = S0(0ˇ) = 0ˇ. Also for any p1 ∈ Z[a,b]\{b} and p2 ∈ Z[a,b]
if p1 +1 = p2 in K[a,b] then S(µ(p1)) = S(S
p1+j(d)) = Sp1+1+j(d) = Sp2+j(d) = µ(p2).
Now by BZAx(3.1) for any q in dom(M) we have q < S(q). By ZAx(7) < is
also defined to be a transitive relation, so since d < S(d), by induction we have
Sm(d) < Sn(d) for any m,n ∈ {0, . . . , N} such that m < n in N. Therefore if
p1 < p2 in K[a,b] then µ(p1) = S
p1+j(d) < Sp2+j(d) = µ(p2), and so µ(p1) < µ(p2) in
M.
Conversely, if p1 6< p2 in K[a,b] then p1 6 p2, and if p1 = p2 then by ZAx(5)
¬(µ(p1) < µ(p2)). Whereas if p2 < p1 in K[a,b] then µ(p2) < µ(p1) and by ZAx(6)
¬(µ(p1) < µ(p2)). Consequently p1 < p2 in K[a,b] iff µ(p1) < µ(p2) in M. o
1So µ is almost an embedding from K[a,b] to M, when looking at <, S and 0ˇ. The difference is
that S(b) = b in K[a,b], but this need not be true for µ(b) in M.
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We may now characterise a Turing machine computing a decision problem with a
finitely modelable FFOT machine in in a similar manner to how we characterised it
by a finite FO=-theory machine in Example 8.1.1.
Example 9.1.6 Let M = (Λ,Π,b,A, s0, 〈sa, sr〉,R) be a Turing machine which
computes the decision problem A ⊆ A∗, in time t : N→ N and space u : N→ N.
We can characterise M via the finite FO=BVM -machine:
BTM−M = (BTMT
−
M , Aˆ
∗
XTM
, {{I(h) = sa}, {I(h) = sr}}),
in the vocabulary of:
BVM = VM ∪ {l, r},
where VM is the vocabulary used in Example 5.1.1 and XTM is the input sequence
used in Example 5.1.1 . The theory of BTM−M is then:
BTMT−M = (TMTM \ (ISA ∪ ETR)) ∪BISA− ∪ ET ′R.
Where TMTM is the theory of TMM in Example 5.1.1. So the difference is that
BTMT−M contains the bounded integer successor axioms rather than the standard
integer successor axioms, also BTMT−M contains ET
′
R, which is a slightly modified
version of the set of sentences that implement the rules of R.
Specifically ET ′R is:
ET ′R =
 ∀x((0 < S(x)) ∧ µ(s,a)(x, x))→(µ(r,b)(S(x), x) ∧ pi′(p)(x) ∧ ν(x)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (s, a; r, b, p) ∈ R
 .
Where µ and ν are as in Example 5.1.1. Whereas instead of pi(p)(x), for each p ∈
{LEFT, PAUSE, RIGHT} we have the term:
pi′(p)(x) ≡

(H(S(x)) = S(H(x))) ∧ ¬(H(x) = S(H(x))) if p = RIGHT,
H(S(x)) = H(x) if p = PAUSE,
(S(H(S(x))) = H(x) ∧ ¬(H(S(x))) = S(H(S(x)))) if p = LEFT,
So for each rule of R we have the added condition that if the head moves right or
left, then it must move to a different tape cell. Otherwise the rules are implemented
in the same manner.
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Let G be an FO=VM -model of BTMT
−
M ∪ Φ∗XTM (w). By the input Φ∗XTM (w) =
{C(0, Si(0)) = wi | i ∈ {0, . . . , |w| − 1}} ∪ {C(0, S|w|(0)) = b} it follows that
G |=FO=
BVM
¬(C(0, Si(0)) = b) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , |w| − 1}, but also G |=FO=
BVM
C(0, S|w|(0)) = b. Hence G |=FO=
BVM
¬(Sm(0) = Sn(0)) for all m,n ∈ {0, . . . , |w|}
such that m 6= n. Therefore by Proposition 9.1.5 there is a map from K[0,|w|] onto G
which preserves 0, ordering and the successor function from 0 to |w| − 1. The sen-
tences defining the initial configuration of M on input w are the same as in Example
5.1.1, so the initial configuration of G is the same as M on cells 0 to |w|.
Further the sentences of ET ′R allow G to build on this, as they implement the
rules of R whilst (with the addition of pi′(p)(x)) also ensuring that if G needs to use
a tape cell outside of dom(K[0,|w|]) = Z[0,|w|] then such a tape cell is distinct from
every other tape cell in Z[0,|w|]. So by Proposition 9.1.5 we have a mapping onto
G from some large enough K[a,b] structure. Therefore by the same reasoning as in
Example 5.1.1 from time 0 to |w| the configurations of G must be the same as the
configurations of M on input w
Now, a key property of a halting Turing machine computation is that for any
two distinct time steps x1, x2 between 0 and the halting time, the configuration of
the machine at time x1 differs from the configuration of the machine at time x2.
As otherwise the machine would become stuck in an infinite loop. So in G this
means that there is some y such that ¬(C(x1, y) = C(x2, y)) in G, and therefore
¬(x1 = x2) in G for all x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , t(|w|)} such that x1 6= x2. Consequently
by Proposition 9.1.5 again we have a mapping onto G from a structure K[a,b], where
K[a,b] encompasses all of the time steps and tape cells used by the computation of
M on input w.
Therefore by the same reasoning as in Example 8.1.1, the entirety of the compu-
tation of M on input w occurs in G completely within the region of Z[a,b], eventually
reaching the state sa or the state sr and halting. As in Example 8.1.1 this output
is directly implied by the input, and so as M computes A, it follows that BTM−M is
able to compute A.
Now, regarding the resources that BTM−M computes A with. By the definition of
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the functions t and u the entirety of the computation of M on input w occurs only
on the tape between cells −u(|w|), and u(|w|), and takes place between time steps
0 and t(|w|).
Let a = −u(|w|) and b = max{t(|w|), u(|w|)}. It is therefore possible that G is
a BVM -expansion of K[a,b], as by Proposition 9.1.3, K[a,b] is a model of BISA
− ⊂
BTMT−M , and by our reasoning above the entirety of the computation of M on input
w may be described in G completely within the region of Z[a,b].
The cardinality of Z[a,b] is b− a + 1 = max{t(|w|), u(|w|)} + u(|w|). By Remark
2.2.3 we see that u(|w|) 6 t(|w|)+ |w|, hence |dom(G)| 6 2t(|w|)+2|w| = O(t(|w|)).
Consequently if t is a polynomial function, then BTM−M is able to compute A
with polynomial resources.
9.2 Boundedly Characterising Blakey’s factoriser
We conjecture that we should be able to describe a finitely bounded version of R
with a modification of the dense ordered field axioms DOF , in a similar manner to
how we described a bounded version of Z with BISA−, a modification of the first-
order integer successor axioms. For example, we could approximate R via a finite
structure with a domain of the form { a
m
| a ∈ {−m3, . . . ,m3}}, in which for elements
between −m and m addition can be defined as usual, whereas multiplication could
be such that a
m
× b
m
is equal to whichever element in the domain is nearest to ab
m2
.
As in Subsections 5.2.2 and 8.1.2, it should be possible to characterise Blakey’s
factorisation system with an FFOT machine that includes this modified version of
DOF . Blakey’s factorisation system acts within a bounded region and is designed
to output even with a degree of error. Indeed, if we define the partial derivatives
as we did in Equation 5.1 in Subsection 5.2.1 then they will be defined to be ap-
proximations to their true value. So the outputs will also be the same, provided
that each model of the system is sufficiently precise. To ensure that we do have
enough precision we can define within the theory for the error of the model 1
m
to
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be sufficiently small in relation to the input. For example for an input of n ∈ N we
may have ( 1
m
× n× n× n) 6 1, ensuring that 1
m
6 1
n3
.
Now regarding the resource usage of such a machine. Clearly inputting n should,
in general, give a different output to inputting n + 1. Hence there must be a clear
separation between 1
2
√
n
and 1
2
√
n+1
, which means that in order to implement the
device, the error 1
m
must be less than | 1
2
√
n+1
− 1
2
√
n
|. This error shrinks at an inverse
polynomial rate with respect to n, and at an inverse exponential rate with respect
to the length of n’s binary expansion. By the definition of the factoriser, the domain
of any model of it must at least contain 0 and 1, and between these two numbers
there are at least m elements of the domain. Therefore, as m grows exponentially
with the size of the input, so must the minimal domain size.
We therefore conclude that such a FFOT machine requires super-polynomial re-
sources in order to compute the factorisation problem, agreeing with Blakey’s [17]
assertion that his factoriser requires an infeasibly large resource growth.
9.3 Efficient Computation and NP ∩ co-NP.
As we mentioned before in Subsection 9.0.2 we argue that a computational problem is
efficiently computable by a randomness-free physical system only if it is computable
by FFOT machine with polynomial resources. In this section we offer an answer to
what this class of problems is.
Theorem 9.3.1 A problem is computable by a FFOT machine with polynomial
resources if and only if it is in NP ∩ co-NP.
Proof: (⇒) Let p : N→ N be a polynomial function and M = (T, I,O) be a FFOT
machine in the vocabulary V which computes A ⊆ A∗ with p resources.
By assumption, for some simple sequence X and some Θ,Ψ ∈ O, we have Aˆ∗X ⊆ I
and for each w ∈ A∗ there is a finite FOV-structure A satisfying T ∪ Φ∗X(w) with
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|dom(A)| 6 p(|w|). Also if w ∈ A then A |=FOV Θ and if w 6∈ A then A |=FOV Ψ.
We can non-deterministically obtain such a structure as follows.
Let V contain m relations, k functions, and r constant symbols, also let each
relation and function symbol have an arity at most l. We can encode each ele-
ment of dom(A) as a word in {0, 1}p(|w|). Each relation can then be encoded as
a string of length O(p(|w|)l) by simply listing the strings representing the related
elements. Similarly each function can be encoded by a string of length O(p(|w|)l+1)
and each constant by a string of length O(p(|w|)). We can therefore encode an
exact description of A by a single finite word ρw ∈ {0, 1}q(|w|), where q(n) =
O(m · p(n)l + k · p(n)l+1 + r · p(n)), which is polynomial in the length of w.
In a fixed domain dom(A) a sentence of the form ∀xφ(x) is true iff the sentence∧
a∈dom(A) φ(a) is true. Similarly ∃xψ(x) is true iff
∨
b∈dom(A) ψ(b) is true. Hence to
check if:
∀x1∃x2 · · · ∀xm−1∃xmθ(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ T,
is true in A it is sufficient to determine whether:∧
a1∈dom(A)
∨
a2∈dom(A)
· · ·
∧
am−1∈dom(A)
∨
am∈dom(A)
θ(a1, . . . , am),
is true in A. This can be achieved by checking whether θ(a1, . . . , am) is true in at
most |dom(A)|m assignments.
There is a fixed number of sentences in T and the number of quantifiers in each
one is fixed, hence the time taken to test whether A |=FOV T grows polynomially
with |w|. The number of sentences in Φ∗X(w) is equal to |w|+ 1 and each sentence in
Φ∗X(w) is a quantifier-free sentence whose length grows linearly with |w|, therefore
the time to determine whether A models Φ∗X(w) also takes time polynomial in |w|.
We can therefore construct a non-deterministic Turing machine M1, that given
any input w ∈ A∗, tries to non-deterministically generate a description ρw of some
structure A modelling T ∪ Φ∗X(w). After generating ρw the machine checks in poly-
nomially many steps whether each sentence of T ∪ Φ∗X(w) is true in A. If it does
then M1 determines whether A |=FOV Θ.
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As Θ is a fixed finite set of sentences, like T, this decision process can be carried
out in time polynomial in |w|. If A does FOV-model Θ then M1 accepts w. If any
sentence in T ∪Φ∗X(w)∪Θ is false in A then M1 halts. Thus if for all possible ρw we
have that Θ is false in any structure which models T ∪ Φ∗X(w) then M1 rejects w.
By assumption, for any w ∈ A∗, if A |=FOV T ∪ Φ∗X(w) then A |=FOV Θ iff
w ∈ A. Therefore M1 accepts w if and only if w ∈ A, and since M1 computes in
non-deterministic polynomial time we have that A ∈ NP.
Conversely to see that A ∈ co-NP we can construct a non-deterministic polyno-
mial time Turing machine M2 which acts the same as M1, except that M” checks
whether A models Ψ rather than Θ. By the same reasoning as above M2 accepts
w ∈ A∗ iff w ∈ A∗ \ A, therefore A∗ \ A ∈ NP and A ∈ co-NP. Thus by combining
this with the above result we have A ∈ NP ∩ co-NP.
(⇐) If B ∈ NP ∩ co-NP then B ∈ NP and A∗ \ B ∈ NP, hence there must exist
two non-deterministic polynomial time Turing machines N1, N2 that respectively
decide B and A∗ \ B. To avoid confusion we can assume without loss of generality
that N1 and N2 have disjoint sets of internal states.
We can then construct a finitely modelable FFOT machine BTM−(N1,N2) which
acts like a non-deterministic Turing machine that can implement the rules from
either N1 or N2. In addition BTM
−
(N1,N2)
is defined in such a way that it must
always produces a computational path which halts on the accepting state of N1 or
N2, any other computational path will lead to a logically inconsistency (see Figures
9.3 and 9.3). Such a computation will of course require only polynomial resources
(as N1 and N2 compute in polynomial time). So by simply looking at which of these
accepting states is reached by BTM−(N1,N2) on input Φ
∗
XTM
(w) we are able to compute
B with polynomial resources.
For each i ∈ {1, 2} let Ni = (Λi,Πi,b,A, s0i , 〈sai , sri〉,Ri). The machine has non-
deterministic rule set Ri, so for each (t, b) ∈ (Πi × Λi) let R(t,b)i denote the set of
rule suffixes of Ri that are prefixed by (t, b). If Ni is in state t reading b then any
one of the rule suffixes in R
(t,b)
i may be applied. Also (by relabelling if necessary)
let Π1 ∩ Π2 = ∅.
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Figure 9.1: The possible computation paths of N1 and N2 on input w.
In the vocabulary of V(N1,N2) = V
N1 ∪ VN2 ∪ {e} let:
BTM−(N1,N2) = (BTMT
−
(N1,N2)
, Aˆ∗X, {{I(h) = sa1}, {I(h) = sa2}}),
be an FO=V(N1,N2)
with theory:
BTMT−(N1,N2) = BISA
− ∪ CD=V(N1,N2) ∪ IT(s01 ,s02 ) ∪ ET
′
R1
∪ ET ′R2 ∪HT ′(sa1 ,sa2 ).
Where BISA− is the set of bounded integer successor axioms, and CD=V(N1,N2) is the
set of distinct constant axioms for V(N1,N2). Further, in a similar manner to Example
5.1.1, the set of sentences IT(s01 ,s02 ) defines the two possible initial configurations
of the machine, and the sets ET ′R1 and ET
′
R2
describe the two possible modes of
evolution of the machine. The set HT ′(sa1 ,sa2 ) ensures that the machine halts when
it reaches sa1 or sa2 , crucially HT
′
(sa1 ,sa2 )
also ensures that the machine must halt in
one of these states.
Specifically we have:
IT(s01 ,s02 ) =

(H(0) = 0),
(I(0) = s01) ∨ (I(0) = s02),
∀y(((C(0, y) = b) ∧ (0 < y))→ (C(0, S(y)) = b)),
∀y((y < 0)→ (C(0, y) = b))

.
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Which is the same as ITs0 , except for the fact that the initial state could begin in
either state s01 or state s02 . So as in Example 5.1.1, for any model H ofBTMT
−
(N1,N2)
∪
Φ∗XTM (w) the initial configuration of H is the same as it is for either N1 or N2 on
input w.
For each i ∈ {1, 2} the non-deterministic rules of Ri are implemented by:
ET ′Ri =
 ∀x (((0 < S(x)) ∧ µ(s,a)(x, x))→∨
(v,b,p)∈R(s,a)i
(µ(v,b)(S(x), x) ∧ pi′(p)(x) ∧ ν(x)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (s, a) ∈ (Πi × Λi)
 .
Where µ and ν are as they are in Example 5.1.1, and pi′(p), is as it is in Example 9.1.6.
So for each set R
(s,a)
i each sentence of ET
′
Ri
implements a rule of Ri beginning with
(s, a). Exactly which rule is implemented is not specified, however two different rules
of R
(s,a)
i cannot be implemented simultaneously as this would lead to a contradiction.
By the same reasoning as in Example 9.1.6 it follows from BISA− ∪ IT(s01 ,s02 ) ∪
ET ′R1 ∪ ET ′R2 in BTMT−(N1,N2), and Proposition 9.1.5 that any possible the compu-
tation of N1 or N2 takes place within a bounded region corresponding to Z[a,b] in
H.
Now by the same reasoning as in Example 5.1.1, if the configuration of H at time
x is the same as a possible configuration of Ni at time x then the configuration of
H at time x+ 1 is also a possible configuration of Ni at time x+ 1.
Finally for halting we have:
HT ′(sa1 ,sa2 ) =

∀x((I(x) = sa1)→ (h = x)),
∀x((I(x) = sa2)→ (h = x)),
∀x(¬(I(x) = sr1) ∧ ¬(I(x) = sr2)),
(I(h) = sa1) ∨ (I(h) = sa2)

.
Which corresponds to HT(sa,sr), with sa and sr replaced by sa1 and sa2 , together with
(crucially) the last two sentences which state that the rejecting states can never be
reached, and any model H must eventually halt in one of the two accept states.
So if at time x the machine is in the internal state sa1 or the internal state sa2
then x = h in H. The output {I(h) = sa1} or {I(h) = sa2} is therefore defined at
this time.
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w
η
N1 N2
Figure 9.2: A computation path that may occur within H.
So the configuration of H at time 0, along with the configuration evolution of H
is same as N1 and N2 with input w. Therefore by induction, for any x ∈ N the
configuration of H at time x is a possible configuration of N1 or N2 at time x. By
HT ′(sa1 ,sa2 ) no computation happening in H can be a rejecting computation, as if so
then sr1 or sr2 would eventually be reached.
Hence any computation that happens in H must be an accepting computation,
and if w ∈ B then H must describe a computation of N1 that ends in state sa1 , as
any computation of N2 on input w would end in the reject state sr2 . Conversely if
w ∈ A∗ \B then H must describe a computation of N2 that ends in state sa2 .
This means that H |=FO= (I(h) = sa1) iff w ∈ B. So BTM−(N1,N2) is able
to compute B. Now we also know that any accepting computation of N1 or N2
takes a polynomial number of time steps (and so uses a polynomial number of tape
squares). Therefore by our reasoning in Example 9.1.6 and the fact that BISA− ⊂
BTMT−(N1,N2) we know that there exists a model H of BTMT
−
(N1,N2)
∪Φ∗XTM (w) such
that |dom(H)| is polynomial in |w|.
Consequently BTM−(N1,N2) is able to compute B in polynomial resources. o
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The FFOT machine described in the above proof will only follow a computational
path if that path eventually leads to an accept state. The only way the machine
could know which paths to take would be if potential future states are somehow
able to influence the present states. The above theory machine therefore acts in a
non-causal and somewhat atemporal manner, whilst still being clearly bounded in
its computational capabilities.
Hence if P 6= NP ∩ co-NP then our result implies that atemporal/non-causal
physical computation is more powerful then classical sequential computation.
The problems with known quantum polynomial time algorithms that are believed
to lie in BQP \ P can all be phrased as a hidden subgroup problem [59], which also
lies in NP ∩ co-NP. Our result therefore adds further evidence to the idea that [5]
the source of the quantum computational speed-up lies in quantum computers being
able to act in an atemporal/non-causal manner.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and Further Work
In this document we have presented the concept of a theory machine, and demon-
strated how we can use theory machines equipped with various logical systems to
characterise different computational devices, both “physical” and “unphysical”. We
have also argued that any realisable physical computer (including, potentially, a non-
causally acting one) should be characterisable by a theory machine acting within a
complete logical system (such as first-order logic).
In Chapter 9 we argued that we can describe the resources used by a theory
machine computation by considering the minimal domain size of its satisfying mod-
els. We can then use this complexity measure to describe the resource usage of any
system which is characterised by this theory machine.
However, in Remark 9.0.11 we noted that an issue with this complexity measure is
that it does not faithfully capture the resource usage of a probabilistic computation.
We suspect that a solution to this issue is to look at the size of the quantifier-free
LS-sentences that completely describe a given LS-structure. In first-order logic
any structure of size N may be described by a quantifier-free sentence of size O(N).
However using some form of probabilistic logic [60] we believe that a probabilistic
Turing machine computation with time bound N and O(2N) computation paths
may be completely described by a probabilistic sentence of length O(N)
We believe that we should also be able to faithfully capture quantum complexity
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using this modification of theory machine complexity. Indeed we suspect that any
polynomial time quantum computation can be non-causally characterised with a
polynomially-resourced theory machine that uses a classical probabilistic logic. A
possible non-causal model for quantum computation that this theory machine could
describe is the two-state vector formalism [1, 2].
Another future avenue of research is to look into more general classes of theory
machine input and output sets, instead of just words fromA∗ orAω. For example one
might consider words of ordinal length, such as the kind that the ordinal computers
of Koepke and Koerwien [51] can operate on. Indeed we suspect that the class of
finite SO=-computable ordinal problems is equal to the constructible universe L,
which is class of problems that an ordinal computer is able to decide.
In general we believe that the computational capabilities of any computational
system S may be finitely captured by some logical system LS. That is, there
exists some logical system LS, for which a finite LS-theory machine is able to
characterise S, and the class of problems computable by S is equal to the class of
finite LS-computable problems.
We therefore believe that by studying computational systems via theory machines
we should be able to gain a clearer understanding of how and why distinct systems
differ in their ability to compute and their ability to efficiently compute.
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Axioms
“This is a one line proof... if we start sufficiently far to the left.” -
Unknown
In this appendix we list various standard sets of axioms that are used to define
theory machines in the main body of this document. We also note relevant results
for these sets.
A.1 Standard sets of axioms
A.1.1 Axioms for Equality
Definition A.1.1 In a vocabulary V for each k-ary relation R ∈ V and n-ary
function f ∈ V let:
EQ=R ≡ ∀x1 . . . ∀xk∀y1 . . . ∀yk
(
k∧
i=1
(xi = yi)→ (R(x1, . . . , xk)↔ R(y1, . . . , yk))
)
,
EQ=f ≡ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∀y1 . . . ∀yn
(
n∧
i=1
(xi = yi)→ (f(x1, . . . , xn) = f(y1, . . . , yn))
)
.
The V-equality axioms [31] for the binary relation =∈ V are then:
EQ=V = {EQ=V | V ∈ V} ∪

∀x(x = x),
∀x∀y(x = y)→ (y = x),
∀x∀y∀z((x = y) ∧ (y = z))→ (x = z)
 .
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So EQ=V states that = is an equivalence relation that preserves the truth of every
relation in V, as well as the value of each function assignment.
Remark A.1.2 Let LS be a logical system, and V be a vocabulary containing the
binary relation =′. If M |=LSV EQ=
′
V then it is possible that there may be two
elements p, q ∈ dom(M) where p 6= q but p =′ q in M. However in M the function
and relation assignments of p and q must be identical, so there is no way of knowing
within M that p and q are in fact distinct.
Indeed there must exist an LSV-structure M
′ which embeds into M and for any
p, q ∈ dom(M′) we have p =′ q iff p = q.
If LS=
′
is a logical system which consists of LS together with a true equality
relation =′1, then M′ is also an LS=
′
V -structure. Hence for any LSV-sentence φ
(which is also an LS=
′
V -sentence), φ is true in M iff φ is true in M
′. Therefore for
any LSV-theory T, we have T ∪ EQ=′V |=LSV φ iff T |=LS=′
V
φ.
A.1.2 Axioms for the Natural Numbers
Definition A.1.3 The set of Peano successor axioms [56] in the vocabulary of
{=, S, 0}, where = is a binary relation, S is a unary function and 0 is a constant, is:
PSA =

∀x¬(S(x) = 0),
∀x∀y((S(x) = S(y))→ (x = y)),
∀x¬(S(x) = x),
∀1N((N(0) ∧ (∀y(N(y)→ N(S(y))))→ ∀zN(z))

Recall from Definition 3.2.9 that ∀1Nφ(N) means that we are quantifying over all
unary relations.
Proposition A.1.4 [56] The Peano successor axioms are uniquely SO=-modelled
by the usual structure of the natural numbers 〈N;S, 0〉.
1Such as FO= or SO= in Subsection 3.2.1.
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A.1.3 Axioms for the Integers
Definition A.1.5 The set of integer successor axioms [56] in the vocabulary of
{=, <, S}, where =, < are binary relations and S is a unary function, is:
ISA =

ZAx(1) ∀x∀y(S(x) = S(y))→ (x = y),
ZAx(2) ∀x∃y(S(y) = x),
ZAx(3) ∀x(x < S(x)),
ZAx(4) ∀x¬∃y((x < y) ∧ (y < S(x)),
ZAx(5) ∀x¬(x < x),
ZAx(6) ∀x∀y((x < y)→ ¬(y < x)),
ZAx(7) ∀x∀y∀z((x < y) ∧ (y < z))→ (x < z),
ZAx(8) ∀1Z(((∃xZ(x)) ∧ (∀y(Z(y)↔ Z(S(y))))→ ∀zZ(z)),
ZAx(9) ∃1N(((∃xN(x)) ∧ (∀y(N(y)→ N(S(y))) ∧ (∃z¬N(z)))

.
Proposition A.1.6 Any SO=-model of ISA is isomorphic to the usual ordered
structure of the integers 〈Z;<,S〉.
Proof: ZAx(1), ZAx(2), ZAx(8), and ZAx(9) together with the convention that
every function and relation is total, is equivalent to the integer successor axioms
given in [56]. Hence every model of ISA with vocabulary V = {<,S} is isomorphic
to an expansion of the usual structure of the integers 〈Z;S〉 with successor function
S(x) = x+ 1.
Now if M |=SO=
V
ISA then by ZAx(5)-ZAx(7) < in M is a strict total order,
whilst ZAx(3) and ZAx(4) ensure that M = Z has ordering:
· · · < −2 < −1 < 0 < 1 < 2 < · · · .
Therefore M must be isomorphic to the usual ordered structure of the integers
〈Z;<,S〉. o
A.1.4 Axioms for the Real Numbers
Definition A.1.7 The set of real arithmetic axioms [3, 62] in the vocabulary of
VR = {=, <,+,×, 0, 1}, where =, < are binary relations, +,× are binary functions,
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and 0,1 are constants, is:
RAA =

RAx(1) ∀x∀y((x+ y) = (y + x)),
RAx(2) ∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y) + z) = (x+ (y + z))),
RAx(3) ∀x((x+ 0) = x),
RAx(4) ∀x∃y((x+ y) = 0),
RAx(5) ∀x∀y((x× y) = (y × x)),
RAx(6) ∀x∀y∀z(((x× y)× z) = (x× (y × z))),
RAx(7) ∀x((x× 1) = x),
RAx(8) ∀x(¬(x = 0)→ ∃y((x× y) = 1)),
RAx(9) ∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y)× z) = ((x× z) + (y × z))),
RAx(10) ∀x∀y((x < y) ∨ (x = y) ∨ (y < x)),
RAx(11) ∀x¬(x < x),
RAx(12) ∀x∀y((x < y)→ ¬(y < x)),
RAx(13) ∀x∀y∀z((x < y) ∧ (y < z))→ (x < z),
RAx(14) ∀x∀y∀z(x < y)→ ((x+ z) < (y + z)),
RAx(15) ∀x∀y(((0 < x) ∧ (0 < y))→ (0 < (x× y))),
RAx(16)
∀1Q((∃uQ(u)∧∃v∀w(Q(w)→ (w < v)))
→ ∃x∀y(∀z(Q(z)→ (z < y))↔ (x 6 y)))

.
Proposition A.1.8 [3, 62] Any SO=-model of RAA is isomorphic to the usual
structure of real arithmetic 〈R;<,+,×, 0, 1〉.
A.1.5 Axioms for the Complex Numbers
Definition A.1.9 The set of complex arithmetic axioms [62] in the vocabulary of
VR ∪ {R, i}, where VR = {=, <,+,×, 0, 1} is as in Definition A.1.7, R is a unary
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relation, and i is a constant, is:
CAA = RAAR∪PRVR∪

CAx(1) ∀x∀y((x+ y) = (y + x)),
CAx(2) ∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y) + z) = (x+ (y + z))),
CAx(3) ∀x((x+ 0) = x),
CAx(4) ∀x∃y((x+ y) = 0),
CAx(5) ∀x∀y((x× y) = (y × x)),
CAx(6) ∀x∀y∀z(((x× y)× z) = (x× (y × z))),
CAx(7) ∀x((x× 1) = x),
CAx(8) ∀x¬(x = 0)→ ∃y((x× y) = 1),
CAx(9) ∀x∀y∀z(((x+ y)× z) = ((x× z) + (y × z))),
CAx(10) ((i× i) + 1) = 0,
CAx(11) ∀x∃y∃z(x = (y + (z × i)))

.
Recall from Definition 6.1.4 that RAAR denotes the axioms of RAA from Definition
A.1.7 sorted by the relation R, so they are only true when R is true. Whereas as
in Definition 6.1.6, PRVR is the set of R-preservation sentences for VR, meaning that
the subset in which R is true contains 0, 1 ∈ VR and is closed under the + and ×
functions.
Proposition A.1.10 [62] Any SO=-model of CAA is isomorphic to the usual struc-
ture of complex arithmetic 〈C;<,R,+,×, 0, 1, i〉.
When characterising a quantum computer in Examples 7.1.3-7.1.6 we use the fol-
lowing set of axioms to define some well-known functions, relations and constants
on C.
Definition A.1.11 The set of additional complex axioms in the vocabulary of VC∪
{6,N,−, /, ·2,√·, | · |, 2∧, 2, eipi4 } where 6 is a binary relation, N is a unary relation,
−, / are binary functions, ·2,√·, | · |, 2∧ are unary functions, and 2, eipi4 are constants,
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is:
ACA =

Def(6) ∀Rx∀Ry(x 6 y)↔ ((x < y) ∨ (x = y)),
Def1(N) N(0),
Def2(N) ∀Rx((0 6 x)→ (N(x)↔ N(x+ 1))),
Def3(N) ∀Rx(((x < 1) ∧ ¬(x = 0)))→ ¬N(x)),
Def(−) ∀x∀y∀z(x = (y + z))→ ((x− y) = z),
Def(/) ∀x∀y∀z(¬(y = 0) ∧ (x = (y × z)))→ ((x/y) = z),
Def(·2) ∀x(x2 = (x× x)),
Def(
√·) ∀Rx((0 6 x)→ ((√x×√x) = x)),
Def(| · |) ∀x∀Ry∀Rz(x = (y + (z × i)))→ (|x| = √y2 + z2)),
Def1(2
∧) (2∧(0)) = 1,
Def2(2
∧) ∀Nx(2∧(x+ 1) = ((2∧(x))× 2)),
Def(2) 2 = (1 + 1),
Def(ei
pi
4 ) ((ei
pi
4 )2 = i) ∧ (∀Rx∀Ry((x+ (i× y)) = eipi4 )→ (0 < x))

.
We denote the additional complex vocabulary by:
VC+ = {6,N,−, /, ·2,
√·, | · |, 2∧, 2, eipi4 }.
Proposition A.1.12 If B is an SO=-model of CAA ∪ ACA then B is isomor-
phic to the usual structure of complex arithmetic 〈C;<,6,R,N,+,−,×, /, ·2,√·, | ·
|, 2∧, 0, 1, 2, i〉 with:
• The less than or equal to relation “6”,
• The characteristic relation of the natural numbers “N”,
• The negation function “−”,
• The division function “/”,
• The squaring function “ ·2”,
• The square root function “√·”,
• The modulus function “ | · |”,
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• The powers of 2 function “2∧”,
• The number 2,
• The number eipi4 ,
all defined as usual on dom(B) = C. However if y = 0 then x/y may take any value
in C. Similarly if z 6∈ R or z < 0, and if n 6∈ N then √z and 2∧(n) may have any
value in C.
Proof: By Proposition A.1.10 any SO=-model of CAA is an expansion of the usual
model of the complex numbers.
Now clearly Def(6) defines x 6 y on C in its usual manner if R(x)∧R(y) is true.
The same is similarly true for Def(−), Def(/), Def(·2), Def(√), Def(| · |), and Def(2)
which define −, /, ·2,√,| · |, and 2 respectively.
Def(/) does not define x/y for y = 0. However x/y must take some value in C as
every function in an SO=-structure is total, so as it is undefined x/y can take any
value of C in B. The same is true for the undefined values of
√
z and 2∧(n).
The fact that N(x) is true in B for x ∈ C iff x ∈ N follows by Def1(N)−Def3(N)
and induction. By Def1(N) we have that N(0) is true in B, and Def2(N) provides
the inductive step to ensure that N(x) is true in B if x ∈ N. Conversely, if x ∈ R\N
and x < 1 and x 6= 0 then by Def3(N) we have that N(x) is false in B.
The function 2∧ is defined inductively Def1(2∧) and Def2(2∧) to be such that
2∧n = 2n for each natural number n ∈ N, as by the usual definition of exponentiation
20 = 1 and 2x+1 = 2x × 2.
Finally Def(ei
pi
4 ) defines the constant ei
pi
4 to have its usual value in C. As if
z2 = i = ei
pi
2 then either z = ei
pi
4 = 1√
2
+ 1√
2
i or z = ei
5pi
4 = − 1√
2
− 1√
2
i. So if in
addition the real part of z is greater 0, then it must be the case z = ei
pi
4 . o
Corollary A.1.13 If C is an FOC-model of ACA then C is isomorphic to the usual
structure of complex arithmetic in which the conditions of Proposition A.1.12 hold.
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Proof: By definition, any FOC-structure is an expansion of the usual structure of
complex arithmetic, so if C is an FOC-model of ACA we may follow the proof of
Proposition A.1.12 to show that the conditions of Proposition A.1.12 hold for C. o
A.1.6 Axioms for the Ordinals
As noted in Definition 2.5.3 the ordinal numbers serve as an extension of the natural
numbers, and each ordinal number corresponds to the order type of a well-order.
Definition A.1.14 [25, 64] The set of ordinal successor axioms in the vocabulary
of {=, <, L, S, 0}, where =, < are binary relations, L is a unary relation, S is a unary
function and 0 is a constant, is:
OSA =

OAx(1) ∀x¬(S(x) = 0),
OAx(2) ∀x∀y(S(x) = S(y))→ (x = y),
OAx(3) ∀x¬(S(x) = x),
OAx(4) ∀x(¬(x = 0)→ (0 < x)),
OAx(5) ∀x(x < S(x)),
OAx(6) ∀x¬(x < x),
OAx(7) ∀x∀y((x < y)→ ¬(y < x)),
OAx(8) ∀x∀y∀z((x < y) ∧ (y < z))→ (x < z),
OAx(9) ∀x(L(x)↔ (¬∃y(S(y) = x) ∧ ¬(x = 0))),
OAx(10)
∀1R(∃x(R(x)))
→ ∃y(R(y) ∧ ∀z(R(z)→ ((y < z) ∨ (y = z))))

.
OAx(10) is commonly known as the well-ordering axiom.
Proposition A.1.15 Every SO=-model of the ordinal successor axioms is isomor-
phic to a limit ordinal structure of the form 〈Oλ; =, <, L, S, 0〉 where for some limit
ordinal λ we have:
Oλ = {σ ∈ ORD | σ < λ},
and L(p) is true iff p ∈ Oλ is a limit ordinal.
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Proof: Let M |=SO= OSA, then < in M must be strict total and discrete well-
order with least element 0, such that for any γ ∈ M the least element of M that
is greater than γ is S(γ). Therefore M must be isomorphic to an ordinal structure
with domain of the form:
Oδ = {σ ∈ ORD | σ < δ},
for some ordinal δ. Now by convention any SO=V -structure is closed under any
function in V. So for every γ ∈ Oδ the ordinal S(γ) must be contained within Oδ,
hence δ cannot be a successor ordinal, and as Oδ is non-empty δ must be a limit
ordinal.
By OAx(9), for any p ∈ dom(M), we have L(p) is true iff p 6= 0 and there does
not exist some q ∈ dom(M) such that S(q) = p. So clearly p cannot be 0 or a
successor ordinal, hence p must be a limit ordinal. o
For our characterisation of an infinite time Turing machine computation in Section
7.2 it is necessary that such a computation does not end prematurely. We avoid this
by ensuring that the computation occurs within an uncountable ordinal number of
time steps. Hence we have the following definition.
Definition A.1.16 The set of uncountable ordinal successor axioms in the vocab-
ulary of {=, <, L, S, 0}, where =, < are binary relations, L is a unary relation, S is
a unary function and 0 is a constant, is:
UOSA = OSA∪
 UOAx ¬∃
1
(f∀x∀y(¬(x = y) → ¬(f(x) = f(y)))
∧ ∀z∀δ(L(δ)→ (f(z) < δ)))
 .
Recall from Definition 3.2.9 that ∃1fφ(f) means that we are quantifying over unary
functions.
Proposition A.1.17 Every SO=-model of the uncountable ordinal successor ax-
ioms is isomorphic to an uncountable limit ordinal structure.
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Proof: Since OSA ⊂ UOSA, by Proposition A.1.15, every SO=-model of UOSA is
isomorphic to a limit ordinal structure of the form W = 〈Oλ; =, <, L, S, 0〉 for some
limit ordinal λ.
Now UOAx implies that there cannot exist a function f in W such that f is an
injection, and f(z) is less than any limit ordinal. ω is the least limit ordinal and the
ordinals below it are exactly the numbers contained within N. So if f did exist then
it would be an injective mapping from Oλ to N, and so by definition Oλ would be
countable. Therefore since such a function f cannot exist, Oλ must be uncountable.
o
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